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ABSTRACT: This thesis consists of four studies. The ﬁrst study examines wage dif-
ferentials between women and men in the Finnish manufacturing sector. A matched
employer-employee data set is used to decompose the overall gender wage gap into the
contributions of sex diﬀerences in human capital, labour market segregation, and residual
within-job wage diﬀerentials. The topic of the second study is the relationship between
the extended unemployment beneﬁts and labour market transitions of older workers. The
analysis exploits a quasi-experimental setting caused by a change in the law that raised
the eligibility age of workers beneﬁting from extended beneﬁts. Roughly half of the un-
employed workers with extended beneﬁts are estimated to be eﬀectively withdrawn from
labour market search. The risk of unemployment declined and the re-employment prob-
ability increased among the age groups directly aﬀected by the reform. The third study
provides an empirical analysis of a structural equilibrium search model. Estimation re-
sults from various model speciﬁcations are compared and discussed. The last study is a
methodological study where the diﬃculties of interpreting the results of competing risks
hazard models are discussed and a solution for a particular class of models is proposed. It
is argued that a common practice of reporting the results of qualitative response models in
terms of marginal eﬀects is also useful in the context of competing risks duration models.
Keywords: Gender wage diﬀerentials, unemployment duration, early retire-
ment, competing risks models.
TIIVISTELMÄ: Tutkielma koostuu neljästä tutkimuksesta. Ensimmäinen käsittelee
naisten ja miesten välisiä palkkaeroja tehdasteollisuudessa. Yhdistetyn työnantaja-työnte-
kijäaineiston avulla kokonaispalkkaero hajotetaan osiin, jotka kuvastavat sukupuolten
välisiä eroja taustaominaisuuksissa, työmarkkinoiden segregoitumista ja työtehtävien sisäi-
siä palkkaeroja. Toinen tutkimus käsittelee laajennetun työttömyyspäivärahaoikeuden
vaikutusta ikääntyneiden työmarkkinasiirtymiin. Empiirisessä analyysissä hyödynnetään
lakimuutosta, jonka myötä laajennetun päivärahaoikeuden alaikäraja nousi. Tulosten
mukaan joka toinen laajennetun päivärahaoikeuden piirissä oleva on käytännössä työ-
markkinoiden ulkopuolella. Työttömyysriski laski ja työllistyminen kasvoi ikäryhmissä,
jotka menettivät laajennetun päivärahaoikeutensa lakiuudistuksen myötä. Kolmannessa
tutkimuksessa keskitytään työmarkkinoiden etsintäteoreettisiin rakennemalleihin. Useita
eri mallispesiﬁkaatioita estimoidaan ja niiden tuloksia vertaillaan. Viimeisessä tutkimuk-
sessa pohditaan kilpailevien riskien duraatiomallien tulosten raportoinnin vaikeutta. Tut-
kimuksessa esitetään tietylle malliperheelle ratkaisu perustuen marginaalivaikutusten las-
kemiseen, mikä on yleinen käytäntö useiden diskreetin valinnan mallien yhteydessä. Tutki-
muksessa väitetään, että sama käytäntö on hyödyllinen myös kilpailevien riskien duraa-
tiomallien yhteydessä.
Asiasanat: Sukupuolten väliset palkkaerot, työttömyyden kesto, varhaiseläke,
kilpailevien riskien malli.
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Chapter I
Overview of the Thesis
This thesis consists of four studies. The ﬁrst study examines wage diﬀerentials between
women and men. The second one analyses the relationship between the extended un-
employment beneﬁts and labour market transitions of older workers. These studies are
typical reduced-form microeconometric applications where no structural restrictions from
economic theory are imposed. A rather diﬀerent approach is taken in the third study,
which provides an empirical analysis of a structural equilibrium search model. The last
study is a methodological study where the diﬃculties of interpreting the results of com-
peting risks hazard models are discussed and a solution for a particular class of models
is proposed. Despite the apparent dissimilarities, the topics of the studies are related,
though not very closely, and they have much in common in the statistical methods and
data used. This chapter gives a brief overview of the studies and explains how they are
related to each other. To motivate the diﬀerent approach of the third study, we discuss
some advantages and limitations of the structural equilibrium analysis compared with the
reduced-form approaches followed in the ﬁrst two studies. The topic of the last study
is inspired by an econometric issue of competing risks duration analysis that arises in a
speciﬁc context in the second study.
The ﬁrst study in Chapter II contributes to a huge body of literature on gender wage
diﬀerentials. It is well known that women are paid less on average than men in virtually
all labour markets (e.g. Blau and Kahn, 1995, 2000). The Finnish labour market is no
exception, and women are found to receive about a sixth and a quarter lower wages than
men do among blue- and white-collar workers, respectively. The gender wage gaps of these
sizes are well in line with evidence from other advanced countries. Wage diﬀerentials
between women and men can arise in a variety of ways. The distribution of the sexes
typically varies across occupations, industries, ﬁrms, and jobs, resulting in gender wage
diﬀerentials in favour of men if the labour market segments occupied primarily by women
are lower paid on average than those dominated by men. Employers may also pay lower
wages to their female workers than male workers for the same job, which leads to within-
job wage diﬀerentials between women and men. Such diﬀerentials, to the extent that
they do not arise from diﬀerences in eﬀort or human capital, can be interpreted as wage
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discrimination against women.
Identifying the diﬀerent sources of wage diﬀerentials is crucial to understanding why the
gender gap in pay persistently exists. Due to the increasing availability of comprehensive
matched employer-employee data, this old issue has been reappraised in a number of
recent studies. With such a data set one can study wage diﬀerentials within narrowly
deﬁned job categories between women and men who are working for the same employer
(see e.g. Petersen and Morgan, 1995, Petersen et al., 1997, Meyersson Milgrom et al., 2001,
Groshen, 1991, Datta Gupta and Rothstein, 2001, and Bayard et al., 2003). Exploiting this
sort of matched data the overall gender wage gap can be decomposed into the contributions
of sex diﬀerences in human capital, labour market segregation, and residual within-job
wage diﬀerentials.
In Chapter II we study wage diﬀerentials between sexes in the Finnish manufacturing
sector using a large matched employer-employee data set. Our approach departs from the
existing sex segregation literature in that we explicitly model wage diﬀerentials between
ﬁrms and jobs. We view the data as having a nested structure with three levels: ﬁrms,
jobs within ﬁrms, and workers in jobs within ﬁrms. To account for this hierarchical data
structure we estimate a correlated random eﬀects model. In the second stage we decompose
the raw gender wage gap among blue- and white-collar workers using the regression results
and sample moments. We make use of information on the job complexity level, measuring
the responsibility, skills, and eﬀort required by a given job, to explain wage diﬀerentials
between jobs. This unique feature of our data allows us to asses whether wage diﬀerentials
between typical female and male jobs can be viewed as justiﬁed or not, a question that is
beyond the scope of earlier literature.
We ﬁnd that the major part of gender wage diﬀerentials among white-collar work-
ers stems from the disproportionate concentration of women in lower-paying jobs within
ﬁrms. Within ﬁrms high-paid managerial jobs are mainly occupied by men, and among
non-managerial jobs men are concentrated in positions with higher skill requirements.
Even after controlling for the complexity level and skill requirement of white-collar jobs,
predominantly female jobs are associated with lower wages. In contrast to while-collar
workers, a large part of the gender wage diﬀerentials of blue-collar workers is attributed to
sex segregation among ﬁrms. The origin of lower pay in ﬁrms with a relatively high share
of female blue-collar workers remains a puzzle, however. For both groups of workers we
ﬁnd women to be paid less than their equally qualiﬁed male co-workers within narrowly
deﬁned jobs within ﬁrms. Eliminating the sources of unexplained within-job wage diﬀer-
entials between sexes can at most account for a quarter of the overall gap of white-collar
workers and one-ﬁfth of the overall gap of blue-collar workers.
Whereas the sources of gender wage diﬀerentials have been disputed for decades, the
topic of Chapter III has not attracted so much attention until recently. The tendency of
older workers to withdraw from the labour market at ages well below the oﬃcial retire-
ment age is of growing concern in many OECD countries where the populations are ageing
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rapidly while people are living longer (see Gruber and Wise, 1998, and OECD, 2002). The
ﬁnancial pressure caused by these trends has led many governments to change their policies
with respect to early retirement. Unemployment-related beneﬁts eﬀectively provide a par-
ticular pathway to early withdrawal from the labour market in many European countries
(Duval, 2003). In Finland the entitlement period of unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts
of workers above a given age threshold is extended until age 60 when they can retire via
a particular unemployment pension scheme. This scheme, known as the unemployment
tunnel, eﬀectively provides an indeﬁnite period of UI beneﬁts for the elderly unemployed.
It facilitates the withdrawal of ageing workers from the labour market several years before
the oﬃcial retirement age of 65. In 1997 the eligibility age of workers beneﬁting from
extended beneﬁts was raised from 53 to 55. As a result, the entitlement period for the
age group 53-54 was eﬀectively reduced to the maximum of two years, while the other
age groups remained unaﬀected by the reform. In Chapter III we take advantage of this
quasi-experimental setting to study the eﬀects of extended beneﬁts on the incidence and
duration of unemployment among elderly workers.
In the ﬁrst stage we examine the eﬀect of the 1997 reform on the inﬂow to unemploy-
ment. This eﬀect turns out to be very strong. We ﬁnd that disproportionate numbers of
dismissals fall on employees who are old enough to be entitled to the extended UI period.
Large employers, especially, are shown to exploit this feature of the UI system to get rid
of their elderly employees, as a reasonable income level until retirement is fully secured
for them. In the second stage we examine the eﬀect of extended UI beneﬁts on the labour
market transitions of the elderly unemployed. We compare the unemployment experiences
of the group aﬀected by the reform under two schemes: the extended UI entitlement period
(pre-reform scheme) and the conventional UI period of two years (post-reform scheme). A
younger group is used to eliminate the business cycle eﬀect in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
setting. Our analysis follows a growing literature that exploits policy reforms to iden-
tify the eﬀects of diﬀerent aspects of UI on unemployment duration (e.g. Hunt, 1995,
Winter-Ebmer, 1998, Bratberg and Vaage, 2000, Card and Levine, 2000, Carling et al.,
2001, Røed and Zhang, 2003, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004, Uusitalo and Moisala, 2003,
and Lalive et al., 2006). A novel feature of our analysis is that we explicitly allow for
some older workers, registered as unemployed job seekers, to eﬀectively withdraw from job
search and simply wait for access to early retirement by applying a competing risks version
of a split population duration (see Schmidt and Witte, 1989, Abbring, 2002, and Addison
and Portugal, 2003, for discussion on this class of duration models). The idea is to model
simultaneously both the likelihood that the worker is still active in the labour market and
the timing of exit to various end-states conditional on being active. This approach allows
us to distinguish the participation decision from labour market behaviour in the case of
continued search.
We ﬁnd that some half of those who are entitled to extended UI beneﬁts are eﬀectively
withdrawn from the labour market. The likelihood of labour market withdrawal varies
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with occupation, the level of UI beneﬁts, and the size of the past employer. There are no
notable discrepancies in the employment hazards between active workers with extended
UI beneﬁts and those with the entitlement period of two years. However, active workers
with extended UI beneﬁts have much lower transition rates to labour market programmes
and non-participation (prior to access to early retirement). As a consequence, compared
with those who will lose their beneﬁts after two years of unemployment, active workers
entitled to extended UI beneﬁts are more likely to enter employment but also more likely
to still be unemployed 36 months after entry to unemployment.
In Chapters II and III we perform reduced-form analyses where no structural restric-
tions from theoretical models are imposed. The rationale of this approach is to make robust
inference about the question of interest by making only minimal assumptions about the
process that generated the observed data. A cost of this robustness is that many inter-
esting policy questions are ruled out. To illustrate this point, consider the hypothetical
implementation of a comparable worth policy that would improve the complexity ranking
of some typical female jobs. From our data and regression estimates in Chapter II we could
compute the eﬀect of such a reform on the gender wage gap in a particular case where
all workers remain in their current jobs. But the change in the relative wages is likely to
induce more men to apply for these jobs, thereby leading to the change in the distribution
of sexes across all jobs. This would have an eﬀect on the size of the gender wage gap over
time; the eﬀect that cannot be predicted from our reduced-form results. We cannot predict
this eﬀect because the positions held by workers and the wage distribution are taken as
given, and hence our analysis is silent about the process through which the workers were
allocated to their current jobs. To sum up, although our empirical analysis implies some
scope for a comparable worth policy, we cannot give very meaningful predictions for the
eﬀects of such a policy intervention.
In Chapter III we show that the 1997 reform of the UI system decreased the inﬂow
and increased the outﬂow of unemployment among the age group directly aﬀected by the
reform. Compared with the analysis in Chapter II, we go further by estimating the behav-
ioural eﬀects associated with extended UI beneﬁts. By exploiting the quasi-experimental
setting caused by a change in the law, we identify these eﬀects without making assump-
tions about the optimization behaviour of the unemployed and employers. Because such
assumptions are always a crude simpliﬁcation of real-world behaviour, this is a clear ad-
vantage from the viewpoint of the robustness of our results. A disadvantage is that we
cannot say much about how the UI reform aﬀected the overall unemployment rate or
early retirement expenditures as a whole. It is possible that the decline in the incidence
and duration of unemployment among the group aged 53-54 occurred at the expense of
younger groups. Moreover, tightening the regulations of the unemployment tunnel scheme
might have increased the use of other exit routes, and thereby increased early retirement
expenditures. These sorts of general equilibrium eﬀects, which are often of primary inter-
est from the policy point of view, are beyond the scope of the partial approach adopted
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in Chapter III. In the absence of the policy reform, even the partial evaluation may be
infeasible without some sort of behavioural assumptions.
In Chapter IV we take a diﬀerent approach to the empirical analysis of labour market
issues. We discuss a particular class of equilibrium search models and their estimation
from micro-data. In these models wage dispersion arises as a result of search frictions in
the form of time it takes for ﬁrms and workers to ﬁnd matches that are acceptable to both
parties. In other words, wage diﬀerentials across workers, the topic of the ﬁrst study, are
in large part determined by the layoﬀ rate and the arrival rates of job oﬀers, the topics
of the second study. In the context of equilibrium models a policy reform or shock that
directly aﬀects some subgroup of ﬁrms or workers can change the behaviour of all agents
on both sides of the market, leading to changes in the equilibrium wage distribution and
unemployment rate. In this respect the equilibrium search models oﬀer a useful framework
for analysing many labour market issues.
When both sides of the labour market are modelled in a dynamic environment, a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions must be adopted to keep the model tractable. Despite the
simplifying assumptions, the equilibrium solutions are typically rather complex, involving
highly nonlinear functions of structural parameters. This makes the estimation of such
models diﬃcult. Typically, this sort of models is not estimated but calibrated. In calibra-
tion the author collects numbers from various sources for some parameters of the model
and solves the model with respect to the remaining set of parameters. This procedure looks
quite arbitrary at times, and therefore direct estimation of the structural parameters is
arguably a more proper way to proceed. Another issue is to which extent stylized equi-
librium search models are able to describe the real-world labour market. If the model has
not been tested with the data, the reader must be gullible to take the model’s predictions
seriously. Estimating equilibrium search models from micro-data produces more credible
parameter estimates, allows us to assess the model’s ﬁt, and yields valuable information
for developing a more rigorous basis for equilibrium labour market analysis.
In Section IV we consider the estimation of the various variants of the equilibrium
search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Since the key predictions of the Burdett-
Mortensen model are consistent with many stylized features of the labour market, the
various speciﬁcations of the model have been ﬁtted to data sets from diﬀerent countries
(e.g. Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, and Bunzel et al.,
2001). We give an introduction to equilibrium search theory along the lines of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps et al. (2002). Our focus lies on model speciﬁcations
where all workers are identical but employers may diﬀer in their production technology.
The structural parameters of the model can be recovered from data on unemployment
durations, job durations, and wages associated with jobs. We discuss diﬃculties in the
estimation of diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and compare results across model speciﬁcations and
worker groups. Because the main purpose of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) was to give an
explanation for wage diﬀerentials between observationally identical workers, we examine
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the performance of various speciﬁcations on the basis of their ﬁt to the wage data. Not
surprisingly, the simplest version of the Burdett-Mortensen model is found to give a poor
ﬁt. We need to introduce either measurement error in wages or employer heterogeneity in
terms of labour productivity in order to obtain an acceptable ﬁt to the wage data. These
more complex speciﬁcations are found to yield almost identical estimates for the layoﬀ
rate and the arrival rates of job oﬀers.
In Chapter V we leave the structural models again and discuss the diﬃculties of inter-
preting the results of competing risks duration models, an issue that arises in a particular
context in the second study. In Chapter III we describe the importance of eligibility for
extended UI beneﬁts by comparing the cumulative probabilities of leaving unemployment
via alternative routes between individuals covered by the two diﬀerent UI schemes. In this
way we summarise the eﬀects of extended beneﬁts on hazard functions for transitions to
employment, labour market programmes, and non-participation in a coherent and policy-
relevant way. We give also a simulated example where a longer UI entitlement period is
associated with a higher employment hazard but a lower probability of leaving unemploy-
ment for employment. In other words, the increase in the entitlement period increases
the transition rate to employment but decreases the overall probability of employment.
This example illustrates the risk of confusion about the interpretation of covariate eﬀects
in the competing risks analysis. In general, the eﬀect of a covariate on the hazard for
a particular cause can be very diﬀerent from its eﬀect on the likelihood of exiting from
that cause (Gray, 1988). This is because the latter eﬀect is a function of the eﬀects of
the covariate on all cause-speciﬁc hazards, making the interpretation of covariate eﬀects
in the competing risks hazard model diﬃcult. This issue has been overlooked in many
econometric applications of competing risks data, an important exception being Thomas
(1996).
In the context of some qualitative response models, like multinominal logit and ordered
probit models, the analogous issue arises. As a consequence, the results of such models
are usually reported in terms of the marginal eﬀects, the eﬀects of explanatory variables
on the probability of interest. In Chapter IV we argue that a similar practice is equally
useful in the context of competing risks models as well. More precisely, we consider the
eﬀects of covariates on the cumulative probability of exiting from a particular cause by
a given time. These "marginal eﬀects" are decomposed into direct eﬀects via the hazard
of interest and indirect eﬀects via the competing hazards. We show that the marginal
eﬀects have simple closed-form solutions for a popular class of competing risks models
with piecewise constant hazard functions. As a consequence, the marginal eﬀects can
be computed rather easily for this class from the standard hazard function estimates.
Our main points are illustrated with an empirical application. We estimate a competing
risks model of unemployment duration with distinct hazards for exits to employment,
labour market programmes, and out of the labour force. We ﬁnd clear diﬀerences, both
in quantitative and qualitative terms, between the eﬀects of covariates on cause-speciﬁc
8
hazards and their marginal eﬀects on the associated cumulative exit probabilities. In
addition, by examining the distributions of marginal eﬀects across individuals, we illustrate
how marginal eﬀects may work in opposite directions for diﬀerent subgroups.
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Chapter II
Gender Wage Diﬀerentials:
Evidence from Matched
Employer-Employee Data
In this study we evaluate the extent to which the gender wage gap in the
Finnish manufacturing sector is attributable to within-job wage diﬀerentials,
sex diﬀerences in individual qualiﬁcations, and disproportionate concentration
of women in lower-paying ﬁrms and lower-paying jobs within ﬁrms. We use
matched employer-employee data to compare wage diﬀerentials between sim-
ilarly qualiﬁed female and male workers who are doing similar work for the
same employer. Our modelling approach employs a correlated random eﬀects
speciﬁcation to account for the hierarchical grouped structure of the underlying
data.
1
1 Introduction
A huge body of literature has emerged to explain why the gender wage gap persistently
exists in virtually all labour markets (see Altonji and Blank, 1999, and Blau and Kahn,
2000, for recent surveys). Traditional attempts to explain the wage gap focused on sex
diﬀerences in individual qualiﬁcations and their rewards in the labour market. More
recently, the importance of the segregation of women and men into diﬀerent jobs has been
recognised. This line of research emphasises that wages are closely tied to the properties
of jobs, not only to the characteristics of individuals who hold them. If typical female jobs
pay lower wages than jobs dominated by men, the mean earnings of women can fall short
of men’s earnings even in the absence of within-job wage diﬀerentials between sexes. Thus,
a sizeable wage gap can exist even when female and male workers are equally rewarded by
all employers.
1
This study is joint work with Ossi Korkeamäki. Most of the results can be found in Korkeamäki and
Kyyrä (2003, 2006).
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Attempts to qualify the segregation eﬀects on the wage gap were distorted by a lack
of appropriate data for a long time. Consequently, most of the early analysis focused on
segregation among occupations, ﬁrms, or industries only. This is clearly unsatisfactory,
as women and men are further segregated into diﬀerent jobs within ﬁrms. In recent
years, important advances have been made by access to large matched employer-employee
data sets that contain multiple observations on workers with the same employer. When
information on occupations or job titles is available, such data enable wage comparisons
between male and female workers who are doing similar work for the same employer.
This kind of comparative analysis has been conducted by Petersen and Morgan (1995),
Petersen et al. (1997), Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001), Groshen (1991), Datta Gupta
and Rothstein (2001), and Bayard et al. (2003). In the ﬁrst three of these studies observed
sex diﬀerentials in mean wages within jobs are simply aggregated to form various wage
decompositions. This approach has the obvious drawback that variation in individual
characteristics is left uncontrolled. In the other studies, wages are regressed against a set
of control variables and fraction female in the worker’s industry, ﬁrm, occupation, and/or
job.
2
The key idea is that the regression coeﬃcients of the various fraction female variables
capture the relationship between the wage rate and "femaleness" of the underlying labour
market structure.
It should be noted that a common practice in the fraction female regressions above
has been to neglect the grouping in the underlying data. For example, observations on
workers resulting from the same ﬁrm are interpreted as being independent. However,
intuition suggests that we should expect workers in the same ﬁrm to be more homogeneous
than those in a sample drawn randomly from the population of all ﬁrms. Workers in the
same ﬁrm share many common factors, some of which may be observable (e.g. ﬁrm
size, fraction female) but many are not (e.g. market power, managerial ability). In the
regression analysis the eﬀect of such unobservables serves as a latent ﬁrm eﬀect that will
be absorbed into the error term. Moreover, since diﬀerent jobs require diﬀerent skills
and qualiﬁcations, we can further expect that within a given ﬁrm workers who are doing
the same job are more homogenous than the ﬁrm’s workforce as whole. This implies an
additional source of dependence between workers within jobs.
In general, the matched employer-employee data exhibit a particular type of grouped
structure, which contrasts the statistical properties of such data with the classical random
sample case. A consequence of the grouping in the regression analysis is that the errors will
be correlated within groups owing to the latent group eﬀects. In the absence of correlation
between the latent group eﬀects and regressors included in the model, the OLS coeﬃcients
will be unbiased but ineﬃcient. The standard errors, however, will be biased downwards,
leading to the risk of spurious inference about the statistical signiﬁcance of parameters
of interest (Moulton, 1986). More generally, when the group eﬀects are correlated with
the regressors, the OLS coeﬃcients will be biased and inconsistent. These econometric
2
In a related paper we apply this method to the Finnish data; see Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2002).
14
problems have been overlooked in the previous analysis of gender wage diﬀerentials using
the matched employer-employee data.
3
In this study, we explore wage diﬀerentials between sexes in the Finnish manufacturing
sector using a large matched employer-employee data set. We view the data as having
a nested structure with three levels: ﬁrms, jobs within ﬁrms, and workers in jobs within
ﬁrms. A job is deﬁned as an occupation within a ﬁrm. Along with individual characteris-
tics, the wage rate is allowed to depend upon the employing ﬁrm and the job the worker
is holding within the ﬁrm. The latent ﬁrm and job eﬀects are modelled as a function of
group characteristics, including the mean characteristics of individuals within the groups.
We end up with a regression model with variables measured at the individual, job, and
ﬁrm levels, and an error term that has a two-way nested structure with separate intercepts
for ﬁrms and jobs within ﬁrms. The model is estimated with generalized least squares that
exploits the nested structure of error variation for eﬃciency. Using the regression results
we decompose the overall sex gap in pay into the contributions of sex segregation, sex
diﬀerences in the individual qualiﬁcations, and the unexplained within-job gap.
Our approach departs from the existing segregation literature in that we explicitly
model wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms and jobs. In contrast with the standard fraction
female regressions, we obtain consistent estimates of the parameters of interest in the
presence of the correlated group eﬀects that are likely to arise in the case of the matched
employer-employee data. With respect to job segregation the previous studies have focused
on quantifying what fraction of the overall wage gap can be attributed to disproportionate
concentration of women in lower-paying jobs. In addition to identifying this quantity,
we take a step further by addressing the issue why typical female jobs are lower paid.
When evaluating the extent to which lower wages in predominantly female jobs can be
explained by job attributes, we make use of an index of job complexity that measures the
responsibility, skills, and eﬀort required by a given job. Thus we are able to assess whether
wage diﬀerentials between typical female and male jobs can be viewed as justiﬁed or not,
a question that is beyond the scope of earlier analysis but crucial, for example, in the view
of comparable worth policy.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the main
results from some related studies for other countries. In Section 3 we give details on
the econometric methods and wage gap decomposition. Section 4 describes the data and
reports some descriptive statistics. The results are reported in Section 5, which is followed
by a concluding section.
3
Bayard et al. (2003) report the standard errors adjusted for intraestablishment error correlation but
assume independence of the latent group eﬀects and regressors.
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2 Related literature
It is evident that the gender gap in pay exists in virtually all labour markets. The size of
the gap is rather similar across diﬀerent advanced countries, amounting to 15-35 percent
lower mean wages for women than for men (see e.g. Blau and Kahn, 2000). Altonji
and Blank (1999) give a comprehensive survey of research in economics investigating sex
diﬀerences in the labour market. Here we discuss only some studies that are closely related
to our approach. That is, we focus on studies that explore the importance of labour market
segregation and wage diﬀerentials occurring within jobs (i.e. within occupations within
ﬁrms/establishments) in explaining the gender wage gap. There are only a few such
studies, as the evaluation of within-job wage diﬀerentials calls for high quality matched
employer-employee data, which are not widely available. We emphasise that the results of
these studies are not directly comparable and some diﬀering conclusions are likely to result
from dissimilarities in the data coverage, occupational classiﬁcation, and/or statistical
methods used. Throughout the following discussion the gender wage gap of a given percent
is used to indicate that women’s mean wage is less than men’s mean wage by that percent.
The results for the U.S. labour market are mixed. Using the Industrial Wage Survey
(IWS) data from the 1970s and 1980s,
4
Groshen (1991) and Petersen and Morgan (1995)
ﬁnd that sex segregation essentially explains all of the gender wage diﬀerentials in the
U.S. labour market, within-job wage diﬀerentials between sexes being close to zero. These
ﬁndings are in clear contrast to the results of Bayard et al. (2003) obtained from another
source of data.
5
Bayard et al. (2003) ﬁnd large gender wage diﬀerentials within jobs that
explain as much as one-half of the overall wage gap. According to Groshen (1991) and
Petersen and Morgan (1995), most of the overall gap is due to sex segregation among
occupations. By contrast, Bayard et al. (2003) ﬁnd a quantitatively unimportant eﬀect
for occupational segregation, whereas sex segregation among industries, ﬁrms, and jobs
accounts for 40 percent of the overall gap. Because of these sharp discrepancies, Bayard
et al. (2003) replicated their analysis using the IWS data with the identical occupational
classiﬁcations and the same industries. Surprisingly, the results from the two data sets
remained sharply diﬀerent. Bayard et al. (2003) conclude that their diﬀerent ﬁndings
from Groshen’s (1991) cannot be explained by diﬀering levels of detail in occupational
classiﬁcations nor by focus on diﬀerent industries. Instead, they raise some doubts about
the representativeness of the IWS data.
Petersen et al. (1997) andMeyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) report very similar patterns
4
The IWS data cover only a narrow subset of occupations in 16 industries. Petersen and Morgan (1995)
include all industries to their analysis, among which the gender wage gap varies between 38.5 and —5.3
percent with the average of 19 percent. Groshen (1991) focuses on ﬁve industries, where the gender wage
gap lies between 21 and 37 percent.
5
The data set used by Bayard et al. (2003) was constructed by matching individuals from the 1990
Decennial Census to establishments from the 1990 Standard Statistical Establishment List. While not
entirely representative, the data include workers and establishments from all sectors of the U.S. economy.
The size of the gender wage gap in the data is 31 percent.
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of gender wage diﬀerentials for Norway and Sweden respectively.
6
In both countries white-
collar women earn on average 27 percent less than their male counterparts do. The within-
job wage gap among white-collar workers is 6 percent in Norway, compared with 5 percent
in Sweden. Among the Norwegian blue-collar workers, the overall sex gap in pay is 12
percent and the within-job gap is 3.3 percent. The corresponding ﬁgures for Sweden
are 13 percent and 1.4 percent respectively. In both Sweden and Norway occupational
segregation alone explains over 70 percent of the overall wage gap of white-collar workers,
whereas the contributions of sex segregation among industries, establishments, and jobs
are quantitatively important only for blue-collar workers.
Using the Integrated Database for Labour Market Research, Datta Gupta and Roth-
stein (2001) study gender wage diﬀerentials in the Danish labour market. Their data
include basically all salaried workers in the private sector. They ﬁnd that occupational
segregation accounts for roughly one-half of the overall gap of 29 percent, while over 40
percent of the gap remains attributable to unexplained within-job wage diﬀerentials be-
tween women and men. The latter ﬁnding is in contrast with the evidence for Sweden and
Norway, being more in line with the U.S. results of Bayard et al. (2003).
3 Methodological framework
We assume that the wage rate is closely tied to the employing ﬁrm and the job held within
that ﬁrm. That is, we expect systematic variation in wages across ﬁrms and jobs within
ﬁrms that cannot be explained by the characteristics of workers in the underlying groups.
Thus wage variation can occur at diﬀerent levels: between ﬁrms, between jobs within
ﬁrms, and between workers within jobs.
7
Within this framework the allocation of women
and men to diﬀerent positions in the labour market serves as a potential source of gender
wage diﬀerentials. In the following sections we explain how to identify various sources of
the wage diﬀerentials.
3.1 The wage model
Suppose our data consist of all employees of F ﬁrms. Within ﬁrms employees who do
similar work are grouped together, in which case they are said to hold the same job.
Observations across ﬁrms are regarded as being independent, but within ﬁrms wages are
correlated owing to common ﬁrm and job characteristics. We model the log wage of worker
i (i = 1, 2, ..., njk) who holds job k (k = 1, 2, ..., cj) in ﬁrm j (j = 1, 2, ..., F) as
wjki = ηsjki +β
′
xjki + fj + vjk + εjki, (II.1)
6
The Norwegian data of Petersen et al. (1997) contain basically all workers in six business sectors
in 1984 and 1990. The data used by Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) is more extensive, covering most
privately employed workers in Sweden over the period 1970-1990. In the text we refer only to the results
for the 1990s in the case of both studies.
7
Obviously we could go further and introduce an additional level on top of this hierarchy by grouping
ﬁrms by industry. For simplicity, we focus on the three levels and treat industry as a characteristic of ﬁrms
rather than a hierarchy level of its own.
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where s is the female dummy, x is a vector of other individual characteristics, v is the job
eﬀect that is "nested" within the ﬁrm eﬀect f. For the idiosyncratic errors ε, we assume
E(εjki |Xj ,vj , fj) = 0 and E(εjkiεjki′ |Xj ,vj , fj) = 0 for i = i
′
, (II.2)
where Xj includes x and s for all employees of ﬁrm j, and vj =
(
vj1, vj2, ..., vjcj
)
.
Wage variation between ﬁrms and jobs beyond the observable individual characteristics
is captured by f and v respectively. Without loss of generality, the job eﬀects are deﬁned
in deviation from the ﬁrm eﬀects, with the expected value within each ﬁrm equal to zero.
Thus, E(f + v |ﬁrm j) = fj+ E(v |ﬁrm j) = fj . We emphasize that f and v are likely to
be correlated with s and x. In particular, women are expected to be concentrated in ﬁrms
with low values of f, and further in jobs with low values of v. Since diﬀerent ﬁrms and jobs
require diﬀerent qualiﬁcations, the group eﬀects f and v are likely to be correlated also
with the variables in x. If fj > fj ′ , workers in ﬁrm j earn more on average than workers
in ﬁrm j
′
, after controlling for s and x. Similarly, provided that vjk > vjk′ , workers in
job k are more highly paid on average than those in job k
′
within the same ﬁrm j, after
controlling for s and x.
Within jobs wage diﬀerentials are related to workers’ sex (s), other individual charac-
teristics (x), and unobservables (ε). A parameter of particular interest is η that gives the
expected wage diﬀerential between equally qualiﬁed (in terms of x) women and men who
are doing the same work for the same employer. One may be tempted to view a negative
value of η as evidence of wage discrimination against women. Such an interpretation is
justiﬁed only if all relevant explanatory variables were included in x. This may not be
the case in practice. In general, the inﬂuences of possible discrimination and unmeasured
individual characteristics are indistinguishable in the value of η. Therefore, we interpret η
simply as a measure of the unexplained within-job wage diﬀerential between sexes.
At this point a few remarks on the restrictions imposed above are in order. First, the
returns to individual qualiﬁcations, β, are assumed to be equal for women and men. One
should recognise that the interpretation of β is conditional on the position held in the
labour market (i.e. conditional on f and v), so β measures the returns within a given
job. Since employers cannot apply very diﬀerent reward schemes to their female and male
employees who are doing the same work, our assumption is not as restrictive as it might
ﬁrst look. We will return to this issue and discuss also results from a regression model
with gender-speciﬁc slopes. The assumption that the unexplained within-job wage gap is
of the same size everywhere is rather restrictive. One might wish to allow the coeﬃcient
of the female dummy to vary across jobs, i.e. replace η with η
jk
. We adopt a very narrow
deﬁnition for jobs in our empirical application. This results in a huge number of jobs,
many of which include either female or male employees only, making the estimation of
job-speciﬁc coeﬃcients infeasible in practice.
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3.2 Decomposing the gender gap in pay
The gender wage gap is deﬁned as the diﬀerence in the expected wages between men and
women, i.e. the wage diﬀerence between a randomly chosen man and woman. Using the
model outlined above we decompose it as
E(w |s = 0)−E(w |s = 1) = −η +β
′
[E(x |s = 0)−E(x |s = 1)]
+ [E(f |s = 0)−E(f |s = 1)] (II.3)
+[E(v |s = 0)−E(v |s = 1)] ,
where the contributions of sex segregation among ﬁrms and jobs are captured by the
last two terms. A positive value of E(f |s = 0) − E(f |s = 1) indicates that women are
disproportionately concentrated in lower-paying ﬁrms. This term would be zero, if there
were no variation in f across ﬁrms or if women and men were identically distributed across
ﬁrms. If women are relatively more frequently allocated to lower-paying jobs within ﬁrms,
E(v |s = 0) − E(v |s = 1) will take a positive value. It would be zero, if there was no
systematic wage variation across jobs within ﬁrms beyond the diﬀerences in individual
characteristics or if, within all ﬁrms, women and men were allocated identically across
jobs. The amount of within-job wage diﬀerentials between sexes not accounted for by
the explanatory variables x equals −η. The contribution of sex diﬀerences in individual
characteristics is captured by the remaining term on the right-hand side.
To obtain an empirical counterpart of the decomposition, the conditional means of
w and x can be replaced with the sample means over women and men but the other
components need to be estimated. Since the latent group eﬀects are expected to be
correlated with the explanatory variables, we will focus on estimation by ﬁxed eﬀects and
correlated random eﬀects.
3.3 The ﬁxed eﬀects approach
In our ﬁrst approach we take f and v as ﬁxed constants to be estimated along with η and
β. So we consider the model conditional on the ﬁrm and job eﬀects:
E(wjki |Xj ,vj , fj) = ηsjki + β
′
xjki + fj + vjk. (II.4)
In this case η and β could be estimated by regressing w on s, x, and the full set of job
dummies. As the number of job dummies may be too large to make estimation feasible,
we obtain analytically equivalent estimators of η and β by applying pooled OLS to the
transformed model:
wjki −wjk· = η (sjki − sjk·) +β
′
(xjki − xjk·) + εjki − εjk·, (II.5)
where wjk·, sjk·, xjk·, and εjk· denote averages over workers in the kth job of ﬁrm j. Under
the assumptions (II.2), the resulting "ﬁxed eﬀects" (FE) estimators η̂ and β̂ are consistent
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under arbitrary correlation between (s,x) and (f, v). Given the restrictionE(v |ﬁrm j) = 0
for all j, the ﬁrm and job eﬀects can be estimated as
f̂j = wj·· − η̂sj·· − β̂
′
xj··, (II.6)
v̂jk = wjk· − η̂sjk· − β̂
′
xjk· − f̂j , (II.7)
where wj··, sj ··, and xj·· denote averages over the employees of ﬁrm j. The point estimates
of f and v are noisy because the number of observations per ﬁrm and, especially, per job
can be small. However, the estimates of their expected values among women and men
based upon sample averages are expected to be reasonably accurate. Thus, we proceed
by inserting η̂ and β̂ along with the sample means of f̂ and v̂ over women and men
into (II.3). This gives the ﬁrst version of our wage gap decomposition. It allows us
to distinguish the contributions of sex segregation among ﬁrms and jobs to the overall
wage gap from the contributions of the unexplained within-job gap and sex diﬀerences in
individual characteristics.
3.4 The correlated random eﬀects approach
In an alternative approach we take an explicit account of the relationship between the
latent group eﬀects and the explanatory variables. More precisely, we specify the ex-
pected values of f and v conditional on observables via auxiliary linear regressions. Let
X
∗
j
=
(
Xj ,zj ,gj1, ...,gjcj
)
be the extended set of conditioning variables that includes ﬁrm
attributes zj (ﬁrm size, industry, etc.) and job attributes gjk’s (job size, job complexity
index, etc.) in addition to Xj . We specify the conditional mean of the ﬁrm eﬀect as
E(fj
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
= α+ δ0sj ·· + δ
′
1
xj·· + δ
′
2
zj (II.8)
and that of the job eﬀect as
E(vjk
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
= θ0 (sjk· − sj··) + θ
′
1
(xjk· − xj··) + θ
′
2
(
gjk − gj·
)
, (II.9)
i.e. the ﬁrst moments of the marginal distributions of f and v are assumed to be linear
functions of the group means of s and x and of other group level variables. All the
explanatory variables on the right-hand side of (II.9) are measured in deviation from the
ﬁrm mean in order to enforce the expected value of v within ﬁrms to zero.
8
Now we consider the model conditional on X
∗
j
:
E(wjki
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
= ηsjki +β
′
xjki +E(fj
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
+E(vjk
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
.
Deﬁning ξ
j
≡ fj −E (fj |X
∗
j
) and ωjk ≡ vjk −E (vjk|X
∗
j
), we obtain the estimating wage
equation:
wjki = α+ ηsjki + δ0sj·· + θ0 (sjk· − sj ··) +β
′
xjki + δ
′
1
xj·· + θ
′
1
(xjk· − xj··)
+δ
′
2
zj + θ
′
2
(
gjk − gj ·
)
+ ujki, (II.10)
8
This is only a matter of parametrization provided that g
j·
is included in the set of ﬁrm covariates zj.
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where ujki ≡ ξj +ωjk+εjki. Conditional on X
∗
j
, all components of ujki are assumed to be
mutually independent, with zero means and constant variances σ
2
ξ
, σ
2
ω
, and σ
2
ε
respectively.
Within ﬁrm j, the variance-covariance structure of the errors is given by
E
(
ujkiujk′i′
∣∣
X
∗
j
)
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
σ
2
ξ
+ σ
2
ω
+ σ
2
ε
, if k = k
′
and i = i
′
;
σ
2
ξ
+ σ
2
ω
, if k = k
′
and i = i
′
;
σ
2
ξ
, if k = k
′
and i = i
′
.
(II.11)
This is known as the two-way nested error structure in econometrics (Fuller and Batesse,
1973). It models the residual correlation within ﬁrms that remains after conditioning on
the observed ﬁrm, job, and individual characteristics. Such a correlation is likely to exist
owing to unobservable job and ﬁrm factors. We estimate the model with generalized least
squares (GLS) that exploits the particular form of the error structure for eﬃciency and
produces appropriate standard errors.
9
The large unbalanced data raise some computa-
tional issues, as the inverse of the error variance-covariance matrix is required by the GLS
procedure. These issues and the estimation of the variance components are discussed in
the Appendix.
It should be stressed that including the group means of individual explanatory variables
in (II.8) and (II.9) provides a way of allowing s and x to be correlated with f and v, an old
idea by Mundlak (1978).
10
To emphasize this point, we refer to the speciﬁcation outlined
above as the "correlated random eﬀects" (CRE) model.
11
Coeﬃcients of the fraction
female variables in (II.8) and (II.9) are of particular interest. A negative value of δ0
implies that ﬁrms with a high density of female workers pay lower wages after controlling
for xj·· and zj . If within ﬁrms employees in predominantly female jobs are lower paid
given (xjk· − xj··) and
(
gjk − gj·
)
, it will be indicated by a negative value of θ0. That is,
δ0 and θ0 are kind of "residual gender eﬀects", which imply that predominantly female
ﬁrms and jobs pay diﬀerent wages for reasons not accounted for by the observed worker
and group characteristics.
Because E(f |s = 0) = E [E(f |X
∗
) |s = 0] by the law of iterative expectations, we
9
Alternatives for GLS are the maximum likelihood (ML) and restricted maximum likelihood (RML)
methods, both of which require an additional distributional assumption for the error terms (e.g. each
component of ujki is an i.i.d. normal variable). The unknown variance components and regression coef-
ﬁcients are then estimated simultaneously by maximising the likelihood function. The RML method by
Patterson and Thompson (1971) is a modiﬁcation of the ML procedure in which the loss of degrees of
freedom due to estimation of regression coeﬃcients is taken into account when estimating the variance
components. Monte Carlo evidence suggests that the GLS, ML and RML methods all perform equally
well in estimating the regression coeﬃcients but the variance components may be better estimated with
ML and RML. See Maddala and Mount (1973) for evidence for the simple error component models, and
Baltagi et al. (2001) for the two-way nested error structure.
10
Chamberlain (1984) considers a general case where the latent group eﬀects are modelled as linear
predictors of s and x of all employees within the group. Mundlak’s (1978) speciﬁcation is obtained by
imposing a restriction that the coeﬃcients of s and x in the linear predictor are identical for all i within
the group. The unrestricted speciﬁcation becomes cumbersome in our case where group sizes vary and
some ﬁrms are very large.
11
The model deﬁned by (II.10) and (II.11) is known also under a variety of other names, including the
nested error components model, variance components model, random intercepts model, mixed model, and
hierarchical model.
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obtain an estimate of E(f |s = 0) by averaging the right-hand side of (II.8) over all men.
E(f |s = 1) is estimated analogously by averaging over women. The contribution of sex
segregation among ﬁrms can then be expressed as
E(f |s = 0)−E(f |s = 1) =
F∑
j=1
(
o
m
j
− o
f
j
)
δ0sj·· (II.12)
+
F∑
j=1
(
o
m
j
− o
f
j
) (
δ
′
1
xj ·· + δ
′
2
zj
)
,
where o
f
j
(o
m
j
) is the fraction of all women (men) allocated to ﬁrm j. Similarly, the con-
tribution of sex segregation among jobs within ﬁrms is given by
E(v |s = 0)−E(v |s = 1) =
F∑
j=1
cj∑
k=1
(
o
m
jk
− o
f
jk
)
θ0 (sjk· − sj ··) (II.13)
+
F∑
j=1
cj∑
k=1
(
o
m
jk
− o
f
jk
) [
θ
′
1
(xjk· − xj··) + θ
′
2
(
gjk − gj ·
)]
,
where o
f
jk
(o
m
jk
) is the fraction of all women (men) allocated to the kth job of ﬁrm j.
Substituting (II.12) and (II.13) into (II.3) along with the GLS estimates of the regression
coeﬃcients gives us the second version of our wage gap decomposition.
In the case of the CRE model the segregation contributions can be expressed as sums
of various terms. These terms pass on useful information, which is not available from the
FE model. For example, if typical female jobs are found to be characterised by low values
of v, one may speculate that lower wages in such jobs result from lower skill requirements.
If this is the case, a large fraction of the contribution of sex segregation among jobs in
(II.13) will be attributed to diﬀerences in the mean education (incorporated in xjk·−xj··)
and job complexity (incorporated in gjk − gj·), while the component associated with the
fraction female (sjk·− sj··) will be close to zero. By contrast, if wage diﬀerentials between
typical female and male jobs arise to a large extent from some unobserved sources, this
will be indicated by a strong eﬀect of the fraction female term in (II.13).
3.5 Discussion
In the case of the FE model we cannot say anything about why predominantly female
ﬁrms and jobs are lower paid on average. This of course is a cost of the robustness of
the ﬁxed eﬀect method: we do not assume anything about the relationship between the
group eﬀects and regressors. Compared with the FE model, the CRE speciﬁcation is more
restrictive, as the conditional expectations of f and v are assumed to be linear. However,
when the group means of s and x are included in (II.8) and (II.9), the GLS estimators of
η and β are identical to their FE estimators, and hence not aﬀected by these additional
restrictions. In this respect we do not loose anything by imposing more structure on
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the model. The additional structure of the CRE model is exploited in explaining wage
variation between ﬁrms and jobs. While both the FE and CRE model are able to produce
identical results for the eﬀects of individual level regressors, only the latter is informative
about sources of wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms and jobs. For this reason the CRE model
is our preferred choice. A potential drawback of the method is that the sum of various
contributions does not necessarily equal to the raw wage gap in ﬁnite samples. This is a
consequence of the more complex error structure.
Our approach departs from the decomposition exercises in Groshen (1991), Datta
Gupta and Rothstein (2001), and Bayard et al. (2003) in some essential ways. Of course,
the main diﬀerence is that our CRE approach is informative about the determinants of
lower wages in predominantly female ﬁrms and jobs. Secondly, the interpretation of the
regressor coeﬃcients η and β comes from the wage model deﬁned in (II.1) and (II.2),
i.e. they measure wage diﬀerentials within jobs (that is, the ﬁrm and job eﬀects held
constant). This interpretation is trivial when the model is estimated by ﬁxed eﬀects, but
the coeﬃcients have the same meaning also in the CRE speciﬁcation as we allow f and v to
be correlated with s and x. The coeﬃcients in the standard fraction female regressions do
not generally have the same within-job interpretation. Thirdly, we deﬁne the segregation
contributions as diﬀerences in the mean values of the ﬁrm and job eﬀects between men
and women.
12
Despite the diﬀerences in the modelling framework, the estimating wage equation in
(II.10) and the associated decomposition are not much diﬀerent from those in the previous
studies. If occupational segregation is omitted, the standard fraction female decomposi-
tions can be viewed as special cases of our CRE decomposition. If we set δ1, δ2, θ1, and
θ2 to zero, we obtain a speciﬁcation similar to those in Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001)
and Bayard et al. (2003). If we impose further β = 0, the model is reduced to Groshen’s
(1991) speciﬁcation. Within our framework, the restriction δ1 = θ1 = 0 is equivalent to
assuming that the ﬁrm and job eﬀects are uncorrelated with x. This of course is a rather
restrictive assumption, and it may lead to inconsistent estimates of η and β. The impor-
tance of this sort of restrictions is an empirical issue, and it depends on the data in hand.
For example, both Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001) and Bayard et al. (2003) ﬁnd only
a minor change in the female dummy coeﬃcient when the fraction female variables were
replaced with the full set of job dummies. In general, it does make a diﬀerence whether
one conditions on the job held or only on the femaleness of the worker’s position. In our
application we ﬁnd quantitatively signiﬁcant discrepancies in the estimated coeﬃcients,
standard errors, and decomposition results between the CRE model and standard fraction
female speciﬁcation.
12
Additional, less important, diﬀerences are: (1) we measure the fraction female in job as a deviation
from the ﬁrm mean, (2) we do not include the fraction female in occupation nor in industry in our model,
and (3) we apply GLS, not OLS.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Evaluation of job tasks in the collective agreements
In Finland working conditions are determined in large part by collective bargaining be-
tween employers’ organisation and labour unions. The collective agreements are made
along broad occupational lines and signed at industry level. Within an industry, all em-
ployees, irrespective of their union status, are covered by the collective agreement of their
occupational group if the unionization rate exceeds a certain threshold level (which is true
in almost all cases). A speciﬁc collective agreement determines, among other working
conditions, a minimum rate of pay for a particular type of job. For this purpose, most
job tasks are evaluated according to the responsibility, skills, and eﬀort they require, and
thereby mapped onto a scale of complexity levels. Each level of job complexity is then as-
sociated with a given basic wage that serves as the wage ﬂoor for that type of job. Actual
wages received by workers generally exceed the basic wages because of ﬁrm premiums and
rewards for individual qualiﬁcations and performance.
We emphasise that employers do not hold the evaluation of job tasks in the palm of their
hands, but it is highly regulated and supervised by the representatives of unions. The key
principle is that the basic wage is determined by job attributes only, independently of the
individual characteristics of the current job holder (e.g. sex and education). The evaluation
process of jobs has two important implications for our analysis. First, it explicitly states
that the wages are closely tied to jobs, not only to the workers who hold them. Second,
knowledge of job complexity ranking provides valuable information about job attributes
that we can exploit in explaining wage variation between jobs.
4.2 TT data
Our data come from the records of the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers
(TT). TT is the central organisation of manufacturing employers and its member ﬁrms
account for more than three-quarters of the value added of the Finnish manufacturing
sector.
13
Each year TT conducts three surveys covering basically all employees of its
member ﬁrms. All surveys are directed to the employer, one asking information about
white-collar workers and the other two about blue-collar workers. These surveys contain
detailed information on wages, working hours, job complexity levels, and occupations (or
job titles), as well as some demographic background information. Each individual in the
records is associated to his or her employer with a unique ﬁrm identiﬁer.
We stress that the TT data are of high quality and have several advantages over most of
the other data sets employed in previous research. First, our data can be regarded as highly
reliable since all information comes directly from the employer records. There is practically
no response bias and all information is reported with high accuracy compared with the
13
TT does not exist any more. In 2005 the Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) was established as
a result of the uniﬁcation of TT and the Employers’ Confederation of Service Industries (PT).
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standard employee surveys. Second, the data cover all employees of each ﬁrm surveyed.
Thus we get rid of the measurement error issues in measuring the mean characteristics
of workers within ﬁrms and jobs.
14
Third, our data contain precise information on the
standard human capital characteristics, such as education (level and ﬁeld), ﬁrm tenure,
and age, making the analysis less prone to omitted variable bias. Fourth, knowledge of
the job complexity ranking provides a rare opportunity to take into account heterogeneity
across jobs.
In the subsequent analysis we focus on the cross-section of full-time workers aged
between 18 and 65 who were employed in 2000 by TT ﬁrms with at least ﬁve workers.
White- and blue-collar workers will be analysed separately as they are subject to diﬀerent
compensation schemes and covered by diﬀerent collective agreements.
White-collar workers
The collective agreements for white-collar workers specify three broad groups: managerial,
technical, and clerical workers. Each group is covered by a separate industry-speciﬁc
agreement, though the clerical and technical employees are combined and covered by
the same agreement in some industries. White-collar workers are also classiﬁed into 78
occupational groups that are common to all white-collar groups and all industries.
We deﬁne a job as an occupation within an employing ﬁrm (this results in 26,236
jobs).
15
However, where workers covered by diﬀerent agreements are allocated to the same
job, we split the job into parts, each one including only technical, clerical, or managerial
employees. The number of jobs increases to 30,281. Finally, jobs that include workers with
diﬀering levels of job complexity are further divided into jobs including only workers with
the same level of job complexity. This raises the number of jobs to 40,664. At the end,
all workers within a given job have the same occupation and job complexity classiﬁcation,
and are covered by the same collective agreement.
As a part of the collective agreements, jobs of technical and clerical workers are eval-
uated and classiﬁed into complexity levels. There are two complications regarding the
use of this information in the regression analysis. First, job complexity information is
missing for all the managerial jobs, which are not subject to any evaluation process. This
is because the managerial employees are regarded as high-paid employees whose wages are
of less interest to the unions. Secondly, the scale of the complexity classiﬁcation is not
constant, but 9 diﬀerent scales are applied in diﬀerent industries. Where no distinction
14
If only a sample of the ﬁrm’s workforce is available, the fraction of female employees, for example, will
be measured with error. This in turn tends to bias their regression coeﬃcients towards zero. It is also
quite common that information on the worker composition of the underlying labour market structure is
obtained from another survey through some incomplete matching process.
15
Additionally, we use information on each worker’s job location (municipality) to sub-divide jobs within
ﬁrms. Workers with the same occupation but who are working in diﬀerent plants of the same ﬁrm are
allocated to separate jobs, if the plants are located in diﬀerent municipalities. We do not consider it
prudent to divide ﬁrms into plants with this indirect information on job locations. Thus, the employer
unit in our analysis is ﬁrm, not plant.
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between the technical and clerical employees is made, the number of complexity levels lies
somewhere between 3 and 15 (being 8, 9, or 10 in most cases). In other industries the
number of complexity levels is 6 for technical employees and 12 for clerical employees.
However, the diﬀerent scales for job complexity cover roughly the same range of logarith-
mic basic wages and the relationship between the job complexity levels and basic wages is
approximately log-linear within each scale. Therefore, we re-scale the original complexity
variables on the interval 0 to 9 by applying a suitable stretch or compression factor to each
industry-speciﬁc scale (i.e. the lowest level of job complexity is set to 0 and the highest
level to 9).
16
Table II.1 reports some sample statistics. The wage variable is constructed by dividing
the monthly salary in December 2000 (bonuses etc. excluded) by regular working hours. In
the Finnish manufacturing sector, 37 percent of white-collar workers are female and they
earn on average 23 percent less than their male counterparts do. There are no large sex
diﬀerences in the average age, work experience, or ﬁrm tenure. While men are only slightly
more educated as measured by the education level, sex diﬀerences in terms of the ﬁeld of
education are quite substantial. Of men, 65 percent have received a technical education,
compared with 17 percent of women. Moreover, 41 percent of women have obtained a
degree in social sciences, business, or law. The mean value of the job complexity level
is clearly higher for men, indicating that more demanding clerical and technical jobs are
mainly occupied by men.
To give a hint of the role of sex segregation, Table II.2 shows the gender wage ratio
and sex composition by 2-digit occupation group and white-collar group (i.e. managerial
vs. technical and clerical workers). Variation in the female share indicates a large degree
of sex segregation among occupations, perhaps reﬂecting diﬀerences in education. Women
appear to be concentrated in the administrative occupations. By contrast, less than 10
percent of white-collar workers in production occupations are female. The gender wage
ratio within the occupation groups ranges from .670 to 1.062, being on average clearly
higher than the raw wage ratio on the bottom line. This suggests that occupational
segregation plays a role in explaining the gender wage gap. There is no clear relationship
between the female share and the size of the within-occupation gender wage gap: the
correlation coeﬃcient between these variables is .26 and statistically insigniﬁcant at the 5
percent level.
17
We emphasize that the allocation of workers to diﬀerent jobs is based on a more de-
tailed 3-digit occupation code, which corresponds to the ﬁnest classiﬁcation level. That is,
each occupation group in Table II.2 includes 1—6 more detailed occupations, resulting in
a total of 78 occupations. For example, Oﬃce services in Administration include Recep-
16
This conversion idea came from Antti Luukkonen, who found by comparing various wage regressions
that the single variable works relatively well compared with the huge number of industry-speciﬁc complexity
dummies. See Luukkonen (2003a) for details.
17
When the observations are weighted by the size of the occupation group, the correlation coeﬃcient is
even lower (.06).
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Table II.1: Sample statistics for white-collar workers
Women Men All
Hourly wage, euro 12.107 (3.926) 15.763 (5.59) 14.409 (5.336)
Log hourly wage 2.452 (.276) 2.702 (.326) 2.610 (.331)
Age 41.146 (9.794) 41.128 (9.920) 41.135 (9.874)
Schooling years 12.065 (2.164) 12.810 (2.200) 12.534 (2.216)
Firm tenure, years 12.395 (10.648) 11.860 (10.552) 12.058 (10.591)
Work experience, years 22.081 (10.632) 21.318 (10.381) 21.601 (10.481)
Job complexity (0-9 scale) 3.707 (1.69) 4.909 (2.201) 4.379 2.078
Job complexity missing, share .437 .569 .520
Job size 242 (665) 310 (754) 285 (723)
Employer size 3,445 (4,772) 3,526 (4,759) 3,496 (4,764)
Education level, %
Basic or unknown 19.256 11.966 14.665
Secondary 29.916 22.621 25.322
First stage of tertiary 31.544 27.030 28.701
Bachelor’s degree 8.247 22.559 17.259
Master’s degree 10.528 14.808 13.223
PhD .509 1.017 .829
Field of education, %
General 8.070 6.382 7.007
Education .372 .069 .181
Humanities and art 2.825 0.413 1.306
Social sciences, business and law 40.975 9.500 21.156
Science 2.687 2.491 2.563
Technical 17.091 64.722 47.083
Agriculture 1.115 3.062 2.341
Health and welfare 2.591 0.364 1.188
Services 5.006 1.029 2.502
Unknown 19.270 11.969 14.673
Fraction female in ﬁrm .436 (.165) .332 (.137) .370 (.156)
Fraction female in job .778 (.293) .131 (.185) .370 (.388)
Sample size 55,158 93,786 148,944
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the ﬁgures in the table are means. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Hourly wage is computed dividing the monthly wage by regular working hours. Schooling years is deﬁned as the
mean years of schooling attached to a given level of education. Work experience is approximated by subtracting
the years of schooling and seven years for time prior to the age of school entry from the worker’s age. The mean
level of job complexity is computed using non-missing values only. Employer and job sizes are the average ﬁrm and
job size over workers. The mean ﬁrm size in the data is 102 and the mean job size is 3.7. The total number of
ﬁrms is 1,464 and that of jobs is 40,664.
tionists, Switchboard Operators, Copyists and Mail Dispatchers, and Oﬃce Messengers;
and Purchasing in Logistics includes Purchasing Managers, Purchasers, and Purchasing
Assistants. Recall that employees of a given ﬁrm with the same detailed occupation are
assumed to be doing the same job only if they are covered by the same collective agree-
ment, their jobs are located in the same municipality, and in the case of technical and
clerical employees their job tasks have been ranked to be of equal worth.
It is worth emphasizing that we have made an attempt to deﬁne jobs as narrowly as
possible in order to be able to compare workers who are doing the "same" work for the
same employer. The managerial employees are a problematic group in this respect, as
they had to be grouped into jobs without information on the complexity levels of their job
tasks. Therefore, we expect more heterogeneity in job tasks within managerial jobs than
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Table II.2: Fraction female and gender wage ratio by white-collar occupation
Managerial Technical & clerical All white-collar
Occupational group N Fem Gap N Fem Gap N Fem Gap
R&D 28,128 .163 .909 19,102 .422 .791 47,230 .268 .759
R&D management 1,320 .135 .847 4,956 .528 .859 6,276 .445 .614
Product design 21,444 .133 .914 8,824 .279 .826 30,268 .176 .843
Quality management 1,397 .327 .894 3,316 .555 .854 4,713 .487 .800
Research 3,967 .277 .885 2,006 .572 .846 5,973 .376 .781
Production 8,469 .079 .842 24,627 .102 .865 33,096 .096 .841
Production and maintenance 5,498 .053 .864 17,810 .074 .857 23,308 .069 .836
management
Production support 2,971 .127 .858 6,817 .177 .866 9,788 .162 .842
Logistics 2,082 .230 .812 4,870 .460 .908 6,952 .391 .794
Materials and logistics 472 .138 .825 2,515 .274 .883 2,987 .252 .825
Purchasing 1,467 .241 .811 1,647 .583 .842 3,114 .422 .725
Shipping 143 .413 .844 708 .833 .930 851 .763 .805
Sales and marketing 8,807 .231 .831 14,231 .663 .765 23,038 .498 .662
Sales 7,211 .207 .823 12,720 .681 .767 19,931 .510 .643
Sales promotion 709 .453 .845 721 .544 1.009 1,430 .499 .876
Production and marketing 887 .246 .828 790 .467 .764 1,677 .350 .766
co-operation
PR 1,828 .398 .884 2,992 .575 .846 4,820 .508 .803
PR 650 .697 .836 629 .812 .891 1,279 .754 .806
Information technology 1,178 .233 .861 2,363 .512 .817 3,541 .419 .750
Juridical & tax assistance 366 .377 .868 402 .560 .670 768 .473 .723
Administration 4,169 .658 .763 14,480 .915 .871 18,649 .857 .682
Administration mngmt. 1,470 .468 .836 400 .678 .864 1,870 .513 .800
Pay oﬃce 100 .790 .746 1,734 .948 .961 1,834 .939 .837
Bookkeeping 328 .811 .869 2,832 .951 .942 3,160 .937 .832
Accounting 975 .461 .915 1,595 .669 .830 2,570 .590 .804
Secretarial work 1,264 .977 .932 5,049 .992 .956 6,313 .989 .893
Oﬃce services 18 .778 1.062 1,746 .861 .953 1,764 .861 .953
Clerical work, small ﬁrms 14 .857 .758 1,124 .943 .887 1,138 .942 .878
Human resources 1,650 .524 .798 2,953 .858 .813 4,603 .739 .674
HR management 388 .479 .874 95 .663 .968 483 .516 .865
Competence development 417 .511 .887 179 .508 .845 596 .510 .877
Recruiting and employing 279 .616 .820 131 .740 .835 410 .656 .799
Payroll administration 101 .832 .866 1,670 .985 .963 1,771 .976 .800
Safety and health care 336 .351 .710 465 .619 .889 801 .507 .705
Personnel services 129 .713 .847 413 .850 .859 542 .817 .802
Other groups together 9,788 .299 .957 9,788 .299 .957
All 55,499 .221 .877 93,445 .459 .839 148,944 .370 .768
Notes: N is the number of observations. Fem is the fraction of female employees in the group. Gap is the sex wage
ratio as obtained by dividing the women’s mean wage by men’s mean wage. Two-digit occupational groups are
further divided into managerial and non-managerial occupations (technical and clerical groups are combined).
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within technical and clerical jobs. One should keep this in mind throughout the paper.
We also report a separate analysis for a sub-sample of technical and clerical workers in
Section 5.
Blue-collar workers
Blue-collar workers are classiﬁed into 516 occupations. Most of the blue-collar occupa-
tions are speciﬁc to a particular industry, which explains the large number of occupational
groups compared with the number of white-collar occupations. The complexity classiﬁca-
tion of blue-collar jobs includes 39 industry-speciﬁc scales, where the number of complexity
levels varies between 3 and 15. In the case of white-collar jobs, each industry-speciﬁc scale
was found to cover roughly the same range of logarithmic basic wages irrespective of the
total number of complexity levels. This is not the case for blue-collar jobs, and hence we
apply a slightly diﬀerent method to translate the industry-speciﬁc complexity levels into
a single variable. We went through all the industry-level collective agreements and looked
up the percentage increase in the minimum hourly wage associated with each complex-
ity level compared with the lowest level. This percentage number serves as our uniﬁed
measure of job complexity for the blue-collar jobs. To keep results comparable with the
white-collar case, the complexity measure is further scaled to take values on the interval
0 to 9.
Once again, we deﬁne a job as an occupation within a ﬁrm (this results in 12,633 jobs).
The resulting jobs are further divided by the level of job complexity, which raises the ﬁnal
number of jobs to 24,020. The wage variable is the hourly wage of the regular working
time in the last quarter of 2000. We exclude pay for overtime, Sundays, holidays, and late
shifts, which are typically paid at a higher hourly rate. Including such pay components
would overstate the wage diﬀerential between sexes, as men typically work more overtime
hours (see e.g. Table 2 in Korkeamäki and Kyyrä, 2002).
From Table II.3 we see that only 24 percent of blue-collar workers are female. This low
ﬁgure reﬂects the fact that the manufacturing sector has been traditionally dominated by
men, rather than a low labour force participation rate by the Finnish women. Compared
with the white-collar workers, the gender wage gap among blue-collar workers is much
lower, being .18 in log wages. This amounts to a 16 percent lower mean wage for women.
Some 60 percent of blue-collar workers have received a secondary education, but a third
have not completed any formal degree since the (compulsory) comprehensive school. Men
are highly concentrated in technical education, which is in accordance with the ﬁndings for
the white-collar workers. Women’s degrees are obtained mainly in the technical or service
ﬁelds. Sex diﬀerences in other individual background characteristics are quite moderate.
Blue-collar women are slightly older, have more work experience but less job tenure than
men. The mean value of the job complexity variable for women is substantially lower than
that for men, indicating that less complex blue-collar jobs are mainly occupied by women.
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Table II.3: Sample statistics for blue-collar workers
Women Men All
Hourly wage, euro 9.845 (1.818) 11.782 (2.198) 11.323 (2.269)
Log hourly wage 2.271 (.175) 2.451 (.177) 2.408 (.192)
Age 42.624 (10.691) 40.536 (10.557) 41.031 (10.626)
Schooling years 10.196 (1.199) 10.479 (1.047) 10.412 (1.091)
Firm tenure, years 12.598 (10.142) 14.188 (11.025) 13.811 (10.844)
Work experience, years 25.429 (11.191) 23.057 (10.891) 23.619 (11.009)
Job complexity (0−9 scale) 2.506 (1.352) 4.449 (1.782) 3.987 (1.881)
Job complexity missing, share .037 .063 .057
Job size 79 (162) 52 (92) 58 (113)
Employer size 1,535 (2,658) 1,538 (2,453) 1,537 (2,503)
Education level, %
Basic or unknown 45.837 29.899 33.673
Secondary 48.886 66.484 62.316
First stage of tertiary 4.783 3.246 3.610
Bachelor’s degree .407 .324 .343
Master’s degree .084 .048 .056
PhD .002 . .001
Field of education, %
Education .065 .014 .026
Humanities and art 1.477 .388 .646
Social sciences, business and law 7.109 2.043 3.243
Science .107 .052 .065
Technical 21.926 60.560 51.410
Agriculture 1.413 2.473 2.222
Health and welfare 2.771 .256 .852
Services 15.952 2.038 2.50
Unknown 49.179 32.176 36.203
Fraction female in ﬁrm .459 (.249) .168 (.172) .237 (.230)
Fraction female in job .734 (.273) .083 (.175) .237 (.343)
Sample size 40,271 129,762 170,033
Notes: Unless otherwise indicated, the ﬁgures in the table are means. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Hourly wage is the wage paid for regular working hours, omitting overtime pay, Sunday supplements, etc.
Schooling years is deﬁned as the mean years of schooling attached to a given level of education. Work experience is
approximated by subtracting the years of schooling and seven years for time prior to the age of school entry from
the worker’s age. The mean level of job complexity is computed using non-missing values only. Employer and job
sizes are the average ﬁrm and job size over workers. The mean ﬁrm size in the data is 124 and the mean job size is
7.1. The total number of ﬁrms is 1,373 and that of jobs is 24,020.
5 Results
5.1 White-collar workers
The results from various wage regressions for white-collar workers are given in Table
II.4. The explanatory variables are grouped into three categories. The individual re-
gressors cover the female dummy (sjki) and other person-speciﬁc explanatory variables
(xjki-variables), including the years of schooling, work experience, and the time spent
with the current employer. The job regressors (sjk· and gjk-variables) include the job
means of the individual regressors and controls for the size, location, type, and complexity
level of the job. Information on job complexity is missing for all managerial jobs and
for some non-managerial jobs in which cases the dummy for missing job complexity takes
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a value of one. The job regressors are measured in deviation from the ﬁrm mean. The
ﬁrm regressors (sj·· and zj -variables) are level variables, including the ﬁrm means of the
individual and job regressors plus industry dummies, the worker mix variable (= the ratio
of white-collar employees to all employees), and ﬁrm size.
Coeﬃcients of all individual regressors are statistically highly signiﬁcant in all speciﬁ-
cations. Let us consider the ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) model ﬁrst. Recall that this speciﬁcation
does not impose any restrictions on the correlation between the individual regressors and
unobservable group eﬀects. The coeﬃcient of the female dummy takes a value of —.0627,
indicating that women and men are not equally rewarded by employers.
18
A woman can
expect to receive a 6 percent lower wage than her equally qualiﬁed male co-worker doing
the same job within the same ﬁrm.
One additional year of schooling is estimated to increase the expected wage in a given
job by 2.6 percent. This is clearly below the conventional estimates for the returns to
schooling. The much lower estimate obtained here by conditioning on the job held suggests
that the wage eﬀect of education works largely through the diﬀerential allocation to jobs.
That is, better educated workers are qualiﬁed for more demanding jobs that pay higher
wages than the jobs held by their less educated counterparts (see discussion below). As
expected, wages increase with tenure and the eﬀect of work experience takes the familiar
quadratic form. It should be stressed that the potential years of experience has a tendency
to overestimate women’s experience because of their higher propensity to be out of work
owing to family responsibilities. Asplund’s (2001) ﬁndings, however, suggest that this may
be a less serious problem in our case.
19
The RE model is the most parsimonious version of our random eﬀects models, including
only the fractions of female employees in the set of job and ﬁrm regressors. This speci-
ﬁcation resembles the speciﬁcations estimated by Groshen (1991), Bayard et al. (2003),
and Datta Gupta and Rothstein (2001).
20
As expected, the coeﬃcients of both fraction
female variables are negative and statistically highly signiﬁcant, indicating lower wages
for predominantly female ﬁrms and jobs mainly occupied by women within ﬁrms. A ﬁrm
whose total white-collar workforce is female is estimated to pay 13 percent lower wages
on average than a ﬁrm that employs only male white-collar workers. Within a ﬁrm, a
hypothetical switch to a job with a 10 percent points higher female share would cause an
18
The coeﬃcient of the female dummy takes a value —.0632 if we do not control for x.
19
Asplund (2001) has studied this issue within the Finnish context. Using survey data she found that
among women the mean potential work experience exceeds the mean of actual (self-reported) one by
three years while among men the diﬀerence is close to zero. Replacing potential work experience with
the actual one in the standard gender-speciﬁc wage models had only a small and statistically insigniﬁcant
impact on the experience (and schooling) coeﬃcients for both women and men. Moreover, note that the
coeﬃcients of work experience in Asplund’s setting comprise wage growth resulting from accumulation of
general human capital as well as movements in the job ladder towards better paid jobs over time. In our
setting, by contrast, we are conditioning on the job held, and this conditioning picks up — without error —
wage growth that is due to climbing up the job ladder. Thus we expect the potential bias resulting from
measurement error in experience to be more limited in our case.
20
The main diﬀerences are: (1) we measure the fraction female in job as a deviation from the ﬁrm mean,
and (2) we do not include the fraction female in occupation nor in industry in our model.
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Table II.4: Wage regression results for white-collar workers
Model speciﬁcation
FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Intercept 1.3483 (.0054) [.0834] 1.8744 (.0083) 1.6734 (.0555) 1.6540 (.0561)
Individual regressors
Female —.0627 (.0012) —.0732 (.0022) [.0054] —.0653 (.0015) —.0627 (.0012) —.0627 (.0012)
Schooling years .0258 (.0003) .0886 (.0003) [.0051] .0425 (.0003) .0258 (.0003) .0258 (.0003)
Experience .0151 (.0002) .0182 (.0003) [.0013] .0175 (.0002) .0151 (.0002) .0151 (.0002)
Experience
2
/100 —.0228 (.0004) —.0224 (.0006) [.0040] —.0254 (.0004) —.0228 (.0004) —.0228 (.0004)
√
Firm tenure .0138 (.0004) —.0065 (.0005) [.0038] .0085 (.0005) .0138 (.0004) .0138 (.0004)
Job regressors
Fraction female —.1794 (.0028) [.0124] —.2155 (.0026) —.1266 (.0022) —.0779 (.0023)
Mean schooling .0324 (.0006) .0218 (.0006)
Mean experience .0075 (.0005) .0046 (.0005)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.0084 (.0010) —.0044 (.0010)
Technical .0317 (.0030) .0363 (.0029)
Managerial .3070 (.0022) .3112 (.0030)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0102 (.0010) —.0110 (.0009)
Complexity level .0457 (.0006)
Complexity missing .0348 (.0027)
Large city .0535 (.0029) .0460 (.0028)
Log (job size) —.0151 (.0009) —.0137 (.0008)
Firm regressors
Fraction female —.1796 (.0046) [.0572] —.1407 (.0157) —.0758 (.0129) —.0637 (.0130)
Mean schooling .0280 (.0037) .0258 (.0038)
Mean experience —.0006 (.0030) —.0067 (.0030)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 .0179 (.0064) .0198 (.0064)
Fraction technical jobs .0496 (.0127) .0554 (.0128)
Fraction managerial jobs .2021 (.0120) .1667 (.0138)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0329 (.0030) —.0321 (.0030)
Mean job complexity .0099 (.0015)
Fraction complexity missing .0681 (.0108)
Fraction jobs in large cities .0441 (.0044) .0438 (.0044)
Worker mix .0734 (.0106) .0688 (.0107)
Mean log (job size) —.0187 (.0046) —.0198 (.0048)
Log (ﬁrm size) .0197 (.0028) .0191 (.0029)
Variance components
σ
2
ε
(individual error) .0270 .0173 .0173
σ
2
ω
(job random eﬀect) .0192 .0117 .0101
σ
2
ξ
(ﬁrm random eﬀect) .0115 .0029 .0031
Notes: FE is the ﬁxed eﬀects model with the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. For the
OLS model the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intraﬁrm correlation are in square brackets. RE, CRE1, and CRE2 are the
(correlated) random eﬀects models with the GLS standard errors in parentheses. All job regressors are measured
in deviation from the ﬁrm mean. The clerical jobs include also non-managerial jobs in industries where no
distinction between the clerical and technical jobs has been made. CRE1 and CRE2 models include 38 industry
dummies. Number of observations is 148,944 in all regressions.
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expected wage loss of about two percent.
It is illustrative to consider the OLS estimates of the same model. The OLS stan-
dard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity but derived under the assumption of random
sampling are given in the parentheses. In addition, the standard errors that are robust to
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intraﬁrm correlation are shown in the square brackets (see
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 328-331). The diﬀerence between the standard errors is substantial
for all coeﬃcients. The OLS standard errors that do not take into account the grouped
structure of the underlying data are dramatically understated.
Compared with the ﬁxed eﬀects model, the coeﬃcients of the RE and OLS models are
quite diﬀerent for some individual regressors. Within the random eﬀects framework, this
calls into question whether the random eﬀects associated with ﬁrms and jobs are uncorre-
lated with the individual explanatory variables. In the presence of such a correlation the
regression coeﬃcients in the RE model are biased and inconsistent. In the CRE1 model
a number of job and ﬁrm controls, including the group means of the individual variables,
are added to the model. Testing statistical signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of the group
means can be interpreted as a Hausman-type test for the random eﬀects speciﬁcation.
Since the coeﬃcients of the group means of x in the CRE1 model are highly signiﬁcant,
we conclude that the RE model is not valid (i.e. the ﬁrm and job error components are
correlated with x). By implication, the OLS model must be miss-speciﬁed as well. In the
CRE1 and CRE2 speciﬁcations this problem is solved by adding the group means of x
to the model, as proposed by Mundlak (1978). As a consequence, the coeﬃcients of all
individual regressors are identical to those of the FE model.
In the CRE1 model the coeﬃcients of the fraction female variables are reduced by
one-half in absolute value when compared with the RE model. This implies that the
fraction female variables in the RE model serve in large part as a proxy for other factors
responsible for wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms and jobs within ﬁrms. Coeﬃcients of job
and ﬁrm regressors generally have signs that seem intuitively reasonable. Larger ﬁrms pay
higher wages. Firms and jobs within ﬁrms that require higher education are associated
with higher wages. This is consistent with the claim above that better educated workers
are allocated to ﬁrms and further to jobs that pay higher wages. Workers whose jobs
are located in large cities receive better wages, perhaps to compensate for higher living
costs. Within ﬁrms wage diﬀerentials between technical and clerical jobs are relatively
small, being around 3 percent in favour of technical jobs. A white-collar worker holding
a managerial job receives 36 percent higher wage than an equally qualiﬁed worker doing
clerical work within the same ﬁrm.
In the CRE2 speciﬁcation the job complexity level is added to the model. This is our
preferred model speciﬁcation. Information on job complexity is missing for all managerial
jobs and for some non-managerial jobs. In these cases the dummy for missing job com-
plexity takes a value of one. One additional level of (re-scaled) job complexity is found
to be associated with a wage increase of almost ﬁve percent. Compared with the CRE1
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model, the coeﬃcients of managerial and technical job dummies remain almost unchanged.
Provided that more complex jobs require higher education, it is not surprising to ﬁnd a
considerable fall in the eﬀect of the mean schooling years in job. The coeﬃcient of the
fraction female in job is reduced by over one-third in absolute value. Even after controlling
for job complexity, average education, and many other factors, it is quite remarkable that
wages remain negatively associated with the fraction female variables. This indicates that
ﬁrms and jobs within ﬁrms mainly occupied by women pay lower wages for reasons that
cannot be explained by observables. This may be due to sex diﬀerences in preferences
but it may also reﬂect discrimination through diﬀerential access to higher-paying jobs at
the point of hire or subsequent promotions. On the other hand, these ﬁndings may be
driven to some extent by missing job complexity information for the managerial jobs. We
elaborate on this issue below.
Before turning to the wage gap decompositions, let us take a look at the estimates
of variance components that are shown on the bottom lines of the table. Of course, the
magnitude of error variation falls as more controls are added to the model (i.e. when we
move from the RE model towards the CRE2 model). Estimates of variance components
imply that most of the unexplained wage variation is related to individuals within jobs. In
the CRE2 speciﬁcation, for example, the individual error variance σ
2
ε
accounts for about
60 percent of the total error variance, σ
2
ε
+ σ
2
ω
+ σ
2
ξ
. Note also that the variance of ﬁrm
random eﬀects is clearly below that of job random eﬀects. This implies that adding ﬁrm
level regressors to the model cannot notably improve the model’s ﬁt.
The residual intrajob correlation, (σ
2
ω
+σ
2
ξ
)/(σ
2
ε
+σ
2
ω
+σ
2
ξ
), describes correlation between
the wage outcomes of two randomly chosen workers in a randomly chosen job within a
randomly chosen ﬁrm, after controlling for s and x. In the CRE2 model this correlation
is as high as .43, which highlights the importance of accounting for the grouping in the
econometric modelling.
Table II.5 shows the gender wage gap decompositions for white-collar workers based
upon the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst two columns report the sample means
of the regressors among men and women, and the third column shows the diﬀerence. The
absolute contribution of each variable to the wage gap is obtained by multiplying the sex
diﬀerence in the sample means by the associated regressor coeﬃcient. These contributions
are reported in the last ﬁve columns of the table, where each column corresponds to the
model speciﬁcation in Table II.4. The aggregate contribution of each group of regressors
is shown below the horizontal lines.
From the ﬁxed eﬀect speciﬁcation we conclude that roughly one-third of the overall
gender wage gap of .2505 can be attributed to unexplained within-job wage diﬀerentials
between sexes (.0627) and within-job sex diﬀerences in education, work experience, and
ﬁrm tenure (.0154). Sex segregation among ﬁrms explains 16 percent (.0391), while over
one-half of the overall gap is owing to sex segregation among jobs within ﬁrms (.1334).
The OLS and RE models, which were found to be inconsistent, give a diﬀerent picture
34
Table II.5: Gender wage gap decompositions for white-collar workers
Sample means Contribution to the wage gap
Men Women Diﬀ. FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Individual regressors
Female .0000 1.0000 —1.0000 .0627 .0732 .0653 .0627 .0627
Schooling years 12.8100 12.0654 .7446 .0192 .0660 .0316 .0192 .0192
Experience 21.3181 22.0808 —.7627 —.0115 −.0139 —.0133 —.0115 —.0115
Experience
2
/100 5.6217 6.0056 —.3839 .0088 .0086 .0097 .0088 .0088
√
Firm tenure 3.0579 3.1327 —.0748 —.0010 .0005 —.0006 —.0010 —.0010
.0781 .1344 .0933 .0781 .0781
Job regressors
Fraction female —.2011 .3420 —.5431 .0974 .1170 .0688 .0423
Mean schooling .1784 —.3033 .4817 .0156 .0105
Mean experience —.0465 .0791 —.1257 —.0009 —.0006
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.0242 .0412 —.0654 .0005 .0003
Technical job .0334 —.0568 .0901 .0029 .0033
Managerial job .0620 —.1054 .1674 .0514 .0521
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0066 .0112 —.0178 .0002 .0002
Complexity level .2075 —.3527 .5602 .0256
Complexity missing .0340 —.0579 .0919 .0032
Large city .0008 —.0014 .0022 .0001 .0001
Log (job size) .1778 —.3023 .4801 —.0073 —.0066
.1334 .0974 .1170 .1312 .1304
Firm regressors
Fraction female .3318 .4359 —.1042 .0187 .0147 .0079 .0066
Mean schooling 12.6462 12.3440 .3022 .0085 .0078
Mean experience 21.3802 21.9753 —.5950 .0033 .0040
Mean (experience)
2
/100 5.6635 5.9345 —.2711 —.0049 —.0054
Fraction technical jobs .1353 .1122 .0231 .0011 .0013
Fraction managerial jobs .3992 .3274 .0719 .0145 .0120
√
Mean ﬁrm tenure 3.0445 3.1554 —.1108 .0036 .0036
Mean job complexity 4.2717 4.0381 .2336 .0023
Fraction complexity missing .5345 .4952 .0393 .0027
Fraction jobs in large cities .5859 .5698 .0161 .0007 .0007
Worker mix .6724 .6855 —.0131 —.0010 —.0009
Mean log (job size) 2.8923 2.8272 .0651 —.0012 —.0013
Log (ﬁrm size) 6.8822 6.8259 .0563 .0011 .0011
Industry dummies .0043 .0051
.0391 .0187 .0147 .0380 .0395
Overall sum .2505 .2505 .2243 .2473 .2480
Notes: The raw wage gap, as measured by the sex diﬀerence in mean log wages, is .2505. The ﬁrst two columns
report the samples means of all regressors among men and women; the third column gives the diﬀerence. The last
ﬁve columns show the absolute contribution of each regressor obtained from various model speciﬁcations. The
contributions are obtained by multiplying the coeﬃcients in Table II.4 by the sex diﬀerences in sample means in
Table II.5. The cumulative eﬀect of each group of regressors is shown below the horizontal lines.
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about the relative importance of the various determinants of gender wage diﬀerentials.
The CRE1 and CRE2 models, however, produce decompositions consistent with the ﬁxed
eﬀect speciﬁcation. Contrary to the ﬁxed eﬀects approach, the correlated random eﬀects
models allow us to address the question as to why predominantly female ﬁrms and jobs
are lower paid.
Consider the decompositions associated with the CRE1 and CRE2 models. There are
no dominating factors that could be argued to be responsible for most of the aggregate
eﬀect of sex segregation among ﬁrms (which in turn is quite moderate). The fraction
female in ﬁrm especially has only a minor impact on the gender wage gap, accounting
for less than .0080 in both speciﬁcations. Likewise, the industry dummies and hence sex
segregation among industries do not play any role in explaining the gender wage gap. Sex
segregation among jobs within ﬁrms is a more interesting case. It appears that over .0500
of the overall wage gap is explained by the disproportionate concentration of men in high-
paid managerial jobs. This accounts for about 40 percent of the aggregate eﬀect of sex
segregation among jobs. Among technical and clerical jobs women are more likely to hold
less complex jobs, which explains .0256 of the overall gap in the CRE2 decomposition.
Once we control for job complexity, the contribution of the fraction female in job falls
from .0688 to .0423, where the latter ﬁgure still accounts for 17 percent of the overall wage
gap. In other words, predominantly female jobs pay lower wages for reasons that cannot
be explained by diﬀerences in schooling requirements or job complexity levels between
jobs. However, it will turn out that this result is partly driven by the missing complexity
information of managerial jobs (we will discuss this below).
5.2 Blue-collar workers
Table II.6 displays the results of wage regressions for blue-collar workers. The coeﬃcient
of the female dummy in the ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation indicates that a blue-collar woman
receives a 3.5 percent lower wage for the same job than her equally qualiﬁed male co-
worker does. This amounts to one-ﬁfth of the overall gender gap of blue-collar workers,
i.e. the similar amount that we found for white-collar workers.
Compared with the (correlated) random eﬀects results for white-collar workers in Table
II.4, the qualitative results in Table II.6 are rather similar, though the coeﬃcients of the
job size and large city dummy have reversed signs. Some interesting discrepancies in the
magnitude of diﬀerent factors exist, however. Education, for example, contributes very
little to wage diﬀerentials within jobs. Conditional on the job held, one additional year of
schooling results in an increase of only .2 percent in the expected wage rate.
As expected, the coeﬃcients of the fraction female variables are always negative and
statistically highly signiﬁcant. When the measure of job complexity is added to the analy-
sis, the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of fraction female in job is reduced by one-half,
as in the case of white-collar workers. Interestingly, the eﬀect of the fraction female in
ﬁrm exceeds that of the fraction female in job and remains very strong in all random ef-
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Table II.6: Wage regression results for blue-collar workers
Model speciﬁcation
FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Intercept 2.2557 (.0046) [.0182] 2.2712 (.0050) 1.7501 (.0930) 1.8373 (.0921)
Individual regressors
Female —.0357 (.0009) −.0389 (.0016) [.0035] —.0372 (.0009) —.0357 (.0009) —.0357 (.0009)
Schooling years .0023 (.0003) .0090 (.0004) [.0011] .0034 (.0003) .0023 (.0003) .0023 (.0003)
Experience .0038 (.0001) .0054 (.0002) [.0008] .0047 (.0001) .0038 (.0001) .0038 (.0001)
Experience
2
/100 —.0075 (.0002) −.0120 (.0003) [.0012] —.0092 (.0002) —.0075 (.0002) —.0075 (.0002)
√
Firm tenure .0123 (.0003) .0283 (.0003) [.0032] .0141 (.0003) .0123 (.0003) .0123 (.0003)
Job regressors
Fraction female −.1101 (.0022) [.0063] —.1002 (.0023) —.1011 (.0022) —.0521 (.0023)
Mean schooling .0119 (.0010) .0033 (.0009)
Mean experience .0087 (.0004) .0051 (.0003)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.0159 (.0008) —.0091 (.0007)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure .0103 (.0009) .0003 (.0008)
Complexity level .0286 (.0005)
Complexity missing —.0500 (.0060)
Large city —.0173 (.0024) —.0202 (.0022)
Log (job size) .0161 (.0006) .0135 (.0005)
Firm regressors
Fraction female −.3102 (.0023) [.0240] —.2943 (.0116) —.2632 (.0127) —.2421 (.0136)
Mean schooling .0250 (.0083) .0120 (.0083)
Mean experience .0186 (.0034) .0159 (.0033)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.0277 (.0072) —.0236 (.0071)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0187 (.0036) —.0219 (.0036)
Mean job complexity .0234 (.0026)
Fraction complexity missing .0697 (.0147)
Fraction jobs in large cities —.0272 (.0056) —.0258 (.0055)
Worker mix .0226 (.0142) .0223 (.0141)
Mean log (job size) .0126 (.0036) .0174 (.0039)
Log (ﬁrm size) .0238 (.0028) .0199 (.0031)
Variance components
σ
2
ε
(individual error) .0088 .0085 .0085
σ
2
ω
(job random eﬀect) .0054 .0049 .0041
σ
2
ξ
(ﬁrm random eﬀect) .0113 .0060 .0059
Notes: FE is the ﬁxed eﬀects model with the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. For the
OLS model the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intraﬁrm correlation are in square brackets. RE, CRE1, and CRE2 are the
(correlated) random eﬀects models with the GLS standard errors in parentheses. All job regressors are measured
in deviation from the ﬁrm mean. The reference category in the job regressors is job located outside large cities.
CRE1 and CRE2 models include 49 industry dummies. Number of observations is 170,033 in all regressions.
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Table II.7: Gender wage gap decompositions for blue-collar workers
Sample means Contribution to the wage gap
Men Women Diﬀ. FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Individual regressors
Female .0000 1.0000 —1.0000 .0357 .0389 .0372 .0357 .0357
Schooling years 10.4790 10.1956 .2835 .0006 .0026 .0010 .0006 .0006
Experience 23.0571 25.4285 —2.3715 —.0089 −.0128 —.0111 —.0089 —.0089
Experience
2
/100 6.5024 7.7185 —1.2161 .0091 .0146 .0112 .0091 .0091
√
Firm tenure 3.4148 3.2060 .2088 .0026 .0059 .0029 .0026 .0026
.0390 .0492 .0412 .0390 .0390
Job regressors
Fraction female —.0853 .2747 —.3600 .0396 .0361 .0364 .0188
Mean schooling .0309 —.0994 .1303 .0016 .0004
Mean experience —.2135 .6879 —.9014 —.0078 —.0046
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.1196 .3854 —.5049 .0080 .0046
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure .0287 —.0926 .1214 .0013 .0000
Complexity level .1886 —.6080 .7966 .0228
Complexity missing .0021 —.0067 .0088 —.0004
Large city —.0018 .0058 —.0076 .0001 .0002
Log (job size) —.0451 .1454 —.1905 —.0031 —.0026
.0444 .0396 .0361 .0364 .0392
Firm regressors
Fraction female .1678 .4594 —.2916 .0905 .0858 .0768 .0706
Mean schooling 10.4289 10.3570 .0719 .0018 .0009
Mean experience 23.7848 23.0838 .7010 .0130 .0112
Mean (experience)
2
/100 6.8443 6.6170 .2273 —.0063 —.0054
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure 3.4219 3.1832 .2387 —.0045 —.0052
Mean job complexity 3.9454 2.9767 .9687 .0227
Fraction complexity missing .0614 .0439 .0174 .0012
Fraction jobs in large cities .6890 .7197 —.0306 .0008 .0008
Worker mix .2844 .2774 .0069 .0002 .0002
Mean log (job size) 2.9812 3.1357 —.1545 —.0019 —.0027
Log (ﬁrm size) 6.3066 6.2456 .0610 .0015 .0012
Industry dummies .0177 .0066
.0958 .0905 .0858 .0991 .1020
Overall sum .1793 .1793 .1631 .1745 .1802
Notes: The raw wage gap, as measured by the sex diﬀerence in mean log wages, is .1793. The ﬁrst two columns
report the samples means of all regressors among men and women; the third column gives the diﬀerence. The last
ﬁve columns show the absolute contribution of each regressor obtained from various model speciﬁcations. The
contributions are obtained by multiplying the coeﬃcients in Table II.6 by the sex diﬀerences in sample means in
Table II.7. The cumulative eﬀect of each group of regressors is shown below the horizontal lines.
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fects speciﬁcations. A ﬁrm with only female blue-collar employees is found to pay over 20
percent lower wages than a ﬁrm employing only male blue-collar workers, suggesting that
sex segregation among ﬁrms is an important piece of the explanation of the gender wage
diﬀerentials between female and male blue-collar workers. In the CRE2 speciﬁcation, each
level of job complexity is estimated to increase the wage rate by two percent, i.e. much
less than what was the case with white-collar workers.
By looking at the estimates of the variance components on the bottom lines of the ta-
ble, we see that the largest fraction of unexplained wage variation occurs between workers
within jobs, which is in accordance with the ﬁndings for the white-collar workers. Inter-
estingly, the variance of the ﬁrm random eﬀects exceeds that of the job random eﬀects
in all speciﬁcations. This further supports the view that wage diﬀerentials between ﬁrms
play a more important role for blue-collar workers than for white-collar workers.
Table II.7 shows the decomposition results for blue-collar workers. It appears that sex
segregation among ﬁrms accounts for over one-half of the wage gap. This is in contrast with
the ﬁnding that segregation of white-collar workers among ﬁrms does not play an important
role in explaining the gender wage diﬀerentials. The explanation is two-fold and related to
the fraction female variable. First, among blue-collar workers, there exists a much stronger
negative association between the wage rate and fraction female in ﬁrm, which does not get
weaker even after controlling for a number of ﬁrm level factors. Second, the strong eﬀect
of the gender composition of the ﬁrm is reinforced in the wage gap decomposition by a
large degree of sex segregation among ﬁrms (see the sex diﬀerence in the sample means
of the fraction female). In other words, ﬁrms with a high fraction of female blue-collar
employees pay lower wages for unobservable reasons, and this widens the sex gap in pay
considerably because of the large degree of sex segregation among ﬁrms.
The segregation of blue-collar women into lower paying jobs within ﬁrms accounts for
one-ﬁfth of the wage gap, which is clearly less than what was the case with white-collar
workers. Most of the aggregate eﬀect of job segregation in the CRE2 speciﬁcation (.0392)
results from the allocation of women to less complex jobs (.0228) but almost one-half is
attributed to the fraction female in job (.0188). The aggregate contribution of individual
characteristics is .0390, which is attributed almost entirely to unexplained gender wage
diﬀerentials within jobs.
5.3 Robustness of the results
In this section we test how sensitive our regression and decomposition results are with
respect to the model speciﬁcation and data restrictions adopted.
Missing job complexity information
In the case of white-collar workers, information on job complexity is missing for many
observations, including all workers in managerial jobs and some workers in technical and
clerical jobs. This has two implications. First, the degree of detail in the classiﬁcation of
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managerial jobs is low compared with the classiﬁcation of technical and clerical jobs. This
is likely to have an eﬀect on the relative importance of job segregation and that of within-
job wage diﬀerentials. Secondly, job complexity is only partly controlled for in the CRE2
speciﬁcations in Tables II.4 and II.5. Therefore, we have performed the same analysis
for a white-collar sample that excludes observations with missing values for the level of
job complexity. This sub-sample represents only technical and clerical workers, among
whom the raw wage gap is much lower (.1570). The regression results are shown in Table
II.10 in the Appendix. Compared with the previous results, the magnitude of coeﬃcients
is diﬀerent but signs remain unchanged. In the ﬁxed eﬀects model the coeﬃcient of the
female dummy equals —.0283. In the CRE1 speciﬁcation both fraction female variables
have coeﬃcients around —.150. Adding the level of job complexity to the analysis reduces
the unexplained segregation eﬀects considerably. The coeﬃcient of the fraction female
in job drops to a value of —.0335, and that of the fraction female in ﬁrm is reduced by
one-third. This means that a major part of wage variation between jobs within ﬁrms can
be explained by diﬀerences in the complexity levels of jobs.
In the Appendix Table II.11 displays the wage gap decompositions for the sub-sample
of technical and clerical workers. The overall relative contribution of wage diﬀerentials
arising from wage diﬀerentials within jobs is lower for the sub-sample than for the entire
white-collar data in Table II.5. In particular, the unexplained within-job wage gap of
.0283 accounts now for 18 percent of the overall gap among technical and clerical workers
(compared with 25 percent for the entire data). The importance of sex segregation among
ﬁrms appears to be slightly weaker now, whereas the contribution of segregation among
jobs dominates, accounting for two-thirds of the overall gap. The major part of the eﬀect
of sex segregation among jobs within ﬁrms (.0738) is attributable to sex diﬀerences in
complexity levels in the jobs held by women and men. This in fact explains approximately
one-half of the overall gender wage gap among technical and clerical employees.
In the sample of blue-collar workers, we have valid information on the job complexity
level for 96 percent of observations. Dropping those with missing information out of the
sample does not change the results in Tables II.6 and II.7.
Varying size thresholds for jobs
Obviously, our deﬁnition for the job is quite strict. This leads to a large number of
jobs with only one or two workers in the white-collar data. One might wonder whether
this feature of the data would be partly driving the results. To explore this possibility,
we replicated our analysis by excluding all white-collar workers in jobs with less than
three workers (17 percent of all observations). As a result the raw wage gap changes by
less than one percentage point. While the regression results of the CRE2 model remain
qualitatively unchanged, the variance of the job random eﬀects shrinks (by 20 percent)
and the coeﬃcients of the job regressors change to some extent. Importantly, changes in
the wage gap decomposition turned out to be very small.
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In the blue-collar data, the weight of small jobs is much lower — less than 4 percent of
blue-collar workers are in jobs with less than three employees — and their exclusion from
the analysis does not change the results.
Jobs with both sexes present
Another potential problem with our data setup is that apart from being small, quite
many jobs consist of only men or women. It is obvious that observations in such jobs
contribute to the role of sex segregation, but not to the role of gender wage diﬀerentials
within jobs. So we replicated our analysis using samples restricted to integrated jobs
with at least three workers. This restriction results in considerably smaller sub-samples.
In the case of white-collar workers, the number of jobs drops from 40,663 to 3,890, that
of workers drops from 148,944 to 76,375, and the raw wage gap shrinks from .2505 to
.2070. Considering the CRE2 speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcients of job regressors are aﬀected
but those of individual and ﬁrm regressors remain almost unchanged. The most notable
diﬀerences are more negative coeﬃcients for the fraction female variables. In the wage gap
decompositions these changes are reﬂected in the relative importance of the various sources
of gender wage diﬀerentials. In the CRE2 decomposition the absolute contribution of job
segregation drops from .13 to .05, that of ﬁrm segregation rises from .04 to .09, whereas the
contribution of unexplained within-job wage diﬀerentials and sex diﬀerences in individual
characteristics remains around .08. The decrease in the importance of job segregation
stems from a smaller degree of sex segregation among jobs and from smaller complexity
diﬀerences between female and male jobs in this sub-sample.
By imposing the same restriction to the blue-collar data, the number of jobs drops from
24,020 to 3,446, that of workers drops from 170,033 to 78,937, and the raw wage gap reduces
from .179 to .126. The regression and decomposition results change in the same way as was
the case with the white-collar workers. Namely, the regressor coeﬃcients do not change
much, but the relative importance of job segregation in the wage gap decompositions
falls, owing to a smaller degree of job segregation and reduced sex diﬀerences in the job
complexity levels.
Gender-speciﬁc slopes
In the Oaxaca-type decompositions the regression coeﬃcients are usually allowed to be
gender-speciﬁc. Table II.8 shows results for white-collar workers from an extended version
of the CRE2 model where all individual level regressors are interacted with the female
dummy. For ease of interpretation the education, experience, and tenure variables are
measured in deviation from their values for the average worker. The intercept of the
model and the female dummy coeﬃcient are shown in the ﬁrst row of columns 4 and 5
respectively. The other coeﬃcients in column 4 measure returns to education, experience,
and tenure for men. Women’s returns are obtained as the sum of the coeﬃcients in columns
4 and 5. The female dummy coeﬃcient gives the size of the unexplained within-job sex
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Table II.8: Regression coeﬃcients and gender wage gap decompositions from the CRE2
model with female interactions in individual level variables for white-collar workers
CRE2 coeﬃcients Contribution to
Sample means Male Female the wage gap
Men Women Diﬀ. coeﬃcient interaction Means Coeﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 2.1946 (.0515) —.0795 (.0018) .0000 .0795
Schooling years .2757 —.4688 .7446 .0289 (.0003) —.0105 (.0004) .0215 —.0049
Experience —.2824 .4802 —.7627 .0180 (.0002) —.0081 (.0003) —.0137 .0039
Experience
2
/100 .9559 1.3398 —.3839 —.0276 (.0005) .0127 (.0007) .0106 —.0171
√
Firm tenure —1.4146 —1.3398 —.0748 .0127 (.0005) .0026 (.0007) —.0010 .0035
.0174 .0649
Notes: From education, experience, and tenure variables we have subtracted their values for the average worker.
Coeﬃcients of the regressors and their interactions with the female dummy are given in columns 4 and 5
respectively. The interaction for the intercept corresponds to the female dummy. The GLS standard errors are in
parentheses. The contributions of sex diﬀerences in background characteristics in column 6 are obtained by
multiplying the coeﬃcients in column 4 with the sex diﬀerences in the variable means in column 3. The
contributions of sex diﬀerences in coeﬃcients in column 7 are obtained by multiplying the interaction coeﬃcients
with the sample means for women in column 2 and changing the sign. Cumulative contributions are shown below
the horizontal lines.
gap in pay for workers with the average years of education, experience, and tenure. We
do not show results for job and ﬁrm level regressors, as they remain basically unchanged.
When β is allowed to diﬀer between sexes, we ﬁnd a lower return to education but a
higher return to ﬁrm tenure for white-collar women. In the presence of substantial sex
diﬀerences in the ﬁeld of received education, women’s lower return to education may indi-
cate that the employers value most technical education, which is received by the majority
of men. The absolute value of the female dummy coeﬃcient is slightly higher than in the
corresponding speciﬁcation where β was restricted to be equal for both sexes. Among
workers with the average years of education, experience, and tenure, white-collar women
are found to receive some 7.6% lower wages than their male co-workers who are doing the
same job. The expected wage rate increases over the ﬁrst 35 years of experience but at a
lower rate for women. As a consequence, the unexplained wage gap within jobs is small
for workers with little experience but grows with experience.
21
There is no evidence of
the within-job sex gap in favour of men among workers with no experience and tenure; in
fact, women may be even slightly better paid in such cases.
The potential years of work experience has a tendency to overestimate actual experi-
ence, and the problem is more acute for women because of their higher propensity to be
out of work owing to family responsibilities. The imposed functional form for the eﬀect
of work experience is also rather rigid. These remarks suggest that our ﬁndings may be
sensitive with respect to the way how work experience is measured and incorporated in the
model. If we adjust our measure of experience for likely career interruptions and replace
21
Strictly speaking, the within-job wage gap between women and men begins to shrink after 35 years
of experience. This phenomenon is, however, driven by the imposed quadratic form for the eﬀect of
experience, and does not occur when the experience dummies are used (see the following discussion and
footnote 22).
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Table II.9: Regression coeﬃcients and gender wage gap decompositions from the CRE2
model with female interactions in individual level variables for blue-collar workers
CRE2 coeﬃcients Contribution to
Sample means Male Female the wage gap
Men Women Diﬀ. coeﬃcient interaction Means Coeﬀ.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Intercept 1.0000 1.0000 .0000 1.9574 (.0921) —.0426 (.0011) .0000 .0426
Schooling years .0671 —.2163 .2835 .0025 (.0003) —.0013 (.0005) .0007 —.0003
Experience —.5617 1.8098 —2.3715 .0045 (.0001) —.0027 (.0002) —.0107 .0049
Experience
2
/100 .9240 2.1401 —1.2161 —.0089 (.0003) .0052 (.0005) .0108 —.0112
√
Firm tenure —.3015 —0.5103 .2088 .0120 (.0003) .0005 (.0005) .0025 .0003
.0034 .0362
Notes: From education, experience, and tenure variables we have subtracted their values for the average worker.
Coeﬃcients of the regressors and their interactions with the female dummy are given in columns 4 and 5
respectively. The interaction for the intercept corresponds to the female dummy. The GLS standard errors are in
parentheses. The contributions of sex diﬀerences in background characteristics in column 6 are obtained by
multiplying the coeﬃcients in column 4 with the sex diﬀerences in the variable means in column 3. The
contributions of sex diﬀerences in coeﬃcients in column 7 are obtained by multiplying the interaction coeﬃcients
with the sample means for women in column 2 and changing the sign. Cumulative contributions are shown below
the horizontal lines.
the quadratic experience terms with the set of experience dummies,
22
our main ﬁndings
remain unchanged, though the female interaction with tenure becomes insigniﬁcant.
The last two columns of Table II.8 show the contributions of sex diﬀerences in the back-
ground characteristics (column 6) and regressor coeﬃcients (column 7), i.e. the explained
and unexplained part of the wage diﬀerential between the average woman and average man
who are doing the same work for the same employer respectively. Some 80% of the overall
within-job wage diﬀerential remains unexplained, being attributed to diﬀerent coeﬃcients
for women and men. Only a small fraction of the gender wage diﬀerential is attributable
to sex diﬀerences in the background characteristics, namely to women’s lower education
level. Not surprisingly, these are the same conclusions we jumped to in the case of the
model without gender-speciﬁc slopes.
Table II.9 reports the results of the same exercise for blue-collar workers. The ﬁndings
are in line with the white-collar results. Namely, returns to education and work experience
are diﬀerent for women, and the absolute value of the female dummy coeﬃcient is higher
than with the previous estimate. However, the diﬀerence in returns to tenure between sexes
is not statistically signiﬁcant among blue-collar workers. Over 90% of the within-job wage
gap is attributed to diﬀerent coeﬃcients for blue-collar women and men. Stated diﬀerently,
sex diﬀerences in the observed background characteristics do not explain the within-job
gap. This is the same conclusion we obtained from the model where the coeﬃcients were
restricted to be equal for both sexes.
It is important to recognize that the results of decomposition exercises with gender-
22
From men’s experience we subtracted one year for military service. We subtracted 1, 2, or 3 years
from women’s experience if the original experience variable was 2-4, 5-7, or more than 7 years respectively.
These modiﬁcations are based on Asplund’s (2001) comparisons of the potential and actual (self-reported)
years of work experience.
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speciﬁc slopes are somewhat arbitrary. First, the male coeﬃcients are taken as a reference
structure that is used to evaluate the contributions of sex diﬀerences in the background
characteristics in Tables II.8 and II.9. Alternatively, one could choose the female coef-
ﬁcients or some weighted average of male and female coeﬃcients. If we use the female
coeﬃcients as the reference structure, our main insights do not change much. Second,
the estimated contributions of sex diﬀerences in the slopes are aﬀected by the location
transformations of the explanatory variables (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999), making the
decomposition results in column 7 arbitrary. We found that the unexplained within-job
wage diﬀerential among both groups of workers is attributed mainly to the female dummy
coeﬃcient, while women’s diﬀerent returns to education and experience have only mod-
erate contributions. These ﬁndings are driven by our choice to measure the education,
experience, and tenure variables in deviation from their values for the average worker. If
these variables were transformed to range from zero upwards, we would ﬁnd a negligible
(or slightly negative) female dummy eﬀect and strong positive contributions for women’s
lower returns to education and experience. In such a case the female dummy coeﬃcient
would pick up the size of the within-job sex gap in pay among the lowest educated workers
with no experience and tenure. In other words, the results in the last column depend on
the interpretation we put on the female dummy coeﬃcient. Importantly, the overall eﬀect
of sex diﬀerences in the regression coeﬃcients is not aﬀected by the location transforma-
tions, nor the estimated contributions of sex diﬀerences in the background characteristics
in column 6.
Despite these diﬃculties in interpretation, it is safe to make the following conclusions
that apply to both groups of workers. First, only a small fraction of the within-job wage
gap between sexes can be explained by sex diﬀerences in background characteristics, while
most of the gap remains unexplained, being attributable to diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients.
Second, the unexplained within-job wage diﬀerential increases with education and experi-
ence (over the major part of the career), being very small or negligible among low educated
workers with little experience and tenure.
5.4 Comparisons with results from other studies
We conclude this section by contrasting our main ﬁndings with the ﬁndings from other
countries and a related Finnish study. One should not forget that the results of diﬀerent
studies are not directly comparable owing to dissimilarities in the data coverage, occupa-
tional classiﬁcation, and statistical methods used.
White-collar workers in Nordic countries
Our results for white-collar workers are most directly comparable with evidence for Norway
(Petersen et al., 1997), Sweden (Meyersson Milgrom et al., 2001), and Denmark (Datta
Gupta and Rothstein, 2001). We found that in Finland white-collar women earn some
23 percent less on average than men do, compared with 29 percent in Denmark and 27
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percent in Norway and Sweden. Sex segregation among ﬁrms accounts for about 16 percent
of the Finnish raw gap, while the industry eﬀects have no signiﬁcant role at all. These
results are consistent with the ﬁndings for other Nordic countries that sex segregation
among industries or employers does not play an important role in the case of white-collar
workers.
Roughly one-half of the raw gap of the Finnish white-collar workers is attributable to
the disproportionate concentration of women in lower-paying jobs within ﬁrms. Within
ﬁrms high-paid managerial jobs are mainly occupied by men, and among other types
of jobs men are concentrated in positions with higher skill requirements. In Denmark
occupational and job segregation explains less than one-half of the raw gap but in Norway
and Sweden as much as 80 percent. Finally, we found that within jobs white-collar women
are paid some 6 percent lower wages on average than their male co-workers with equal
education, work experience, and tenure. This ﬁgure is roughly identical to the size of the
(unconditional) within-job wage gap found for Sweden and Norway but much lower than
what has been found for Denmark (about 14 percent after controlling for a number of
individual characteristics).
Blue-collar workers in Nordic countries
In the Finnish manufacturing sector blue-collar women’s mean wage is 16 percent lower
than men’s mean wage. Petersen et al. (1997) and Meyersson Milgrom et al. (2001) report
somewhat lower wage gaps for blue-collar workers in Norway and Sweden respectively.
We found that most of the sex gap results from sex segregation among ﬁrms. This is in
accordance with a strong eﬀect of establishment segregation among the Swedish blue-collar
workers. By contrast, Petersen et al. (1997) ﬁnd employer segregation less important in
the case of Norway. Furthermore, we found that blue-collar women are paid 3.5 percent
less than their equally qualiﬁed male counterparts who are doing the same job for the
same employer. This ﬁgure is very close to the (unconditional) within-job gap in Norway,
being above the Swedish level.
U.S. evidence
Comparisons with U.S. evidence are less straightforward because the U.S. ﬁndings are
mixed and because the U.S. studies do not make a clear diﬀerence between white-collar
and blue-collar workers. Compared with the U.S. results of Bayard et al. (2003), our
results point to a smaller (unexplained) within-job gender gap and a stronger role for sex
segregation in Finland. These conclusions are reversed, if the ﬁndings of Groshen (1991)
or Petersen and Morgan (1995) are taken as a reference.
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Finnish service industries
In a complementary study Luukkonen (2003b) explores gender wage diﬀerentials in the
Finnish service sector using the methods developed in this paper. His data, obtained from
the records of the Employers’ Federation of Service Industries (PT),
23
cover some 190,000
workers in 3,900 private services ﬁrms. In the service sector analysis white- and blue-collar
workers were not analysed separately, owing to a diﬀerent occupational structure. Keeping
this in mind, the raw wage gap of 20 percent in the service sector corresponds quite closely
to our ﬁndings for the manufacturing industries. According to Luukkonen (2003b), one-
half of the overall gap in the service industries results from sex segregation among jobs,
one-third from sex segregation among ﬁrms, and one-sixth is owing to unexplained within-
job wage diﬀerentials and sex diﬀerences in individual characteristics. Within-job wage
diﬀerentials between sexes remain mostly unexplained, women being paid 3.7 percent less
for the same job than their equally qualiﬁed male co-workers.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a new way of decomposing the gender wage gap based
upon the nested correlated random eﬀects model. Our modelling approach took an explicit
account of the hierarchical grouped structure of the matched employer-employee data. The
decomposition allowed us to assess the extent to which the overall sex gap is attributable
to within-job wage diﬀerentials and sex segregation among ﬁrms and jobs within ﬁrms.
Importantly, by explicitly modelling the ﬁrm and job eﬀects, the approach proved to
be informative about the sources of lower pay in predominantly female ﬁrms and jobs.
Compared with the standard fraction female decomposition, the correlated random eﬀects
speciﬁcation led to quantitatively diﬀerent results. These diﬀerences suggest that the
latent ﬁrm and job eﬀects may bias the coeﬃcients in the simple fraction female regressions
and lead to misleading conclusions.
A major part of the gender wage diﬀerentials among white-collar manufacturing work-
ers was attributed to the disproportionate concentration of women in lower-paying jobs.
Within ﬁrms high-paid managerial jobs are mainly occupied by men, and among other
types of jobs men are concentrated in positions with higher skill requirements. This may
reﬂect discrimination through diﬀerential access to higher-paying jobs, or it may result
from sex diﬀerences in preferences. Becker (1985) for example illustrates how women’s
greater responsibility for child care and homework may induce them to crowd into less-
demanding jobs, as well as to spend less eﬀort for the same job than men do. Although
reasons for women’s concentration in lower-paying jobs remain a puzzle, our ﬁndings high-
light the importance of equal opportunities in education, hiring, and promotion.
When explaining wage diﬀerentials between white-collar jobs, we found that lower
23
PT does not exits any more but its member associations belong to EK along with the member associ-
ations of the former TT.
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wages in predominantly female jobs are in large part attributable to lower skill require-
ments and job complexity (especially when managerial jobs were excluded). However, our
results suggest that, in the same ﬁrm, predominantly female jobs pay lower wages than
predominantly male jobs that are associated with the same level of average education,
average tenure, and job complexity. That is, jobs of equal worth are diﬀerently rewarded
depending on whether they are occupied by men or women. Of course, one can always
speculate how accurate our job complexity variable is, but if we assume that this measure
is reasonably good, our results would imply that policies like comparable worth might be
worth considering. This does assume that men and women exert equal eﬀort in these jobs
(e.g. Becker, 1985). Even if eﬀectively implemented, the scope of such measures is likely
to be relatively limited, however, because the part of lower wages in predominantly female
jobs that was left unexplained accounts for less than one-ﬁfth of the overall gender gap.
Designing an eﬀective policy for reducing the gender wage diﬀerentials of blue-collar
workers would be a trickier task. Among this group of workers, much of gender wage
diﬀerentials results from sex segregation among ﬁrms. The origin of such a strong eﬀect
of ﬁrm segregation, however, remains a puzzle. That is, ﬁrms with a high fraction of
blue-collar female employees pay lower wages for some unobserved reasons.
Finally, it is notable that we found women to be lower paid within narrowly deﬁned
jobs within ﬁrms. Compared with equally qualiﬁed men who are doing similar work for
the same employer, white-collar women are paid 6 percent less (2.8 percent less in the
case of non-managerial white-collar workers) and blue-collar women 3.5 percent less on
average. Eliminating the sources of unexplained within-job wage diﬀerentials can at most
account for a quarter of the overall gap of white-collar workers and one-ﬁfth of the overall
gap of blue-collar workers.
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II.A Generalized least squares estimation
II.A.1 Regression coeﬃcients
We rewrite the regression model deﬁned in (II.10) and (II.11) for the block of observations
resulting from the jth ﬁrm as
wj = X˜jϕ+ uj , j = 1, 2, ..., F,
where ϕ is a vector of all regression coeﬃcients and X˜j is a matrix of all explanatory
variables in (II.10), including a column of ones for the constant. The observations are
stacked group-wise in such manner that the slowest running index is the ﬁrm index j,
the second slowest running index is the job index k, and the fastest running index is the
person index i. Given this ordering of observations, the wage vector can be decomposed
as w
′
j
= (w
′
j1
,w
′
j2
, ...,w
′
jcj
)
′
, where w
′
jk
= (wjk1, wjk2, ..., wjknjk
) and njk denotes the
number of workers in job k within ﬁrm j. The X˜j and uj are constructed similarly.
Given the independence of observations across ﬁrms, the GLS estimator is
ϕ˜
GLS
=
⎛
⎝
F∑
j=1
X˜
′
j
Σ
−1
j
X˜j
⎞
⎠
−1
F∑
j=1
X˜
′
j
Σ
−1
j
wj , (A1)
and its variance-covariance matrix is
V (ϕ˜
GLS
) =
⎛
⎝
F∑
j=1
X˜
′
j
Σ
−1
j
X˜j
⎞
⎠
−1
. (A2)
The error variance-covariance matrix for the jth block of observations can be expressed
as
Σj = σ
2
ε
(
Inj
+DjD
′
j
)
,
where Inj
is an identity matrix of dimension nj , and Dj = [dj1 Dj2] is a matrix of
dimension nj × (cj + 1), where nj ≡
∑cj
k=1
njk is the size of ﬁrm j. All elements of the
ﬁrst column of Dj (= dj1) are equal to σξ/σε, and other cj columns are represented by
the block diagonal matrix Dj2, where the kth block is a column vector of dimension njk,
with all elements equal to σω/σε, k = 1, 2, ..., cj .
The direct computation of ϕ˜
GLS
from (A1) would require inverting matrices Σj ’s,
whose dimensions correspond to ﬁrm sizes nj , j = 1, 2, ..., F. If, as in our application, there
are several large ﬁrms in the data, the numerical inversions of Σj ’s would become com-
putationally burdensome. With balanced data, inversions of the error variance-covariance
matrices can usually be avoided by use of certain variable transformations. Fuller and
Batesse (1973) consider a special case where njk is constant for all k within each j. They
show how the GLS estimator can be obtained by applying OLS to the transformed model.
This transformation method, however, does not easily generalise to the case where njk
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varies within ﬁrms, so we remain stuck with the problem of inverting a series of poten-
tially very large matrices.
Fortunately, the computational burden can be considerably reduced by the use of a bit
of matrix algebra. More speciﬁcally, using Lemma 2 of Davis (2002), we can express Σ
−1
j
as
Σ
−1
j
=
ejQj −Qjdj1d
′
j1
Qj
ejσ
2
ε
, (A3)
where
Qj = In
j
−Dj2
(
Ic
j
+D
′
j2
Dj2
)−1
D
′
j2
,
ej = 1+ d
′
j1
Qjdj1.
Icj
+ D
′
j2
Dj2 is a diagonal matrix with the kth element equal to 1 + njk(σ
2
ω
/σ
2
ε
), k =
1, 2, ..., cj , and so its inverse is obtained analytically by inverting each of the diagonal
elements.
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With this in mind, it is evident that the expression in (A3) provides a very
convenient way of computing Σ
−1
j
as it avoids numerical inversions entirely. Consequently,
using (A3) for Σ
−1
j
’s the GLS estimator and its standard errors can be computed rather
easily from (A1) and (A2) even for very large unbalanced problems.
II.A.2 Variance components
In practice Σj ’s depend upon unknown variances σ
2
ε
, σ
2
ξ
, and σ
2
ω
. These have to be esti-
mated in the ﬁrst step to make the GLS estimator operational. The consistent estimates
of the variances can be obtained by equating the various sums of squared residuals to their
expected values. From Searle (1961) we obtain
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cj∑
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j··
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2
ξ
+ k12σ
2
ω
+ Fσ
2
ε
,
NE
(
u
2
···
)
= k1σ
2
ξ
+ k3σ
2
ω
+ σ
2
ε
,
where the job, ﬁrm, and grand means of the residuals ujki are denoted with ujk·, uj··, and
u··· respectively; N =
∑
F
j=1
nj is the sample size; C =
∑
F
j=1
cj is the aggregate number of
jobs; k12 =
∑
F
j=1
n
−1
j
(∑cj
k=1
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2
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)
; k1 = N
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∑
F
j=1
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2
j
; and k3 = N
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∑
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k=1
n
2
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.
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Moreover, ej can be expressed as
ej = 1+ nj
σ
2
ξ
σ
2
ε
−
c
j∑
k=1
(njkσξσω)
2
σ
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ε
+ njkσ
2
ε
σ
2
ω
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The expectations on the left-hand side of the equation system are estimated using
̂
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jki
,
̂
E
(
u
2
jk·
)
= u˜
2
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j ··
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2
j··,
̂
E
(
u
2
···
)
= u˜
2
··· = 0
where u˜jki denotes the OLS residual from the regression (II.10). By substituting these
into the equation system and solving for the variance components, we obtain the following
estimators:
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Using the estimated values of σ
2
ε
, σ
2
ξ
, and σ
2
ω
, we can construct estimates for the Σj ’s. In
the second step the feasible GLS estimator of ϕ and its variance-covariance matrix are
obtained from (A1) and (A2) computing the inversions using (A3).
There are several alternative methods available for estimating the variance components
(see e.g. Baltagi et al., 2001). We adopted perhaps the simplest one here. However, by
means of Monte Carlo simulations and empirical examples, the two-step GLS estimator
has been found to be reasonably robust with respect to a particular choice of the method
used in estimating the variance components (see Maddala and Mount, 1973, for the one-
way error components models, and Baltagi et al., 2001, and Davis, 2002, for the nested
error components models).
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Table II.10: Wage regression results for technical and clerical workers
Model speciﬁcation
FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Intercept 1.6210 (.0065) [.1557] 2.1733 (.0088) 1.9896 (.0609) 1.9827 (.0597)
Individual regressors
Female —.0283 (.0011) −.0343 (.0036) [.0036] —.0293 (.0015) —.0283 (.0011) —.0283 (.0011)
Schooling years .0098 (.0003) .0596 (.0004) [.0090] .0191 (.0003) .0098 (.0003) .0098 (.0003)
Experience .0061 (.0002) .0090 (.0003) [.0010] .0081 (.0002) .0061 (.0002) .0061 (.0002)
Experience
2
/100 —.0084 (.0004) −.0076 (.0006) [.0023] —.0110 (.0004) —.0084 (.0004) —.0084 (.0004)
√
Firm tenure .0145 (.0004) .0044 (.0006) [.0034] .0130 (.0005) .0145 (.0004) .0145 (.0004)
Job regressors
Fraction female −.1714 (.0032) [.0118] —.1646 (.0026) —.1463 (.0024) —.0335 (.0021)
Mean schooling .0391 (.0007) .0101 (.0006)
Mean experience .0096 (.0005) .0009 (.0004)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 —.0123 (.0010) —.0002 (.0008)
Technical .0447 (.0030) .0629 (.0026)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0074 (.0010) —.0141 (.0009)
Complexity level .0666 (.0005)
Large city .0482 (.0033) .0309 (.0025)
Log (job size) —.0131 (.0011) —.0097 (.0008)
Firm regressors
Fraction female −.0474 (.0042) [.0737] —.1770 (.0133) —.1545 (.0129) —.1025 (.0128)
Mean schooling .0271 (.0040) .0115 (.0041)
Mean experience —.0010 (.0030) —.0036 (.0030)
Mean (experience)
2
/100 .0068 (.0064) .0198 (.0064)
Fraction technical job .0398 (.0131) .0312 (.0123)
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure —.0252 (.0030) —.0225 (.0031)
Mean job complexity .0433 (.0025)
Fraction jobs in large cities .0496 (.0051) .0499 (.0051)
Worker mix .0314 (.0104) .0274 (.0104)
Mean log (job size) —.0057 (.0049) —.0097 (.0049)
Log (ﬁrm size) .0056 (.0026) .0071 (.0026)
Variance components
σ
2
ε
(individual error) .0106 .0064 .0064
σ
2
ω
(job random eﬀect) .0111 .0115 .0052
σ
2
ξ
(ﬁrm random eﬀect) .0121 .0035 .0043
Notes: FE is the ﬁxed eﬀects model with the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses. For the
OLS model the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses and standard errors robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and intraﬁrm correlation are in square brackets. RE, CRE1, and CRE2 are the
(correlated) random eﬀects models with the GLS standard errors in parentheses. All job regressors are measured
in deviation from the ﬁrm mean. CRE1 and CRE2 models include 38 industry dummies. Number of observations
is 71,504 in all regressions.
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Table II.11: Gender wage gap decompositions for technical and clerical workers
Sample means Contribution to the wage gap
Men Women Diﬀ. FE OLS RE CRE1 CRE2
Individual regressors
Female .0000 1.0000 —1.0000 .0283 .0343 .0293 .0283 .0283
Schooling years 11.8415 11.5404 .3012 .0030 .0180 .0057 .0030 .0030
Experience 23.7720 23.2968 .4753 .0029 .0043 .0038 .0029 .0029
Experience
2
/100 6.7065 6.5161 .1904 —.0016 −.0015 —.0021 —.0016 —.0016
√
Firm tenure 3.4688 3.3031 .1657 .0024 .0007 .0022 .0024 .0024
.0349 .0558 .0390 .0349 .0349
Job regressors
Fraction female —.2358 .3074 —.5432 .0931 .0894 .0795 .0182
Mean schooling .0968 —.1262 .2230 .0087 .0023
Mean experience .2190 —.2855 .5045 .0049 .0004
Mean (experience)
2
/100 .1004 —.1308 .2312 —.0029 .0000
Technical .0607 —.0792 .1399 .0063 .0088
Mean
√
ﬁrm tenure .0260 —.0339 .0599 —.0004 —.0008
Complexity level .4808 —.6269 1.1077 .0738
Large city —.0042 .0055 —.0097 —.0005 —.0003
Log (job size) .0846 —.1103 .1949 —.0026 —.0019
.1086 .0931 .0894 .0930 .1004
Firm regressors
Fraction female .3599 .5308 —.1710 .0081 .0303 .0264 .0175
Mean schooling 11.7460 11.6645 .0818 .0022 .0009
Mean experience 23.6655 23.4357 .2298 —.0002 —.0008
Mean (experience)
2
/100 6.6642 6.5713 .0929 .0006 .0008
Fraction technical jobs .2805 .1701 .1104 .0044 .0034
√
Mean ﬁrm tenure 3.4145 3.3739 .0406 —.0010 —.0009
Mean job complexity 4.1964 4.2619 —.0655 —.0028
Fraction jobs in large cities .5217 .5477 —.0260 —.0013 —.0013
Worker mix .6688 .6710 —.0022 —.0001 —.0001
Mean log (job size) 2.7546 2.1469 .6077 —.003 —.0064
Log (ﬁrm size) 6.8983 6.6157 .2826 .0016 .0020
Industry dummies —.0078 .0052
.0136 .0081 .0303 .0214 .0176
Overall sum .1570 .1570 .1587 .1493 .1529
Notes: The raw wage gap, as measured by the sex diﬀerence in mean log wages, is .1570. The ﬁrst two columns
report the samples means of all regressors among men and women; the third column gives the diﬀerence. The last
ﬁve columns show the absolute contribution of each regressor obtained from various model speciﬁcations. The
contributions are obtained by multiplying the coeﬃcients in Table II.10 by the sex diﬀerences in sample means in
Table II.11. The cumulative eﬀect of each group of regressors is shown below the horizontal lines.
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Chapter III
Extended UI Beneﬁts and Labour
Market Withdrawal of Older
Workers via Unemployment
In Finland the older unemployed can collect unemployment insurance bene-
ﬁts until retirement, while the entitlement period for younger groups is two
years. In 1997 the eligibility age of persons beneﬁting from extended beneﬁts
was raised from 53 to 55. We consider layoﬀ risks, unemployment durations,
and exit states before and after the reform. In the duration analysis we apply
a competing risks version of a split population model to account for multiple
exit routes and the possibility that some of the elderly unemployed may not be
active in the labour market due to pension rules. Since the reform the employed
aged 53-54 have had a much lower risk of unemployment. We estimate that
roughly half of unemployed workers with extended beneﬁts are eﬀectively with-
drawn from the labour market. Those who remain active have a similar hazard
rate to employment as individuals with the two-year entitlement period, but
much lower hazard rates to non-participation and labour market programmes.
1
1 Introduction
Unemployment diﬀerences between the European countries and the United States have
been the focus of much political and academic debate during the past couple of decades.
In addition to higher levels of unemployment, the duration of unemployment spells is
typically much longer in Europe than in the US (Machin and Manning, 1999). A high
incidence of long-term unemployment among older workers and a tendency of workers to
leave the labour force at ages several years below the oﬃcial retirement age are common
problems in Europe. The unemployment compensation system, with generous beneﬁt lev-
els and long entitlement periods, is often blamed for being responsible for much of the
1
Results of this study can be found in Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2006) and Kyyrä and Wilke (2007).
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European unemployment problem (e.g. Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1998). In many Euro-
pean countries, including Finland, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, and United Kingdom, the entitlement periods are further extended for older work-
ers and/or particular early retirement schemes are tailored for the elderly unemployed
so that unemployment-related beneﬁts eﬀectively provide a particular pathway to early
withdrawal from the labour market (Duval, 2003).
In Finland unemployment beneﬁts, i.e. the basic unemployment allowance or earnings-
related unemployment insurance beneﬁts, can be received for a maximum of two years,
but there is an exception for the older unemployed. Workers aged 55 (53 before 1997)
or more at the time of job loss are allowed to collect unemployment beneﬁts up to the
age of 60, when they become eligible for the unemployment pension beneﬁt. At the age
of 65 the unemployment pension is transformed into the normal old-age pension. This
route out of the labour market is widely known as the "unemployment tunnel". Since the
level of unemployment pension beneﬁts is comparable to that of UI beneﬁts, this scheme
eﬀectively provides an indeﬁnite period of UI beneﬁts for older workers.
The unemployment tunnel (UT) scheme contributes to aggregate unemployment in
two ways. First, the employers tend to target dismissals at the elderly workers, as a
reasonable income level is fully secured for them. Rantala (2002) provides evidence that
unemployment risk at least doubles at the eligibility age of the UT scheme. Secondly,
without a risk of future cuts in the beneﬁt level, the elderly unemployed are likely to be
more passive in job search and more choosy in accepting job oﬀers, leading to longer un-
employment spells. In fact, many of those with extended UI beneﬁts may not be searching
for a new job at all. Not surprisingly, the older cohorts account for a large fraction of the
aggregate unemployment rate. In 2000 one-third of the unemployed (including those on
the unemployment pension) and two-thirds of the long-term unemployed were aged 56 and
over (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2006).
In practice, the UT scheme facilitates the withdrawal of ageing workers from the labour
market several years before the oﬃcial retirement age of 65. This is in clear contrast with
the government’s goal to induce people to retire later. The eﬀective retirement age in
Finland is currently around 60, ﬁve years below the oﬃcial retirement age. The Finnish
pension system is built in such a way that the pensions of the retired are paid in large
part by the current employees. As the Finnish population will age more rapidly than
most of the other European populations over the next few decades,
2
the ﬁnancing of
future pensions has been a subject of increasing concern. As a result of ﬁnancial pressure,
several policy measures have been taken to discourage early retirement. These measures
included an increase in the age threshold for the UT scheme: the eligibility age for the
extended beneﬁt entitlement period, followed by the unemployment pension at the age
2
The old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged
20-64, is estimated to rise from the current level of 25% to over 40% by 2025, when Finland is expected to
have the second highest dependency ratio among the OECD countries (OECD, 2004, pp. 18-20).
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of 60, was increased from 53 to 55 in 1997. Consequently, the entitlement period of
unemployment beneﬁts for the age group 53-54 was eﬀectively reduced to the maximum
of two years, while the other age groups remained unaﬀected by the reform. We exploit
this quasi-experimental setting to study how the incidence and duration of unemployment
are aﬀected by eligibility for extended UI beneﬁts.
We employ high-quality panel data drawn from the records of the Employment Sta-
tistics database of Statistics Finland. This database includes information from several
administrative registers, and it eﬀectively covers the entire Finnish population. In the
ﬁrst stage we quantify the change in the inﬂow to unemployment resulting from the in-
crease in the age threshold of the UT scheme. This eﬀect turns out to be very strong. We
ﬁnd that disproportionate numbers of dismissals fall on employees who are old enough to
be entitled to the extended UI period. Large employers, especially, tend to exploit this
feature of the UI system to get rid of their elderly employees. There is also evidence of
notable anticipation behaviour prior to the UT reform in 1997 and another reform in 1996.
In the second state we examine the eﬀect of extended UI beneﬁts on the labour mar-
ket transitions of the elderly unemployed. This main part of the study contributes to the
growing literature on the impact of maximum UI duration. The analysis of unemployment
insurance has been the topic of several theoretical and empirical studies in recent years. In
the empirical work the focus has been on estimating reduced-form duration models where
the restrictions implied by structural job search models are not imposed. A typical prob-
lem in most empirical work has been the lack of variation in the maximum duration of UI
beneﬁts that can be regarded as independent of other factors determining unemployment
duration (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991; and Holmlund, 1998). A number of recent
studies have exploited various policy changes in an attempt to overcome the endogeneity
issue (e.g. Hunt, 1995; Winter-Ebmer, 1998; Bratberg and Vaage, 2000; Card and Levine,
2000; Carling et al., 2001; Røed and Zhang, 2003; Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004; Uusitalo
and Moisala, 2003; and Lalive et al., 2006). In these studies escape rates from unem-
ployment before and after the reform are compared within the group aﬀected. A similar
approach is taken in this study.
We use a sample of workers aged 50-54 who became unemployed between 1995 and
1998. Unemployment experiences of the group aged 53-54 are compared under two
schemes: the extended UI entitlement period (pre-reform scheme) and the conventional
UI period of two years (post-reform scheme). The younger group (aged 50-52) serves as a
control group used to eliminate the business cycle eﬀect. Since the unemployment spells
can end through the taking of a job, withdrawal from the labour force, or participation in
an active labour market programme (ALMP), competing risks are inherent in our data.
As pointed out by Carling et al. (1996), the availability of various labour market pro-
grammes, in particular, may play an important role in mitigating the incentive eﬀects of
UI on the job-ﬁnding rate. A novel feature of our analysis is that we explicitly allow for
some older workers, registered as unemployed job seekers, to eﬀectively withdraw from
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job search and simply wait for access to early retirement. If this is the case, the standard
duration models that assume all individuals are at risk of experiencing the event of interest
are not applicable. Therefore, we apply a competing risks version of a split population
duration model that is capable of accounting for this sort of heterogeneity, i.e. the possi-
bility that some individuals do not consider all possible exit routes. The idea is to model
simultaneously both the likelihood that the worker is still active in the labour market and
the timing of exit to various end-states conditional on being active. This approach allows
us to distinguish the participation decision from labour market behaviour in the case of
continued search. We ﬁnd that some half of those who are entitled to extended UI beneﬁts
are eﬀectively withdrawn from the labour market.
The empirical analysis of UI has focused on detecting eﬀects on the hazard rates.
The cause-speciﬁc hazard function can be used to identify the eﬀect of the UI scheme on
the instantaneous transition rate to a particular destination at a given phase of the spell
conditional on having not exited from unemployment to any destination. As a result,
the employment hazard functions do not provide direct information about policy-relevant
issues like changes in the overall or cumulative probability of employment, nor in the
expected duration of unemployment. These are functions of all cause-speciﬁc hazard func-
tions, each of which is subject to change in response to the change in the entitlement
period. Therefore, we summarize our results from the competing risks analysis in terms
of the cumulative incidence functions, which describe the probability of leaving unemploy-
ment to a particular destination by a given time. In this way we can assess to what extent
the eﬀect of the extended UI beneﬁts on the probability of entering employment stems
directly from a change in the employment hazard and indirectly from changes in other
cause-speciﬁc hazard functions. This is the question of obvious interest because policy
makers can also aﬀect the employment probability indirectly, for example, by regulating
the availability of labour market programmes over the course of the unemployment spell.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss evaluation issues
and existing empirical evidence about the importance of the length of the UI beneﬁt
entitlement period. Section 3 describes the Finnish unemployment compensation system
and early retirement schemes, with an emphasis on the UT scheme. In Section 4 we give
details of the data and report some descriptive statistics. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the
econometric methods and report our estimation results for the layoﬀ risk and transitions
out of unemployment. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 UI duration in theory and practice
The analysis of unemployment insurance has been an active subject of both theoretical
and empirical work for the past two or three decades. The key predictions of theory have
found support from the microeconometric analysis of unemployment duration data. Here
we brieﬂy discuss the likely eﬀects of maximum UI duration on exits out of unemployment
59
among UI recipients, and give a selective survey of relevant empirical evidence. Needless
to say, our focus is highly restrictive, as the existence of UI can aﬀect labour market
outcomes in a variety of ways that depend on the institutional features of the UI system
under consideration.
3
In particular, we do not discuss here how the availability of extended
beneﬁts for the elderly aﬀects the layoﬀ risk of older workers. This is because such an eﬀect
depends also on other features of the social security system which, in the Finnish case,
includes employers’ liabilities for early retirement expenditures caused by their former
employees.
4
Once the relevant part of the Finnish social security system is described in
Section 3, we return to this issue.
2.1 Evaluation issues
In this section we raise the following issues that require particular attention when the
eﬀects of the length of the entitlement period among the unemployed are investigated.
First, a ﬂexible model speciﬁcation should be adopted, as no a priori parametric restrictions
for the eﬀects of the entitlement period on the hazard functions can be derived from
theoretical models. Second, some elderly unemployed with generous UI beneﬁts may no
longer be actively searching for a new job. Third, competing risks analysis is potentially
very useful, especially when active labour market policy plays an important role, as in
Finland. Finally, reliable analysis requires independent variation in the entitlement periods
across individuals.
Incentives of unemployed workers
Dynamic models of job search have shed light on the ways in which UI can aﬀect unem-
ployment duration through the reservation wage and search eﬀort. Mortensen’s (1977)
model is the seminal contribution of this branch of the literature. In his model, eligi-
bility for UI requires some previous work experience and UI beneﬁts can be received for
a ﬁxed period. Workers are either employed or unemployed. When unemployed, the
worker chooses optimal search eﬀort and samples job oﬀers from a known distribution of
wage oﬀers using the reservation wage strategy. When employed, the worker faces the
risk of becoming unemployed. The transition rate from unemployment to employment
increases with search eﬀort (as the arrival rate of job oﬀers increases) and decreases with
the reservation wage (as the probability that a received oﬀer is acceptable declines). As
the unemployed worker approaches the time when UI beneﬁts will expire, his search eﬀort
3
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) and Holmlund (1998) discuss the topic in a wider context.
4
When extended UI beneﬁts are used to bridge the time until retirement, long-term unemployment
provides eﬀectively a particular pathway to early withdrawal from the labour market for some elderly
workers. In the Finnish system employers are liable for a share of early retirement expenditures via partially
experience-rated employer contributions, and these contributions diﬀer between various early retirement
schemes (and vary across employers of diﬀerent size). As a consequence, it makes a clear diﬀerence for the
employer whether its former employee ends up to unemployment pension via long-term unemployment or
retires via some other early retirement scheme. It follows that the layoﬀ risk of older workers is strongly
aﬀected by the availability of extended beneﬁts for the elderly; see Sections 3.4., 4.2, and 5.
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increases and the reservation wage decreases. After the exhaustion of UI beneﬁts, the
worker faces a stationary environment, and hence his search eﬀort and reservation wage
no longer change. The employment hazard therefore increases up to the point of beneﬁt
exhaustion and remains constant thereafter.
5
The longer entitlement period increases not only the value of being unemployed but
also the value of becoming employed with a given wage rate, as unemployment spells in
the future will be better compensated for. The relative importance of this second eﬀect,
known as the "entitlement eﬀect", increases as the day of beneﬁt exhaustion comes closer.
As a result, an increase in the maximum duration of UI beneﬁts reduces the employment
hazard over the forepart of the unemployment period but increases it close to and beyond
the exhaustion point. In other words, the eﬀect on the employment hazard is predicted to
change over the course of the unemployment spell, potentially reversing its sign at some
point. In the empirical analysis this possibility is sometimes ruled out a priori by imposing
the restriction that changes in the length of the entitlement period may lead to level shifts
in the underlying hazard function but cannot aﬀect its shape (e.g. Hunt, 1995; and Lalive
and Zweimüller, 2004). We do not impose such restrictions but allow the hazard functions
of individuals covered by diﬀerent UI schemes to be of diﬀerent shape.
When behaviour of the older unemployed is of interest, Mortensen’s (1977) assumption
of a stationary environment is problematic. As pointed out by Lalive et al. (2006), the
older unemployed may beneﬁt less from a given search eﬀort due to a shorter period of
time to collect wages as they will retire in the near future in any case. This suggests that
older workers may react stronger to an extension of the UI entitlement period, as was
found in the study of Lalive et al. (2006). In general, the extent to which the length of the
time horizon until retirement induces diﬀerences in search incentives between workers of
diﬀerent ages depends on the way how the level of future pension beneﬁts is determined.
A system where the beneﬁts level is tied to the past wage level is likely to increase the
reservation wage and depress the search eﬀort among the older unemployed. The opposite
may be true if the level of future pension beneﬁts is an increasing function of the months
worked at older ages, in which case the older unemployed have a high incentive to ﬁnd a
new job rapidly. Thus, the Mortensen’s (1977) model gives a rather simpliﬁed picture of
the relationship between the length of the entitlement period and job search for elderly
workers.
Moreover, a particular characteristic of many European UI systems is that extended en-
titlement periods are made available for older workers. Consider a Finnish-type UI scheme
where workers older than a certain age threshold at the time of job loss are entitled to an
5
Mortensen derived a number of other predictions as well. First, the existence of UI beneﬁts increases
the transition rates of the unemployed who are not currently eligible for UI beneﬁts. This is so because
accepting a job oﬀer qualiﬁes for UI beneﬁts in the future. Second, the time proﬁle of the employment
hazard among UI recipients depends on the replacement rate of UI beneﬁts. An increase in the replacement
rate increases both the value of search unemployment and the value of accepting a job oﬀer, where the
former becomes less important as the exhaustion time gets closer. As a consequence, the higher replacement
rate is associated with a steeper hazard rate over the compensated part of the unemployment spell.
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indeﬁnite period of beneﬁts. This scheme discourages job search among the unemployed
entitled to the extension. In an extreme case an elderly unemployed worker with extended
beneﬁts may choose to withdraw from job search entirely, in which case the employment
hazard is zero. In our application we take this possibility into account by using a split
population duration model. Among younger workers who are not currently eligible for
extended beneﬁts, the age-dependent beneﬁt extension increases the value of becoming
employed with a given wage, and thereby the employment hazard, because employment
qualiﬁes for extended beneﬁts in the future.
Multiple exit routes
Although Mortensen (1977) sophistically incorporates the key institutional features of UI
into his model, some important aspects of the real-world labour market are abstracted
away. The existence of large worker ﬂows between unemployment, employment, inac-
tivity, and various labour market programmes brings into question the extent to which
the predictions of the two-state model are carried over to labour markets where workers
can escape unemployment via various routes. Obviously, the generosity of unemployment
compensation aﬀects the attractiveness of participation in the labour market. Exhaustion
of UI beneﬁts in particular may encourage an unemployed worker to withdraw from the
labour force rather than to accept lower wage oﬀers. Moreover, the labour market policy
in many countries, especially in the Nordic countries, involves a heavy stress on various
labour market programmes. Such programmes are often targeted at the long-term un-
employed who are at risk of beneﬁt exhaustion. Participation may be associated with a
rather high compensation level (e.g. relief work), may postpone the exhaustion day of UI
beneﬁts, or may even provide a way of regaining eligibility for UI. Using a search model,
Carling et al. (1996) illustrate how the existence of labour market programmes can mit-
igate the incentive eﬀects of ﬁxed UI duration on the job-ﬁnding rate. If postponing the
exhaustion day and regaining eligibility are important reasons for programme participa-
tion, we should expect much lower hazard rates for exits to such programmes among the
older groups entitled to extended beneﬁts.
In the case of multiple exit routes, the expected duration of the unemployment spell
and the shape of the employment hazard are not the only questions of interest. From
the policy point of view, the likelihood of escaping unemployment through a given route
is an equally important question. The goal of policy makers is typically to induce the
unemployed to ﬁnd an acceptable job within a reasonable amount of time, transitions out
of the labour force and into labour market programmes being less desired outcomes. The
maximum duration of UI beneﬁts is likely to aﬀect all hazard rates, not only the employ-
ment hazard. This suggests that a proper way of analysing the role of the UI entitlement
period requires a simultaneous account of all cause-speciﬁc hazards. We illustrate this
point with a numerical example.
Suppose that when a transition out of unemployment occurs, it can be the result of an
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exit to employment (e), active labour market programme (p), or out of the labour force
(o). The hazard function for destination k ∈ {e, p, o} is denoted by θk(t). The cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of unemployment duration is given by
F (t) ≡ Pr (T ≤ t) = 1− exp
{
−
∫
t
0
θ(u)du
}
,
where θ(u) ≡ θe(u) + θp(u) + θo(u) denotes the overall hazard rate out of unemploy-
ment. The likelihood of entering employment within a short time interval (t, t+ dt] equals
θe(t) [1−F (t)]dt, which depends on all cause-speciﬁc hazard functions through F(t). It
is important to recognize that a policy reform that causes a uniform increase in the em-
ployment hazard does not necessarily imply a higher cumulative or overall probability
of employment. The cumulative incidence function (CIF) for destination k ∈ {e, p, o} is
deﬁned as
Fk(t) ≡ Pr (T ≤ t,K = k) =
∫
t
0
θk(u) [1−F (u)] du,
which gives the probability of entering state k by time t (see e.g. Gaynor et al., 1993). It
is easy to see that F (t) = Fe(t)+Fp(t)+Fo(t). Moreover, the probability of ever escaping
unemployment to state k is given by Pr (K = k) = limt→∞ Fk(t).
Consider two groups of the unemployed who are otherwise identical but diﬀer in the
length of the UI entitlement period. In the ﬁrst group, UI beneﬁts expire after 100
weeks of unemployment, and in the other group after 175 weeks. Hypothetical hazard
functions under the two UI schemes are shown in Figure III.1. Although these hazard
functions are not derived from any particular theoretical model, their shapes are intuitively
reasonable and do not contradict the implications of the search models discussed above.
The employment hazard increases up to the point of beneﬁt exhaustion. The hazard
rate for transitions to ALMPs is close to zero over the early stages of unemployment but
begins to raise rapidly 50 weeks prior to the time when beneﬁts will expire. There is
a discrete upward shift in the hazard rate out of the labour force at the week followed
by beneﬁt exhaustion. The longer entitlement period leads to lower hazard rates for
transitions to ALMPs and out of the labour force, with the level shifts occurring at a later
point in the unemployment spell. The employment hazards under both UI regimes are
assumed to converge at the same level. This is not strictly consistent with the prediction of
Mortensen’s model that the hazard rate associated with the longer UI entitlement period
should end up at a higher level. The entitlement eﬀect is neglected here to emphasize our
main point.
The longer entitlement period is associated with a uniformly lower overall hazard rate
(see Figure III.1g), which implies a longer average spell duration. Without information
on the states occupied after unemployment, there is not much more to be said about the
eﬀects of the entitlement period length. In particular, we are unable to assess how the
overall incidence of employment changes with the length of the entitlement period. One
might guess that it must be lower in the case of the longer entitlement period. From Figure
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Figure III.1: Entitlement period length and transitions out of unemployment (Note: Black
lines correspond to the entitlement period of 100 weeks, and green/grey lines to that of
175 weeks)
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III.1b we see that this may not be the case, however. The fraction of the unemployed who
will eventually exit to employment is higher among those who are entitled to the longer
beneﬁt period. Since the employment hazard of this group never exceeds that of workers
with the shorter entitlement period, this outcome is driven by discrepancies in the hazard
rates out of the labour force and into ALMPs.
To summarize, competing risks analysis is potentially very useful in evaluating the
eﬀects of the length of the entitlement period. This is especially true in the cases where
ALMPs play an important role, as in the Nordic countries. In addition, the cumulative
incidence functions can be used to summarize information from all cause-speciﬁc hazard
functions in a policy-relevant way.
Variation in the entitlement period length
Much of the empirical analysis of the potential UI duration has focused on detecting spikes
in the transition rates around exhaustion time. The ﬁnding of an increasing exit rate to
employment in the vicinity of UI beneﬁt exhaustion is consistent with theory but has
only a limited use from the policy point of view. It does not give much guidance as to
how transition rates would change if the entitlement periods were subject to change. To
address these questions, one needs some variation in the maximum length of UI beneﬁts.
6
In an ideal setting one would have an inﬂow sample of unemployed workers who were
randomly allocated into groups with varying lengths of UI entitlement periods. This sort
of randomized data is not available anywhere, and therefore other sources of variation
must be exploited in practice. The extent to which the available data provide variability
in the beneﬁt duration that is independent of unobserved determinants of unemployment
duration is a crucial identiﬁcation issue.
In many countries, the maximum entitlement length of UI beneﬁts is partly determined
by past work history (e.g. the US, Canada, and the Netherlands).
7
As a consequence,
individuals with better track records in the labour market will be entitled to longer UI
beneﬁts periods. This suggests an endogeneity problem at the individual level if the past
work history that determines the length of the entitlement period is related to unobserved
characteristics that also aﬀect the job-ﬁnding rate. Moreover, policy changes may cause
changes in the entitlement periods across all UI recipients (e.g. US beneﬁt extension
programmes and reforms in Norway) or within some groups (e.g. reforms in Germany and
Austria) over time. These policy changes are typically triggered by economic downturns,
however. If the beneﬁts are extended during periods of high unemployment, longer UI
6
Even if the existence of a spike around beneﬁt exhaustion were the only matter of interest, variation in
the beneﬁt duration would be useful to disentangle the exhaustion eﬀects from the duration dependence.
7
Where the entitlement period is the same for all UI recipients, the hazard rates have sometimes been
compared between UI recipients and non-recipients (e.g. Carling et al., 1996). This is problematic, since
workers who are not qualiﬁed for UI do not generally serve as a valid comparison group. Eligibility for
UI beneﬁt typically requires, among other things, previous work experience and hence non-recipients are
often a highly selected group of labour market entrants and individuals with an unstable labour market
history.
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periods will be available at times when ﬁnding a new job is more diﬃcult due to the
demand constraint. This leads to an aggregate level endogeneity problem, which may be
diﬃcult to overcome unless a suitable control group unaﬀected by the reform is available
to control for business cycle eﬀects. If such a control group is available or the policy change
is "exogenous" in the sense that it takes place over a period of stable economic conditions,
the policy reforms are potentially very useful for identiﬁcation purposes. In this study
we exploit the UI reform which was not triggered by changing economic conditions and
aﬀected only a particular group of the elderly.
2.2 Empirical evidence
In the US the maximum duration of UI beneﬁts varies for various reasons: the length of
regular beneﬁts varies across states, the entitlement period may depend on the individual’s
work history, and beneﬁt periods are occasionally extended (at federal or state level) in
respond to slackness in the labour market. Meyer (1990) and Katz and Meyer (1990)
exploit these sources of variation for identiﬁcation. They ﬁnd that the hazard rate out of
compensated unemployment increases sharply in the last few weeks of UI beneﬁt eligibility.
Moreover, when the beneﬁt entitlement period is extended, the hazard rate also exhibits a
peak around the time when beneﬁts were previously expected to lapse. This ﬁnding may
indicate that some ﬁrms recall their workers who are temporary laid-oﬀ at the time of the
original beneﬁt exhaustion according to a preplanned recall policy. In other words, during
business downturns employers attempt to retain their skilled workers but forward part of
the bill to the taxpayers via the UI system. Alternatively, some individuals eligible for
extended beneﬁts may fail to claim them because they are not aware of such a possibility
or because they managed to arrange the start of a new job at the time when UI beneﬁts
were originally expected to run out. Furthermore, the simulations of Katz and Meyer
(1990) suggest that a 13-week beneﬁt extension (from 26 to 39 weeks) increases the mean
spell duration of compensated unemployment by slightly over 2 weeks.
Card and Levine (2000) take advantage of a politically motivated programme that
provided up to 13 weeks of extended beneﬁts for those who exhausted their regular UI
beneﬁts in the state of New Jersey. The New Jersey Extended Beneﬁt (NJEB) programme
was in eﬀect for a limited period of 6 months. Since the NJEB programme emerged as a
result of a unique legislative episode that was unrelated to changes in economic conditions,
it caused an exogenous change in the entitlement period. Card and Levine (2000) ﬁnd
only a small increase in the fraction of UI recipients who remained unemployed until
the exhaustion of their regular beneﬁts. The authors argue that such a moderate eﬀect
is attributable to the short-term nature of the NJEB programme, since many of those
aﬀected had been unemployed for a while before the programme was introduced. Their
simulations suggest stronger long-term eﬀects: Had the programme aﬀected UI recipients
from the beginning of their spell, the average duration of regular beneﬁts would have
increased by one week and the fraction exhausting the regular beneﬁts would have risen
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by 7 percentage points.
The two major data limitations of these US studies are worth emphasizing. First, only
unemployment spells covered by the UI system are observed. All spells ongoing at the time
of beneﬁt exhaustion are censored, and hence nothing can be said about the transition rate
beyond the exhaustion point. Second, the data do not permit competing risks analysis
because it is not possible to distinguish whether a completed spell ended through recall,
the taking of a new job, withdrawal from the labour force, or exit to uncompensated
unemployment. That is, what has been analysed is the overall rate out of compensated
unemployment up to the point of beneﬁt exhaustion.
8
Consistent with the US evidence, Ham and Rea (1987) ﬁnd the conditional probability
of leaving unemployment through the ﬁnding of a new job to increase just prior to the
exhaustion of UI beneﬁts in Canada.
9
Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1993) provide evidence
that the overall hazard rate out of unemployment increases sharply as the entitlement
period comes to an end in the Netherlands.
10
By analysing the number of search contacts
over the course of the unemployment spell, they conclude that the beneﬁt exhaustion eﬀect
is mainly due to the declining reservation wage. Micklewright and Nagy (1999) recover a
clear spike in the job-ﬁnding rate around the time of UI exhaustion in Hungary. They do
not ﬁnd evidence that the transition rate is strongly aﬀected by the probability of being
eligible for means-tested social assistance after UI exhaustion. Jenkins and García-Serrano
(2004) detect only a moderate increase in the hazard to employment prior to the exhaustion
of UI beneﬁts in Spain. Somewhat surprisingly, longer entitlement periods appear to be
associated with higher re-employment hazards (Figure 1, p. 255). While this observation
was not discussed by the authors, it may be an indication of the endogeneity problem,
since there was no clear exogenous variation in entitlement periods in the Spanish data.
The length of the entitlement period was completely determined by the number of months
for which contributions had been made over the 48-month period prior to unemployment.
Evidence on exhaustion eﬀects from the Nordic countries, where beneﬁt levels are
higher, entitlement periods longer, and labour market programmes play a more important
role, is less convincing. Carling et al. (1996) ﬁnd only very weak evidence of an increase
in the job-ﬁnding rate of UI recipients compared with that of non-recipients around the
exhaustion time of UI beneﬁts at 60 weeks in Sweden. There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
8
Katz and Meyer (1990) provide some indirect evidence that much of the observed eﬀect of the potential
duration of UI is expected to arise from diﬀerences in recall and job-ﬁnding hazards. Using complementary
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, they compare the distributions of unemployment spells
between UI recipients and non-recipients. This source of data provides information on exit states and the
eligibility status of UI beneﬁts but lacks information on the beneﬁt level and length of entitlement periods
for UI recipients. Katz and Meyer (1990) ﬁnd substantial peaks in both the empirical recall rate and the
new job-ﬁnding rate around the durations when UI beneﬁts are "likely to lapse" for UI recipients but
not for non-recipients. These descriptive ﬁndings are consistent with a more formal analysis by Han and
Hausman (1990) who apply a competing risks duration model to the same data.
9
The length of the UI entitlement period is determined by the past work history and the local unem-
ployment rate. The mean entitlement period in the data is 36 weeks.
10
The length of the entitlement period depends on the past work history, the maximum duration being
26 weeks.
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in the hazard rates out of the labour force between the two groups. By contrast, the
transition rate to ALMPs among UI recipients increases sharply near the time of UI
beneﬁt exhaustion, being almost ﬁve times higher than the transition rate of non-recipients
immediately after UI beneﬁts have run out. These ﬁndings are intuitively reasonable in
view of the fact that Swedish labour market policy involves a right to a temporary public
job or training course for the unemployed whose beneﬁts lapse.
In Norway, until 1991, UI beneﬁts expired temporarily for 26 weeks after 80 weeks
of continuous unemployment. This was then followed by a second covered 80-week un-
employment period with somewhat reduced UI beneﬁts.
11
As a response to increasing
long-term unemployment, the intervening period without beneﬁts was ﬁrst shortened to
13 weeks in 1991 and one year later was abolished entirely. Bratberg and Vaage (2000)
and Røed and Zhang (2003) document rises in the transition rate out of unemployment
just prior to temporary and permanent beneﬁt exhaustion. These eﬀects are stronger for
women than for men (Røed and Zhang, 2003). The reforms were followed by a drop in the
employment hazard over the early stages of the unemployment spell but there is no evi-
dence of increases in the employment hazard around beneﬁt exhaustion (80 weeks) prior
to the reforms, nor after the reforms (Bratberg and Vaage, 2000). Thus, the observed
peaks in the overall hazard rate around (at least temporary) beneﬁt exhaustion are due
to the increasing outﬂow to other end-states than employment.
In the UK, the level of UI beneﬁts does not depend on previous earnings but is a ﬂat
rate. If UI beneﬁts expire, the individual can claim means-tested social assistance that is
comparable to UI payments and potentially available for an indeﬁnite period. Therefore,
there is practically no fall in the level of unemployment compensation when the individual
passes from UI beneﬁts to social assistance. Stancanelli (1999) exploits this feature of the
UK system in detecting beneﬁt exhaustion eﬀects. She compares hazard rates to full-time
employment between those unemployed that should expect their beneﬁts to exhaust and
those whose beneﬁt level is unlikely to change due to eligibility for social assistance.
12
Although a larger spike near the time of beneﬁt exhaustion at 52 weeks exists for those
whose beneﬁts are going to expire, Stancanelli (1999) does not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the hazard functions for the two groups.
Hunt (1995) evaluates the impact of a series of UI entitlement extensions for older
workers with much work experience in the former West Germany. These policy measures
were motivated by concern about the increasing unemployment rate and long average spell
duration of older workers. The number of additional months for UI beneﬁts was tied to the
amount of past work experience. As a result of an increase in the maximum UI duration
11
UI beneﬁts depend on past earnings and the system is universal covering all workers with earnings
above a minimum level.
12
Eligibility for social assistance depends on the level of household savings and spouse’s earnings. Since
household savings tend to be correlated with the work history of the unemployed individual, the same kind
of endogeneity issues arise as in the UI systems where the length of the entitlement period is directly tied
to past work history.
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from 12 to 22 months, the hazard rates for workers aged 44 to 48 were found to fall by 46%
for transitions to employment and by 63% for transitions out of the labour force. Among
older workers between the ages of 49 and 57, only the hazard rate out of the labour force
fell by 56% in response to an increase in the entitlement period from 12 to 32 months.
A reform similar to the German case took place in Austria around the turn of the 1990s.
The reform was a response to a privatization process of nationalized ﬁrms that led to mass
layoﬀs due to plant closures and downsizing especially in the steel industry (Winter-Ebmer,
1998, and Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004). The maximum entitlement period of UI beneﬁts
was raised from 30 or 52 to 209 weeks for workers aged 50 or more with experience above
a certain threshold living in certain regions of the country. In terms of pre-reform labour
market conditions, the counties selected for the extended beneﬁt periods were similar
to other counties but characterized by a larger employment share in the steel industry
and hence expected to be hit by a negative demand shock. Winter-Ebmer (1998) ﬁnds
a decrease in the exit rate to a new job for men, but no notable eﬀects on transitions
to recall employment, retirement, or non-participation for either gender.
13
The resulting
increase of 5 weeks in men’s unemployment duration is very low, given the substantial
increase in the maximum beneﬁt duration. Lalive and Zweimüller (2004) exploit variation
in the programme eligibility across regions and over time in an attempt to account for
policy endogeneity. They conclude that the increase in the UI entitlement period from 30
to 209 weeks declined men’s transition rate to employment by 17%.
The focus of Finnish empirical literature has been on the eﬀects of beneﬁt levels (e.g.
Kettunen, 1993, Lilja, 1993, Kyyrä, 1999, Holm et al., 1999). There are no studies with
an emphasis on the role of the entitlement period length. In the late 1980s the Finnish
UI system included a cut in the level of UI beneﬁts. Within the period from April 1987
to July 1989, UI beneﬁts were reduced by 12.5% after 40 weeks of unemployment (and
ﬁnally expired after 100 weeks). Exploiting the removal of the cut in 1989, Uusitalo and
Moisala (2003) ﬁnd an increase of some 8% in the employment hazard when the cut kicks
in, but this eﬀect was not statistically signiﬁcant. Empirical hazard rates for UI recipients
aged 52 or less reported in Koskela and Uusitalo (2006) exhibit no peaks for transitions to
employment, but a level shift at one year that is followed by an additional peak after two
years for transitions to labour market programmes. These descriptive observations are in
line with evidence from Sweden and Norway. The absence of signiﬁcant increases in the
employment hazard around the exhaustion of UI beneﬁts in the Nordic countries is perhaps
attributed to relatively long entitlement periods, the availability of welfare payments after
UI beneﬁt exhaustion, and easy access to active labour market programmes.
13
A fully parametric Weibull model was adopted, so that all hazard functions were restricted to being
constant, monotonically increasing, or monotonically decreasing.
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3 The Institutional Framework
We shall discuss the features of the Finnish social security system during the second half
of the 1990s, i.e. around the time of our empirical analysis. It should be stressed that the
Finnish system has been subject to continuous changes over the years. A more complete
description of the regulations and current reforms aﬀecting early retirement is provided
by OECD (2004).
3.1 The unemployment compensation system
The Finnish compensation system distinguishes between the basic unemployment al-
lowance, earnings-related unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁt, and labour market sup-
port. The earnings-related UI beneﬁt is received by workers who have been working and
contributing insurance payments to an unemployment fund for at least 10 months during
the two years prior to unemployment.
14
Those who fulﬁl the employment criteria of hav-
ing worked at least 10 months but do not belong to any unemployment fund are eligible
only for the basic allowance (which amounts to 115 euros per week in 2003). The replace-
ment rate for the earnings-related UI beneﬁt declines with the level of former earnings,
the gross and net replacement rates for a worker with median earnings being 55% and
64% respectively (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2003). The basic allowance and UI beneﬁt can
be received for a maximum of two years, i.e. 500 working days, but an exception is made
for the elderly (see below). Workers who do not meet the employment criteria or whose
entitlement period has been exhausted can claim labour market support, which is viewed
as a minimum income for the long-term unemployed and those entering the labour mar-
ket. The maximum beneﬁt level for labour market support equals the basic unemployment
allowance, but it is means-tested against household income.
3.2 Early retirement schemes and the unemployment tunnel
Disability and unemployment pensions are the major pathways of early withdrawal from
the labour market.
15
The disability pension is payable to people between the ages of
16 and 65 who are unable to support themselves by regular work due to deteriorated
health. Although receipt of disability pension is conditional on a medical assessment,
almost one-ﬁfth of all people aged 55 to 64 were on a disability pension in 2001 (Rantala
and Romppanen, 2004). Compared with most other OECD countries, the incidence of
disability among older people seems to be particularly high in Finland (OECD, 2004, p.
58). The disability pension provides a beneﬁt level close to normal old-age pension beneﬁts,
which may partly explain its popularity. The unemployment pension is payable to a
14
The unemployment funds are closely related to labour unions. The fund membership is voluntary, and
workers can join the fund without joining the union.
15
Other early retirement schemes include early old-age pension, individual early retirement, part-time
pension, and farmers’ pensions. These schemes are of less importance and are not discussed here. See
OECD (2004) for a more complete description of the Finnish pension system.
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person aged between 60 and 64 who has been unemployed and has collected unemployment
beneﬁts for at least two years. The compensation level of the unemployment pension is
close to other early retirement schemes and usually exceeds the level of UI beneﬁt.
16
At
the age of 65 unemployment and disability pensions are transformed into normal old-age
pensions.
The unemployed who turn 57 (55 before 1997) during their initial two-year period of
unemployment beneﬁt entitlement are allowed to collect unemployment beneﬁts up until
the age of 60. Thus an unemployed person at least 55 years and 1 month of age (53 years
and 1 month or over before 1997) at the beginning of the unemployment spell has an option
to collect unemployment beneﬁts up to the entry into the unemployment pension scheme,
which will be subsequently followed by a normal old-age pension. This combination of the
extended unemployment beneﬁt entitlement period and the unemployment pension has
become known as the "unemployment tunnel" (UT).
There have been two reforms in the UT scheme that are relevant for our analysis.
The ﬁrst one ("1996 reform") cut beneﬁt levels for various early retirement schemes,
including unemployment pensions.
17
The reduced beneﬁt levels apply to workers who
start collecting early pension beneﬁts in 1996 or later. This law was enacted by the
parliament in September 1995. There was, however, a peculiar protection clause in the
law: all workers born before 1943 who were unemployed on the ﬁrst working day of 1996
remain covered by the old rules in case of early retirement (regardless of the day the early
retirement event takes places in the future). As we shall see, the anticipation of the law
change caused an excess inﬂow to unemployment at the end of 1995 among elderly workers
who beneﬁted from the protection clause. Although this reform is not of our interest, we
need to take it into account in our research design.
Another reform ("1997 reform") raised the age threshold for the extended beneﬁt
period from 55 to 57. This reform was passed as a law by the parliament in September
1996, and it came into eﬀect on January 1st 1997. However, according to a protection
clause, the former threshold was applied to workers born before 1944 who were unemployed
on January 1st 1997 if they either resigned from their job or were made redundant before
June 1996. As a result, individuals aged 53-54 becoming unemployed before June 1996
were eligible for the extension, but those becoming unemployed in 1997 no longer were.
Because of the period of notice which can be 6 months at maximum, workers aged 53-
54 who entered unemployment in 1996 between June and December may or may not be
16
The compensation levels of UI beneﬁts and unemployment pensions are determined by previous earn-
ings over the periods of diﬀerent lengths. The UI beneﬁts tend to be higher for workers with a steeply
increasing earnings proﬁle before job loss. Rantala (2003) ﬁnds that transitions from unemployment to the
unemployment pension were followed by an average increase of 16 percent in the gross compensation level
in 1996 and 1997.
17
The accrual rate for projected pensionable service was decreased from 1.5% per year to 1.2% per year
while aged under 60 and to 0.8% per year while aged 60 to 65. (Projected pensionable service is the time
period from the pension contingency to the age of 65. The projected pensionable service increases the
amount of pension, since it is calculated as if the person had continued working until the age of 65. A
pension accrues according to a lower accrual rate, however.)
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eligible for the extension, depending on the exact timing of resignation or dismissal.
The aim of this 1997 reform package was to cut unemployment expenditures, to im-
prove employment incentives among the unemployed, and to close certain loopholes in the
system. The unemployment pension scheme was perceived as a loophole, given that some
companies had exploited the existing system when downsizing and it had turned into a
somewhat generally acceptable early retirement scheme. Hence, the government wanted
to phase the system out.
18
Since there is no reason to believe that the age threshold was
raised in response to a change in relative labour market conditions for the older workers,
our analysis should not be subject to endogenous policy bias.
3.3 Active labour market programmes
Although ﬁnding suitable employment for the unemployed is the main goal of policy
makers we should bear in mind that in the Finnish case active labour market programmes
are a signiﬁcant route out of unemployment and, thus, cannot be ignored. However, the
elderly unemployed were not speciﬁcally targeted with active measures during the 1990s,
since unemployment among them was not foreseen as the most acute problem. In general,
participation in ALMPs tends to be lowest in the oldest cohorts, ranging from some 25%
of all unemployed in the youngest cohorts to some 17% in the eldest cohorts (Aho, 2005).
The programmes are oﬀered to the unemployed by the employment oﬃce, but an un-
employed individual can also apply for these measures unprompted.
19
During the place-
ment period in subsidised employment a participant receives the prevailing market wage
set in collective agreements. Subsidised employment contracts in the private sector are
expected to be continuous and may thus result in the unemployed individual renewing
eligibility for earnings-related beneﬁts by fulﬁlling the 10 months’ time-at-work condition.
Job placements in the public sector tend to be ﬁxed-term and shorter by nature (often
6 months) and, thus, a single such period does not usually suﬃce to renew eligibility.
20
During participation in labour market training the participants receive a sum equalling
their unemployment compensation together with a daily allowance for maintenance and
possibly for accommodation. The training period neither consumes nor accumulates the
UI entitlement period left.
While for some unemployed people ALMPs may truly be a way of obtaining contacts
and skills leading to a secure job, there is also the possibility that others simply comply to
participate in order to prolong the exhaustion of beneﬁts or to regain foregone eligibility.
If the latter should apply, the older individuals entitled to extended UI beneﬁts have little
18
The age threshold for the extended period of unemployment beneﬁts was raised by two additional
years in 2005. Over the period 2009-2014 the unemployment pension scheme will be gradually abolished
and replaced with additional unemployment beneﬁt days for the elderly until the age of 65.
19
Should an unemployed individual refuse to participate in these measures without a valid reason if such
a measure is oﬀered to him, he will be deprived of unemployment compensation for a period of 60 days.
20
According to Virjo et al. (2006) in 1996 and 1998 some 15 percent of all the unemployed were receiving
earnings-related beneﬁts owing at least in part to participation in the programmes.
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incentive to participate in these programmes, and we might also expect this to show up
in our results.
3.4 Incentives
Large numbers of older workers have been found to withdraw from the labour market
several years before the normal retirement age. This ﬁnding is related to the elements
of the Finnish social security system that induce ﬁrms to focus workforce reductions on
older workers on the one hand, and discourage the elderly unemployed from returning
to work on the other hand. Consider the supply side ﬁrst. As those who are eligible
for the extended entitlement period cannot lose their unemployment beneﬁts, they may
be less active in searching for employment opportunities and claim higher wages. There
are also doubts that the employment authorities may not forward job oﬀers that arrive
at the public employment oﬃces to the oldest applicants. Accepting a low wage job can
reduce future old-age pension beneﬁts, which may increase the wage claims of the older
unemployed. It may also be diﬃcult to ﬁnd wage oﬀers close to the previous wage level,
as post-unemployment wages are generally clearly below the average wage level (see Holm
et al., 1999). Overall, ﬁnancial incentives to return to employment are rather poor for the
elderly unemployed.
For the employer, keeping elderly workers can be a risky business. Employers are liable
for a large fraction of early retirement expenditures via partially experience-rated employer
contributions. Experience-rating is not applied to ﬁrms with fewer than 50 employees, but
larger ﬁrms have to pay a given proportion of the early pension beneﬁt stream received
by their former employees. This cost share is determined as a linear function of ﬁrm size.
In the case of the unemployment pension, ﬁrms with over 300 employees pay a maximum
amount of one-half of the overall cost, whereas medium-sized ﬁrms with 51-300 employees
pay a lower share. A diﬀerent scale is applied to the disability pension, in which case
the former employer pays 0% (ﬁrms with fewer than 50 employees) to 100% (ﬁrms with
more 1000 employees) of the early pension expenditures. In practice, the cost share of the
disability pension exceeds that of the unemployment pension for ﬁrms with more than 500
employees.
21
The opposite is true for ﬁrms with 51 to 500 employees, while it does not
make any diﬀerence for smaller ﬁrms.
It is worth emphasizing that costs incurred by the employer can cumulate over several
years until the former employee reaches the age of 65 and transfers to an old-age pension.
Once again, there is a diﬀerence between the two schemes: unemployment pension costs
cannot be realised until the former employee turns 60 but disability pension costs may
emerge much earlier. For example, a worker laid oﬀ at age 55 must remain unemployed for
ﬁve years before he or she can enter the unemployment pension. Since the employer is not
liable for unemployment beneﬁts received by its former employees, the UT scheme may
be a ﬁnancially attractive option to get rid of elderly employees with a high disability risk
21
The experience-ratings of the two early pension schemes were harmonized in 2000.
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also for medium-sized ﬁrms which have to pay a higher share of unemployment pension
expenditures than disability pension expenditures.
It is evident that early retirement can become costly for the former employer, espe-
cially in the case of a large ﬁrm. Discrepancies in experience-rating and timing of early
retirement costs between disability and unemployment pensions may encourage econom-
ically distressed ﬁrms to lay oﬀ older workers. In doing so, the ﬁrm avoids the risk of
incurring disability pension costs later, i.e. the risk that is rather high in the light of
oﬃcial statistics. Moreover, the fear of future early retirement cost may induce ﬁrms to
discriminate against older job applicants in recruitment.
22
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 The Employment Statistics database
Our data were drawn from the records of the Employment Statistics (ES) database of
Statistics Finland. Since 1987 the ES database has been updated regularly by merging
information from over 20 administrative registers through the use of unique personality
identity numbers. The ES database eﬀectively covers all people with permanent resi-
dence in Finland, and its information content is extensive. Along with standard socio-
demographic background variables, the database includes detailed information on annual
income (from the tax authorities), job spells (from the pension institutes), unemployment
spells and participation in labour market programmes (from the employment oﬃces).
With this source of data one can basically follow the entire Finnish population over time
and across diﬀerent labour market states. This sort of comprehensive data is available
for economic research mainly in the Nordic countries, where collection and maintenance
of large-scale administrative registers, with unique identiﬁcation information, has a long
tradition. When our samples were drawn the records of the ES database were available
for the period 1988-2000.
4.2 The incidence of unemployment
The UT scheme is of less importance in the public sector, where employers have weaker
ﬁnancial incentives for age discrimination and workers with a long employment history
gain from a high level of job security. In the following analysis we therefore consider
private sector workers only. Our analysis focuses on the second-half of the 1990s which
was a time of stable economic growth and high unemployment. The Finnish economy was
hit by a severe depression in the early 1990s. The GNP contracted three years in a row
(1991-1993), and at the worst, in 1991 the GNP decreased by over 7%. According to the
22
Age-dependent social security contributions further raise the costs of older workers compared with
prime-age workers. In 2003, the contribution paid by the employer on top of the wage received by the
worker varied from 19.3 to 38.4 percent, being an increasing function of ﬁrm size and the worker’s age
(OECD, 2004, p. 82).
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Labour Force Survey the unemployment rate increased from 3.2% to 16.6% between 1990
and 1994, even though masses of people were removed from the unemployment register and
directed to labour market programmes. The depression was followed by a period of strong
and stable economic growth. The average growth rate of GNP was above 4% between
1994 and 2000. The unemployment rate declined approximately by one percentage point
each year over this period, reaching 9.8% in 2000.
Figure III.2 displays the risk of becoming unemployed by age and year in the private
sector. The unemployment risk corresponds to a proportion of workers who were con-
tinuously employed over the past year but who became unemployed or participated in
a labour market programme during the current year.
23
This group of workers is eligible
for unemployment beneﬁts in the case of job loss, and hence exposed to the UT scheme.
These workers are also very likely to be members of unemployment funds, and thereby
eligible for earnings-related UI beneﬁts.
Before the 1997 reform those who were 53 or older at the beginning of their unemploy-
ment period were eligible for the extended period of unemployment beneﬁts, owing to the
UT scheme. In 1994, 1995, and 1996 the likelihood of unemployment jumped at the age
of 53, increasing thereafter smoothly up to the age of 58. In each year the unemployment
risk starts to decline at around the age of 60, suggesting that the oldest workers can leave
the labour market through other early retirement schemes. At the beginning of 1997 the
age threshold for the UT scheme was raised by two years (for those who resigned from
their job or were made redundant after May 1996). As a result, the unemployment risk as
a function of age shifted forward by two years in 1997 and 1998 compared with the earlier
years. In particular, the risk of unemployment in the age group 53-54 dropped to a level
roughly identical to that of younger groups. This clearly indicates that the sharp level
shift in the unemployment risk after a given age cannot be a coincidence but is driven by
the UT scheme. Moreover, the inﬂow to unemployment among workers aged 53 and 54 is
much higher in 1996 than in 1994 and 1995. This suggests that some employees who were
eligible for extended UI beneﬁts in 1996 but lost their eligibility temporarily as a result of
the increase in the age threshold in 1997 entered unemployment in 1996 in anticipation of
the law change.
A third noteworthy pattern in Figure III.2 is a clear decrease in the incidence of
unemployment among workers aged 55 and over after the 1997 reform. This is partly
illusory, however, as the annual unemployment risks of older groups in 1995 and 1996
23
More speciﬁcally, the risk of unemployment in year t for k years old workers is computed as
1−
∏
12
m=1
[1− pt,m(k)] ,
where pt,m(k) is the monthly layoﬀ rate among workers aged k at the end of month m in year t, which
is deﬁned as the ratio of workers unemployed (and those participating in labour market programmes) at
the end of month m who were employed from the beginning of year t − 1 to the end of month m − 1 in
year t to otherwise equal workers but who were still employed at the end of month m. Data on the entire
population of private sector employees were used for calculations.
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Figure III.2: Annual unemployment risk by age and year in the private sector (Source:
the authors’ calculations from the ES database)
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are inﬂated by the anticipation eﬀects of the two distinct UT reforms. The presence of
anticipation eﬀects can be seen from Figure III.3. The inﬂow to unemployment increases
sharply among workers aged 53 or over (i.e. those born before 1943 who were covered by
the protection clause of the 1996 reform) at the end of 1995, while there is no evidence
of peaks for younger groups. An even larger increase in the unemployment risk occurs
at the end of the next year for workers aged 53 and 54 who were aﬀected by the 1997
increase in the age threshold for the UT scheme. This is consistent with the anticipation
hypothesis of the 1997 reform. Surprisingly, the unemployment inﬂow also increases,
though less strongly, among older workers who remain unaﬀected by the 1997 reform.
There is no obvious explanation for this phenomenon. This "shadow eﬀect" may arise
from uncertainty about the forthcoming reform if ﬁrms and employees were aware that
the age threshold will increase but did not know by how much. This may be the case here,
as the exploitation of the prior age threshold required that the dismissal or resignation
took place several months before the law was enacted by the parliament in September 1996.
When interpreting the results one should note that the majority of the elderly workers
who entered unemployment in the late 1996 were likely to be covered by the protection
clause of the 1997 reform because of 6 months’ notice for workers with long job tenure.
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Figure III.3: Monthly unemployment risk by age in the private sector (Note: Vertical lines
correspond to Decembers. Source: the authors’ calculations from the ES database.)
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Compared with 1998, the inﬂow rate in 1997 is lower for younger groups but higher
for older groups (see Figure III.2). In 1998 the lower age limit for part-time pensions was
reduced from 58 to 56. Workers on part-time pension remain employed but work less than
ﬁve days per week or do a reduced number of hours per day. If employers view part-time
pensions as an alternative way of adjusting working hours in the case of older employees,
this reform may partly explain the decline in the unemployment risk among the older
groups in 1998.
Older workers who are eligible for extended UI beneﬁts are clearly much more likely to
become unemployed than their younger co-workers. It is hard to explain this phenomenon
with a simple supply or demand side story alone. In most cases, unemployment causes,
along with a social stigma, a notable cut in both gross and net income. Therefore, a
claim that elderly workers are ﬂowing into long-term unemployment of their own free will
does not sound very convincing. Moreover, it seems economically irrational for employers
to lay oﬀ disproportionate numbers of workers who have just passed the age limit of the
UT scheme. Such workers yield a liability to the ﬁrm for the unemployment pension
expenditure. The ﬁrm could easily avoid this liability by laying oﬀ employees that are a
few years younger. In the case of a large ﬁrm (with more than 500 employees), which aims
to minimise the risk of disability pension expenditures, targeting dismissals at the elderly
group of workers may have some economic reasoning. This is so because large ﬁrms must
pay a higher cost share of disability pensions than of unemployment pensions. But this
does not explain why layoﬀs tend to fall on the elderly employees in ﬁrms of all sizes (see
Rantala, 2002, and Section 5 below).
One possibility is that the dismissals of older people, whose income levels are secured
through the UT scheme or some other early retirement scheme, have an implicit approval
from the general public and, to some extent, from the older people themselves. For exam-
ple, some elderly people may agree to accept a lower income level in favour of much more
leisure time. This view is formalised in a study by Hakola and Uusitalo (2001). Building
on the work of Arnott et al. (1998) and Hutchens (1999), they lay out an optimal contract
model of early retirement for Finland. In their model the dismissals of elderly employ-
ees are determined via an optimization problem where both the employer and employee
are involved. An optimal contract speciﬁes wages, ﬁring rules, and severance payments
so as to maximise the sum of expected utilities of the employer and employee. Within
this framework a partially experience-rated unemployment pension system subsidizes ef-
fectively the dismissals of the elderly employees. This encourages ﬁrms to target dismissals
at their older employees, which subsequently increases early retirement. In other words,
if a ﬁrm cares about the welfare of its employees, it organises workforce reductions so
that losses to the employees are minimised, which means that those who are eligible for
the extended UI period are displaced in the ﬁrst place. Hakola and Uusitalo also show
that a number of predictions of their theoretical model are in accordance with empirical
regularities observed in the Finnish micro data.
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4.3 The sample of the elderly unemployed
In the subsequent analysis of unemployment durations, we focus on private sector work-
ers aged 50-54 becoming unemployed between 1995 and 1998, having been continuously
employed for at least one calendar year prior to the year of job loss, and being thus likely
eligible for earnings-related UI beneﬁts. We further restrict the sample by including only
those with UI beneﬁts higher than 14 euros per day,
24
which corresponds to the amount
of basic unemployment allowance at the time. For each worker in the data we observe the
length of the unemployment spell (in days), exit destination, and a set of control variables.
All unemployment spells that continue beyond the end of 2000 are treated as censored.
The age threshold for the newly unemployed to be eligible for the extended UI beneﬁt
was increased from 53 to 55 years in 1997. This eﬀectively reduced the unlimited entitle-
ment period to two years among the group aged 53-54 at the time of job loss, providing
a quasi-experimental setting for studying the relationship between the length of the UI
entitlement period and transitions out of unemployment. We allocate workers to groups
on the basis of their age at the beginning of the unemployment spell and the time they
entered unemployment. Workers aged 53-54 who entered unemployment in 1995 or 1996
are referred to as the treatment group since their behaviour is aﬀected by eligibility for
the extended UI beneﬁts. Workers aged 53-54 who became unemployed in 1997 or 1998
serve as the comparison group. Apart from eligibility for the extended UI beneﬁts and the
timing of unemployment entry, this group is assumed to be highly similar to the treatment
group. Workers aged 50-52 are labelled as the control group, as they are used to identify
the business cycle eﬀect.
Figure III.4 shows the distribution of post-unemployment destination states by age
group and the month of unemployment entry. For comparison purposes, we include also
workers aged 55-57 which were eligible for extended beneﬁts in all years. The unemployed
in the youngest group typically exit to employment or labour market programmes. For
this group the distribution of diﬀerent exit events has remained stable over time. Workers
between the ages of 55 and 57 rarely ﬁnd a new job, and they do not participate in labour
market programmes. For this group, when the destination state is observed, it is most
likely to be retirement (i.e. non-participation). A high degree of censoring for the spells
that started in 1997 or 1998 further implies that many retirements occur after the end
of the observation period. The distribution of destination states for the age group 53-54
closely resembles that for the age group 50-52 in the 1997 and 1998 inﬂows. However,
roughly one-half of the unemployment spells of workers aged 53-54 that started in 1995
or 1996 had not terminated by the end of 2000. This indicates very long periods of
unemployment for this group prior to the increase in the age threshold of the UT scheme.
Among the two older groups, the degree of censoring is particularly high and the share
of exits to employment low for the spells that started at the end of 1995 and 1996 while
24
And less than 75 euros per day.
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Figure III.4: Post-unemployment destination by age and the month of unemployment
entry, percent (Note: Vertical lines correspond to Decembers)
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the opposite is true for the spells that started in the early 1996 and early 1997. There is no
similar variation over time for the age group 50-52.
25
This further highlights the selection
issues arising from anticipation of the two distinct UT reforms: the elderly employees
who expected to start a long spell of unemployment in the early 1996 or 1997 (i.e. those
who believed to beneﬁt from extended UI beneﬁts and/or unemployment pension) tend
to advance their unemployment entry in order to beneﬁt from the prior rules. To identify
the eﬀects of eligibility for extended beneﬁts in the absence of anticipation and selection
issues, we exclude the following groups from the duration analysis:
• All individuals who entered unemployment between October 1995 and January 5th
1996. Anticipation of the 1996 reform led to the excess inﬂow to unemployment at
the end of 1995 among workers aged 53 and over owing to the protection clause of
the law (see Figure III.3). These workers are nonrandomly selected with respect to
their re-employment prospects, as implied by the increase in the share of censored
spells and the decline in the share of spells ending in employment particularly in
December 1995 in Figure III.4. Individuals aged 50-52 who became unemployed in
the same period are excluded to keep the seasonal composition of the 1995 inﬂow
identical for both age groups.
• All individuals who entered unemployment between June 1996 and December 1996.
The eligibility status is not clear for workers aged 53 or 54 who became unemployed
during this time interval as it depends on the day of resignation or dismissal which is
not known. Most of these workers are likely to be eligible for the UT scheme due to
the period of notice but we cannot be sure. In addition there is an obvious selection
problem at the end of 1996 due to the anticipation of the 1997 reform (see Figures
III.3 and III.4), which we avoid by focusing on individuals entering unemployment
before June. It should be noted that the ﬁrst half of 1996 for the age group 53-54
may still be subject to another selection issue due to the anticipation of the earlier
reform. The high share of exits to employment among the spells that started in the
early 1996 imply that some of those who expected to retire via the UT scheme and
who would have become unemployed in the ﬁrst half of 1996 in the absence of the
1996 reform did so already in 1995 in order to beneﬁt from the old rules. For this
reason the 1996 inﬂow sample of the age groups 53-54 remains problematic, which
we should keep in mind.
• Individuals born in 1942 or 1943 who entered unemployment in 1997-1998 at age 53
25
As pointed out in Section 2.1, the age-dependent beneﬁt extension may aﬀect also job search incentives
of the unemployed who are not currently entitled to extended beneﬁts. In particular, those who are only
slightly below the age threshold may be able to qualify themselves for extended beneﬁts by accepting a
short-term job or participating in ALMPs. This suggests that the 1997 reform may have had an indirect
eﬀect also on workers aged 52 at the time of job loss. However, we ﬁnd only a marginal change in exit
behaviour of the 52-years-old after the 1997 reform compared with younger workers, and excluding them
from the control group does not change our results.
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or 54. In 1996 the 1942 and 1943 birth cohorts were 53 years old, and thereby eligible
for extended beneﬁts, but they lost their eligibility brieﬂy on January 1st 1997 as
a result of the increase in the age threshold. Those who expected to experience
a long spell of unemployment starting in 1997 or 1998 had an incentive to enter
unemployment already in 1996. This claim is supported by the excess inﬂow to
unemployment among workers aged 53-54 at the end of 1996 (see Figure III.3).
As a consequence, individuals born in 1942 or 1943 who became unemployed after
the 1997 reform are likely to be a selected group in terms of skills and motivation.
By excluding these workers, we eﬀectively restrict the age group 53-54 entering
unemployment in 1997-1998 to those who were born between 1944 and 1945. These
workers were not eligible for extended beneﬁts in 1996, and hence were not able to
gain from the protection clause of the 1997 reform.
These excluded groups were chosen on the basis of the timing of the law changes, the
details of the protection clauses, and our ﬁrst impression of the timing of anticipation
eﬀects. It is not clear at which time employers and employees actually became aware of
the forthcoming law changes. For example, the observed increases in the unemployment
risk at the end of 1996 for the older groups show that anticipatory decisions were made
well before the law change was enacted by the parliament. In Section 5 we assess the
validity of the included groups in more detail.
Sample statistics by age group and by year of entering unemployment are shown in
Table III.1. The average duration of an unemployment spell is roughly one year for the
50 to 52-year-olds entering unemployment in 1995 — 1998, as well as for the 53 to 54-
year-olds entering unemployment in 1997 and 1998, but it is much longer for the older
cohort entering unemployment in 1995 and 1996. When considering only completed spells
eventually ending in employment, diﬀerences between the groups diminish drastically.
This, according to our view, indicates that a large fraction of the older age group entering
unemployment in 1995 or 1996 is not actually searching for a job but is instead passively
waiting for access to retirement.
Given the age structure of our sample, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that most of the
individuals are married, nor that only a small share have a dependent child in the family.
Overall, the diﬀerences in mean individual characteristics among the groups remain small.
The occupational distribution in both age groups is fairly similar across entering years.
Not surprisingly, the elderly unemployed are rather poorly educated on average. Roughly
half of the sample were previously unemployed in the 1990s. This is a rather large fraction
despite the fact that the early 1990s was a period of sky-high unemployment. On the
other hand, almost half of the sample have stayed with the same employer at least for
the previous four years. There is practically no diﬀerence in the average level of earnings-
related unemployment beneﬁts received by the diﬀerent groups.
The excluded spells of the older group (not reported) are longer on average than
the spells included in the 1995 and 1996 inﬂow samples. This is consistent with the likely
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Table III.1: Sample statistics by age and time of entering unemployment
1995 1996 1997/1998
Jan to Sep Jan to May Jan to Dec
50-52 53-54 50-52 53-54 50-52 53-54
Unempl. duration, days 368 1252 290 968 284 299
(382) (866) (350) (767) (291) (265)
Duration to employment 190 215 151 144 151 155
(214) (279) (175) (187) (176) (164)
Female .475 .553 .394 .455 .434 .476
Married .687 .724 .700 .712 .685 .677
Female × married .304 .388 .259 .301 .295 .314
Dependent child .218 .099 .195 .098 .205 .100
Swedish-speaking .061 .045 .051 .043 .040 .062
Post-secondary education .083 .049 .061 .055 .059 .049
Occupation:
Commercial .183 .157 .131 .154 .156 .180
Technical .083 .071 .081 .065 .078 .070
Humanist .022 .021 .020 .015 .021 .029
Health care .019 .014 .016 .017 .020 .020
Clerical .188 .261 .149 .158 .151 .157
Agricultural .026 .011 .076 .046 .016 .021
Transportation .053 .057 .061 .060 .065 .061
Industrial .324 .315 .382 .396 .395 .371
Services .092 .091 .078 .077 .092 .085
Not classiﬁed .009 .003 .005 .012 .006 .006
Firm size:
50 employees or less .435 .297 .474 .390 .470 .473
51-500 employees .293 .313 .253 .293 .270 .271
Over 500 employees .272 .390 .272 .317 .260 .256
Tenure ≥ 4 years .460 .497 .437 .450 .437 .457
Unemployed in early 1990s .383 .287 .570 .510 .549 .518
Past recall in early 1990s .076 .062 .186 .158 .176 .157
Ln (UI beneﬁts) 3.30 3.31 3.32 3.32 3.30 3.28
(.33) (.27) (.34) (.28) (.33) (.33)
Number of observations 935 1046 837 584 2939 657
Notes: Sample standard deviations for continuous variables are in parentheses. The spells of those born
in 1942 or 1943 for 53-54 years old are excluded from 1997/1998 data.
eﬀects of anticipation behaviour, though the business cycle may play a role as well. Among
workers aged 53-54 entering unemployment in 1997 or 1998, the excluded individuals (i.e.
those born in 1942 or 1943) have marginally shorter spells than those included in the
analysis. Also this ﬁnding is in line with the expected selectivity eﬀects.
Almost one-half of workers aged 50-52 were employed by small ﬁrms with 50 employees
or less and a quarter by large ﬁrms with more than 500 employees before unemployment.
These shares do not exhibit variation over time, and the diﬀerences between the included
and excluded groups are minor. The size distribution of the past employer for the age
group 53-54 is quite diﬀerent in 1995 and 1996 but almost identical to the size distribution
for the younger group in 1997-1998. Evidently, individuals old enough for the extended
beneﬁt period tend to become unemployed from larger ﬁrms than their younger counter-
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Table III.2: Risk set and observed exits by duration intervals
Treatment group
1)
Control and comparison groups
2)
Exits to Risk Exits to Risk
Interval Emp ALMP Out set Emp ALMP Out set
(0,2] months 150 10 23 1630 1041 117 100 5368
(2,4] months 121 7 20 1447 674 118 98 4110
(4,6] months 41 10 15 1299 387 103 64 3220
(6,8] months 25 16 11 1233 202 123 48 2666
(8,10] months 32 6 14 1181 129 97 49 2293
(10,12] months 9 9 10 1129 107 121 49 2018
(12,14] months 13 3 21 1101 55 160 43 1741
(14,16] months 9 6 10 1064 63 159 43 1483
(16,18] months 12 9 8 1039 51 128 31 1218
(18,20] months 11 5 9 1010 37 98 35 1008
(20,22] months 2 6 8 985 27 99 43 838
(22,24] months 4 4 6 969 28 86 37 669
(24,30] months 8 17 20 955 44 162 56 518
(30,36] months 2 4 14 910 8 31 20 221
(36,48] months 3 8 33 890 4 12 21 135
(48,60] months 2 4 34 846 1 4 3 49
(60,63] months 0 0 42 547 0 1 0 18
(63,∞] months 1 0 111 502 0 1 0 17
Sum 445 124 409 2858 1620 740
(%) (27.3) (7.6) (25.1) (53.2) (30.2) (13.8)
1) Individuals aged 53-54 becoming unemployed in 1995 or 1996. 2) Individuals aged 50-52 becoming
unemployed in 1995-1998 and individuals aged 53-54 in 1997-1998.
parts. Compared with the included workers, a higher share of the excluded workers in the
older group entering unemployment in 1995 or 1996 were employed by large ﬁrms (not
reported). This suggests that large employers were responsible for much of the excess
inﬂow to unemployment at the end of 1995 and 1996.
Table III.2 shows the numbers of individuals at risk of exiting unemployment and
observed exits to diﬀerent destinations by each duration interval for our treatment group
(those with extended UI beneﬁts) and the pooled control and comparison group (all those
with the ﬁxed two-year entitlement period). Only 60% of the individuals in our treatment
group exit unemployment during the observation period, while almost everyone from the
control and comparison groups do exit. Moreover, the distribution of end-states is quite
diﬀerent in the two groups. Given the large share of individuals in the treatment group
who are still unemployed at the end of the observation period of 5 to 6 years of length, it
seems clear that many of those with extended UI beneﬁts are no longer active in the labour
market. Ervasti (2003) studies preferences for job search using a survey of 970 unemployed
workers.
26
According to their search activity he classiﬁes the unemployed into four groups,
where the most passive group consists of those who do not look for a new job, nor even wish
to return to employment. Members of this group are rather old, i.e. entitled to extended
26
The survey was subject to a large response bias.
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UI beneﬁts, receiving high UI beneﬁts, having high reservation wages, and suﬀering from
deteriorated health. Consequently, accounting for this considerably lower level of activity
does appear necessary here for the treatment group. This will be accomplished by using
the split population model described below.
5 Flow from employment to unemployment
It has become evident that the unemployment inﬂow of the elderly employed changed
sharply in response to the increase in the age threshold for the UT scheme in 1997. From
Figures III.2 and III.3 it is diﬃcult to distinguish the "pure" eﬀects of the 1997 reform
from changes in the business cycle and the anticipation eﬀects of the two distinct reforms.
Therefore, we elaborate this issue further by modelling the likelihood of becoming un-
employed over various periods. By identifying the timing of the anticipation eﬀects, we
also validate our choices of treatment, comparison, and control groups for the duration
analysis.
Since the entire private sector is covered by the ES database, we have observations on
the employees of a large number of plants (and ﬁrms). We model the probability that a
worker aged s who is working in plant k becomes unemployed during the period under
consideration as
pks(x) =
exp (γ
k
+ αs + x
′
β)
1 + exp (γ
k
+ αs + x
′
β)
, (III.1)
where γ
k
is the ﬁxed plant eﬀect, αs is the age eﬀect, and x is a vector of individual-
speciﬁc control variables.
27
We include all workers between the ages of 50 and 63 who were
employed over the past year in the analysis. Workers aged 50 serve as a reference category,
and hence α50 ≡ 0 is imposed as a normalisation. We estimate separate logit models for
diﬀerent periods. Under the assumption that changes in macroeconomic conditions aﬀect
all age groups similarly, signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the age pattern of the unemployment risk
between two periods are attributed to factors other than the business cycle, such as the
anticipation and permanent eﬀects of the UT reforms.
For each period we estimate two models: one for employees of small ﬁrms with less than
50 employees and another for employees of larger ﬁrms.
28
Small ﬁrms should have weaker,
if any, incentives for age discrimination because the experience-rating of early retirement
schemes is applied only to larger ﬁrms.
29
We apply the conditional maximum likelihood
27
Age is measured at the end of the year under consideration. The control variables x include education,
ﬁrm tenure, its square, gender, marital status and its interaction with gender, a dummy for a dependent
child in the family and its interaction with gender, a dummy for those who speak Swedish as their native
language, a dummy for recipients of capital income, a dummy for those with taxable wealth, and a dummy
for debts. Information on income, wealth, and debts refers to the previous year.
28
It may be confusing that we split the data by ﬁrm size but allocate workers to plants in the estimations.
The distinction between plants and ﬁrms is relevant only for large ﬁrms with multiple plants. However,
if we replace the ﬁxed plant eﬀects with the ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects, few very large ﬁrms will lead to numerical
problems in the estimation step.
29
In addition, a large employer has a wider range of possibilities in targeting dismissals at workers of
particular ages than a small ﬁrm with only a few employees.
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method (i.e. the ﬁxed eﬀects logit model) to estimate α51, α52, ..., α63 and β for the
employees of large ﬁrms. Since the ﬁxed plant eﬀects drop out of the conditional likelihood
function, no assumptions about how the unobserved plant eﬀects are related to age and
control variables are needed. A particular feature of the approach is that observations on
the employees of a given plant do not contribute to the conditional likelihood function if
either none or all of the plant’s employees became unemployed during the period. This
is the case for most small plants which cannot have many employees between the ages of
50 and 63. As a result, the ﬁxed eﬀects method is a less appealing choice for modelling
the unemployment risk in small ﬁrms (unless one is willing to throw away over 90% of
observations). In the case of the employees of small ﬁrms we therefore replace the ﬁxed
plant eﬀects with a set of industry and regional dummies and apply the standard logit
model (but adjust the covariance matrix for within-plant correlation). We represent our
results for the age eﬀects in terms of odds ratios. The odds of becoming unemployed is
deﬁned as pks(x)/ [1− pks(x)] . The odds ratio for age group s ∈ [51, 63] is given by e
αs
,
and it gives the proportional eﬀect on the odds of becoming unemployed compared with
the reference worker aged 50.
30
The odds ratios for workers between the ages of 51 and 63 in three diﬀerent years are
shown in Figures III.5a and III.5b. We have chosen 1994 as a reference period for the
pre-reform time since it is supposed to be free of all anticipation issues. We have also
added the 95% conﬁdence band for this year. Among the employees of large ﬁrms the
odds of becoming unemployed starts to increase smoothly at the age of 53 in 1994. This
increase occurs more sharply two years later in the post-reform periods. Since the reform
in 1997 workers aged 53 and 54 have not been at a higher risk of unemployment than the
reference workers aged 50. Overall the older employees of large ﬁrms have a substantially
higher risk of becoming unemployed than their younger co-workers. As expected, the risk
of unemployment does not depend so much on age in small ﬁrms, though it is signiﬁcantly
higher for the elderly employees also in this case. Among the employees of small ﬁrms the
higher risk applies only to workers aged 55 and over in all years, and hence no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences are observed for those aged 53 or 54 in 1994.
Small declines in the odds ratio for 54-years-old workers in 1997 in Figures III.5a and
III.5b are consistent with the hypothesis that the entry to unemployment for some workers
who lost their eligibility for the UT scheme was advanced in anticipation of the 1997 reform.
However, these declines are not statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level and similar declines
occur also in 1998 (workers who turned 54 in 1998 were not eligible for the UT scheme
in 1997). Compared with 1994, the odds ratios for workers aged 55 and over who are
30
For example, e
α
55
= 1.7 would imply that the odds of becoming unemployed is 70 percent higher
for a 55-year-old worker than for a 50-year-old worker who is identical in terms of characteristics x and
who is working in the same plant (or in the same industry and region in the case of workers employed by
a small ﬁrm). Note that the eﬀect of age on the odds of becoming unemployed does not depend on the
other explanatory variables and the unknown plant-speciﬁc eﬀects (which cannot be estimated consistently
without further assumptions).
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Figure III.5: Odds ratios of becoming unemployed from logit models compared with a
reference worker aged 50
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working in large ﬁrms are roughly at the same level in 1997 (with a few exceptions) and
lower in 1998. The age pattern for the employees of small ﬁrms looks rather similar across
all years. So there are no notable changes in the relative risk of unemployment among the
older groups not directly aﬀected by the reform in 1997 (i.e. those aged 55 or more), and
hence the overall inﬂow of the elderly employees to unemployment also decreased. The
additional declines in the unemployment risk for those aged 55 and over in 1998 remain a
puzzle, but reasons like the increased use of part-time pension or social pressure may play
a role here.
In the duration analysis we aim to solve the selection problems arising from the an-
ticipation of the UT reforms by excluding certain inﬂow months of 1995 and 1996 from
the data. To test the validity of this solution we compare the age patterns of the un-
employment risk over the selected subperiods of 1995 and 1996 with the corresponding
subperiods of 1994 which are not subject to any selection issues. Figures III.5c and III.5d
show the age patterns of the unemployment risk over the ﬁrst three quarters of 1994 and
1995. The 1994 curve lies within the 95% conﬁdence band for the 1995 curve with a few
exceptions. Marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerences occur at the ages of 55 and 58. These diﬀer-
ences, however, cannot be attributed to the anticipation of the 1996 reform which should
lead to a higher risk of unemployment for workers aged 53 and over in 1995 than in 1994.
We therefore conclude that the anticipation of the 1996 reform caused the excess inﬂow to
unemployment among workers covered by the protection clause only in the last quarter of
1995 (see also Figure III.3), and thereby workers aged 53-54 who entered unemployment
in 1995 by the end of September serves as an anticipation-free group for the duration
analysis.
In Section 4.2 we found a sharp increase in the unemployment risk at the end of 1995
among the groups covered by the protection clause of the 1996 reform. If a large fraction
of workers who entered unemployment at that time would have become unemployed in
1996 in the absence of the reform, we should see a decline in the unemployment risk in
the early 1996 which would then imply a selection problem for our 1996 inﬂow sample.
Indeed, some diﬀerences appear in Figures III.5e and III.5f, which show the age proﬁles
of the odds of becoming unemployed in 1994, 1995, and 1996 by the end of May, along
with the 95% conﬁdence band for the 1996 curve. The odds ratio for workers older than
55 is occasionally signiﬁcantly lower in 1996 than in 1994 and 1995. But there are no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences at the ages of 53 and 54. Therefore, on the basis of
unemployment risk, workers aged 53-54 who entered unemployment in 1996 by the end of
May seem to be another valid group for the duration analysis. This conclusion should be
treated with caution, however, as it is in contrast with evidence in Figure III.4 where the
distribution of exit states implies a possibility of a selection problem for this group.
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6 Unemployment duration analysis
We need to be aware of several complications in the empirical analysis of duration data.
First, the unemployment spells start at diﬀerent points in time, and, in particular, workers
aged 53-54 under diﬀerent UI schemes enter unemployment in diﬀerent years. We need to
ﬁnd a way to separate the changes in the hazard function owing to diﬀerent UI schemes
from the eﬀects of changing macro-economic conditions. For purposes of identifying the
eﬀects of the business cycle, we adopt a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences type of setting where
workers aged 50-52 serve as a control group. Second, prior survey evidence and our
descriptive analysis suggest that a notable fraction of workers with extended UI beneﬁts
are passive and eﬀectively withdrawn from the labour market. This issue is taken into
account by allowing the transition probabilities to employment and ALMPs to be zero for
some individuals in this group.
6.1 The split population model
Consider a worker who loses his job and becomes unemployed at time τ . The worker is
followed until the termination of the unemployment spell or the end of the observation
period τ (i.e. the last day of 2000). The duration of the unemployment spell T is con-
tinuous. If a transition out of unemployment occurs within the observation period, it will
be followed by employment (e), participation in an ALMP (p), or withdrawal from the
labour market (o). The unemployment spell is right-censored if it continues beyond the
observation period, in which case we know only that T > τ − τ . We allow for a possibility
that the worker chooses to withdraw from active labour market behaviour, in which case
he does not look for employment, nor is he willing to participate in ALMPs. Instead he
is passively waiting for an opportunity to escape the labour force via some early retire-
ment scheme. For simplicity, we assume this choice is made at the moment of entering
unemployment. We denote ε = 1 if the worker is still active, and ε = 0 otherwise. The
value of this latent choice variable is not directly observed. The time path of explanatory
variables for the hazard functions from τ to τ + t is denoted by X(t, τ). This set includes
variables that are either ﬁxed, change with spell duration t (unemployment beneﬁts), or
change with calendar time τ + t (calendar-time dummies and local unemployment rate).
The subset of variables that also aﬀect the probability distribution of ε is denoted with z.
The conditional hazard rates at spell duration t to employment and ALMPs are mul-
tiplicative in ε :
θk(t |X(t, τ), ε) = θk(t |X(t, τ)) ε, k ∈ {e, p} .
We assume that the worker is not active with probability p(z) = Pr(ε = 0 |z) , in which
case θk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) = 0 for k ∈ {e, p} . The transition rate out of the labour force is
independent of ε, so that
θo(t |X(t, τ), ε) = θo(t |X(t, τ)) .
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The survivor function conditional on X(t, τ) and ε is given by
S(t |X(t, τ), ε) = exp
{
−ε
∫
t
0
θe(u |X(u, τ))du− ε
∫
t
0
θp(u |X(u, τ)) du
−
∫
t
0
θo(u |X(u, τ))du
}
. (III.2)
Since the value of ε is observed only in some cases, we cannot always condition on it. By
taking the expected value of S(t |X(t, τ), ε) with respect to ε, we obtain
S(t |X(t, τ)) = [1− p(z)] exp
⎧
⎨
⎩−
∫
t
0
∑
j
θj(u |X(u, τ))du
⎫
⎬
⎭
+p(z) exp
{
−
∫
t
0
θo(u |X(u, τ))du
}
, (III.3)
where
∑
j
denotes the sum over all the three possible exit destinations.
If a transition to employment or to an ALMP occurred at spell duration t, the values
of both ε and T are observed along with the destination state. The likelihood contribution
in this case is given by
[1− p(z)] θk(t |X(t, τ))S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 1) , k ∈ {e, p} .
When the unemployment spell ended via withdrawal from the labour force at spell duration
t, we observe the spell length but not the value of ε, and hence the likelihood contribution
is
θo(t |X(t, τ))S(t |X(t, τ)) .
If the unemployment spell is still in progress at time τ , the value of ε remains unobserved
and all we know is that T > τ − τ . The likelihood contribution in this censored case is
S(τ − τ |X(t, τ)) .
Putting these pieces together, we obtain the log-likelihood of the model:
L =
∑
i
∑
j
dij ln θj(ti |Xi(ti, τ i)) +
∑
i
(1− die − dip) lnS(ti |Xi(ti, τ i))
+
∑
i
(die + dip) [ln [1− p(zi)] + lnS(ti |Xi(ti, τ i), εi = 1)] , (III.4)
where
∑
i
denotes the sum over all individuals in the sample;
∑
j
denotes the sum over
all the three possible exit destinations; dij = 1 if individual i exited to destination j ∈
{e, p, o} , and dij = 0 otherwise; and for censored observations ti = τ − τ i and
∑
j
dij = 0.
The log-likelihood function (III.4) is maximised with respect to the unknown determinants
of θe(·), θp(·), θo(·), and p(·).
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6.2 Parametrization
We adopt a step-function approximation to the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions in a con-
tinuous time framework. Compared with the grouped data analysis, this speciﬁcation
is equally ﬂexible but also allows us to exploit the variation in the observed durations
between the spells that fall into the same time interval. The time axis for the length
of unemployment spells is divided into M intervals as (cm−1, cm] , m = 1, 2, ...,M, with
c0 ≡ 0 and cM ≡∞. Although any duration dependence can be approximated arbitrarily
closely by increasing the number of time intervals, this is not possible in practice because
of a ﬁnite sample size. The number and length of the time intervals used are chosen on
the basis of observed exits out of unemployment in the data. We set the length of the
ﬁrst 12 intervals to two months. These are followed by two intervals of six months, two
intervals of twelve months, one interval of three months, and the open-ended interval (see
Table III.2). We have to impose some group-speciﬁc restrictions on the shape of hazard
functions on the basis of observations available for estimation.
We assume the following hazard function for destination k ∈ {e, p, o} at spell duration
t ∈ (cm−1, cm]:
θk(t |X(t, τ)) = exp
{
λ
m
k
+ η
m
k
D + αkG50−52 + γkY53−54×96 + x
′
m
β
k
}
,
where D is the dummy variable for the entitlement period of two years (i.e. 53-54 years old
who entered unemployment in 1997-1998 and 50-52 years old in all entry years), G50−52 is
the dummy variable for workers aged 50-52, Y53−54×96 is the dummy variable for workers
aged 53-54 whose unemployment started in 1996, and xm is a vector of other covariate val-
ues for the mth duration interval. The hazard functions are constant within each interval
but vary across intervals owing to time-varying parameters (λ
m
k
and η
m
k
) and time-varying
covariates (included in xm). The time-varying covariates include unemployment com-
pensation, local unemployment rate, and year and quarter dummies. Among individuals
under the conventional UI scheme UI beneﬁts lapse after 24 months of unemployment and
are followed by labour market support. The local unemployment rate, year dummies, and
quarter dummies are related to calendar time, not to the elapsed duration of unemploy-
ment. These variables control for changing labour demand conditions over time and across
regions.
31
For destination k the shape of the hazard function for the treatment group (53-54
years old in 1995 and 1996) is modelled with a set of dummy variables for the log baseline
hazard function, λ
m
k
, m = 1, 2, ...,M. Given a relatively small number of observed exits
for this group (see Table III.2), we need to impose some equality constraints on λ
m
k
for
subsequent intervals. Within the treatment group the hazard function is allowed to diﬀer
31
The local unemployment rate is computed as the average of monthly rates. The quarter/year dummy
takes a value of one if the midpoint of the duration interval is located on that quarter/year. For the
open-ended interval 3 months from the beginning of the period is used as a reference point instead of the
midpoint, which is not well-deﬁned.
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by a proportional factor of e
γ
k between workers who entered unemployment in 1995 and
1996. These two groups are covered by diﬀerent rules for computing unemployment pen-
sion beneﬁts. The pattern of duration dependence for the comparison group (53-54 years
old who entered unemployment in 1997 and 1998) is very close to that of the control group
(50-52 years old). This is not very surprising, given that the age diﬀerence is so small and
they all are covered by the same UI scheme. Consequently, the hazard functions between
these groups are allowed to diﬀer only by a proportional shift factor of e
α
k .
The likelihood of choosing passivity, p(z), varies with characteristics z. On the basis
of descriptive evidence, we assume that all workers with a ﬁxed entitlement of two years
are active, and hence p(z) = 0 is imposed for them. Following Schmidt and Witte (1989)
and Pudney and Thomas (1995) among others, we assume the logistic distribution for ε
within the treatment group:
p(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0, if D = 1,
exp {z
′
δ}
1 + exp {z
′
δ}
, if D = 0,
where z includes a constant.
We will consider the standard competing risks model as a benchmark for our duration
analysis. The model outlined above is reduced to the standard competing risks model
with piecewise constant hazards if one imposes p(z) = 0 for all individuals in the data.
In this case the log-likelihood function (III.4) factorizes into separate components for the
parameters of each destination, and hence the estimation may be done in three steps.
6.3 Cumulative incidence functions
In our model there is a variety of channels through which the extended UI beneﬁts
can aﬀect the ﬂows of workers out of unemployment to employment, ALMPs, and non-
participation. The cause-speciﬁc hazard functions are aﬀected by extended UI beneﬁts
in two ways. First, the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions of the treatment group can be
of a diﬀerent shape. The hazard rates to destination k in the mth interval diﬀer by
the proportional factor e
η
m
k between workers who are otherwise identical but are covered
by the two diﬀerent UI schemes. Since η
m
k
are allowed to vary freely across the inter-
vals, this amounts to estimating separate baseline hazard functions for the treatment and
comparison groups.
32
Second, unlike the other groups, workers aged 53-54 who entered
32
The ﬂexible speciﬁcation for the eﬀect of the entitlement period on the hazard functions is adopted
because economic theory does not impose simple parametric restrictions. In the two-state search model of
Mortensen (1977), for example, an increase in the maximum duration of UI beneﬁts reduces the employment
hazard over the forepart of the unemployment period but increases it close to and beyond the exhaustion
point. In other words, the eﬀect on the employment hazard is predicted to change over the course of the
unemployment spell, potentially reversing its sign at some point. In the empirical analysis this possibility is
sometimes ruled out a priori by imposing the restriction that changes in the length of the entitlement period
may lead to level shifts in the underlying hazard function but cannot aﬀect its shape (e.g. Hunt, 1995;
and Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004). Moreover, economic theory provides little guidance on the expected
responses in the hazard rates to ALMPs and non-participation.
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unemployment in 1995 or 1996 do not lose their UI beneﬁts after 24 months. This results
in a diﬀerent time pattern for the unemployment compensation variable that is included
in xm, the eﬀect of which comes on top of the diﬀerence in the baseline hazard functions
for long-duration spells. It should be stressed that these entitlement period eﬀects on the
hazard functions are conditional on workers being active (i.e. conditional on ε = 1). There
is an additional disincentive eﬀect via the choice of labour market withdrawal: some of
those with extended UI beneﬁts may be discouraged and choose to withdraw from active
labour market behaviour entirely. This eﬀect can be heterogeneous, and it is measured
with p(z).
To summarize all these potential eﬀects in a coherent way, we will calculate the mar-
ginal cumulative incidence and distribution functions for diﬀerent groups. The cumulative
incidence function (CIF) for destination k ∈ {e, p, o} at spell-duration t ∈ (cm−1, cm]
conditional on X(t, τ) and ε is deﬁned as
Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε) =
∫
t
0
θk(u |X(u, τ), ε)S(u |X(u, τ), ε)du, (III.5)
and it equals the probability that the individual has entered destination k by spell du-
ration t. Note that Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) = 0 for k ∈ {e, p} and Fo(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) =
1− S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0).
The marginal CIF gives the predicted fraction of workers who have escaped from
unemployment through a particular exit route by a given duration time. The marginal
cumulative distribution function (CDF), which equals the sum of marginal CIFs for all exit
destinations, gives the predicted share of those who have left unemployment by a given
duration time for any reason. The estimated fractions of individuals who have escaped
unemployment by spell duration t through employment and ALMPs are obtained as
F̂k(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
[1− p̂(zi)] F̂k(t |Xi(t, τ i), εi = 1) , k ∈ {e, p} ,
where i indexes individuals and N denotes the group size at time t = 0. The estimated
fraction of the workers who have left the labour force by spell duration t is
F̂o(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
[1− p̂(zi)] F̂o(t |Xi(t, τ i), εi = 1) + p̂(zi)
[
1− Ŝ(t |Xi(t, τ i), εi = 0)
])
.
In other words, we ﬁrst calculate the estimates of CIFs for each individual at various
points in duration time, conditional on the time path of the individual’s covariate values
up until that point. Then we obtain the group-speciﬁc estimates of the marginal CIFs by
taking averages over individual estimates within the groups. The marginal CDF at spell
duration t can be estimated as F̂ (t) =
∑
k
F̂k(t) = 1− Ŝ(t), where the marginal survivor
function is
Ŝ (t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
[1− p̂(zi)] Ŝ(t |Xi(t, τ i), εi = 1) + p̂(zi)Ŝ(t |Xi(t, τ i), εi = 0)
)
.
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In the conventional competing risks speciﬁcation we simply have p̂(zi) = 0 and εi = 1 for
all individuals.
6.4 Discussion
One can think of the model outlined above as a special case of a multiplicative frailty
(or unobserved heterogeneity) model (Sy and Taylor, 2000). As a frailty variable, ε has
a probability distribution with two mass points at known values. Unlike in the standard
frailty models, ε is not entirely unobservable, since it is observed for individuals who
exited to employment or ALMPs, and its distribution can depend on the same observed
characteristics as the hazard functions do. This class of duration models was introduced
by Farewell (1977). The models are known as mixture or cure models in statistics, and
split population or mover-stayer models in econometrics (Schmidt and Witte, 1989; and
Abbring, 2002). Applications in labour economics include Yamaguchi (1992), Swaim and
Podgursky (1994), Pudney and Thomas (1995), Addison and Portugal (2003), Ollikainen
(2003), and Mavromaras and Orme (2004). Our speciﬁcation departs from the existing
literature in that the same ε enters multiplicatively in the two distinct cause-speciﬁc hazard
functions and does so only for a particular subgroup of the population.
Farewell (1982) emphasizes that the split population models should not be applied in-
discriminately. There must be strong evidence of a subgroup not at the risk of experiencing
the event of interest. A feature of the model that the same covariates can aﬀect the choice
of withdrawal from labour market behaviour and exit rates out of unemployment allows
additional ﬂexibility in modelling, but opens up the possibility of over-parametrization (Sy
and Taylor, 2000). Identiﬁability of the model generally requires a long observation period
and a suﬃciently large number of uncensored observations. In our application descriptive
ﬁndings along with indirect survey results give convincing evidence of the existence of a
group of the elderly unemployed who are no longer engaged in labour market activities.
Having a follow-up period of 5-6 years, we should also be able to detect this group.
The focus of the econometric analysis of UI has been on detecting eﬀects on the em-
ployment hazard or the overall hazard out of unemployment. However, the eﬀect of UI on
the employment hazard may be less relevant from a policy perspective than its eﬀects on
the likelihood of leaving unemployment via employment by a given time. The employment
eﬀect of a policy change in the UI system that aﬀects the employment hazard may be rein-
forced or attenuated by changes in hazard rates out of the labour force and to ALMPs. As
a consequence, a policy change with a strong eﬀect on the employment hazard may have
a negligible or even opposite eﬀect on the probability that the unemployment spell will
end with employment. Alternatively, a policy change with no eﬀect on the employment
hazard may still have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of ﬁnding a job due to indirect
eﬀects via competing hazards. Thus it may be hazardous to focus on estimating reform
eﬀects on the employment hazard only by treating individuals who exit to other destina-
tions than employment as censored observations. We believe that an appropriate way of
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evaluating employment eﬀects requires simultaneous account of all cause-speciﬁc hazards,
and the cumulative incidence functions provide a useful way of summarizing the results of
competing risks analysis in a coherent and policy-relevant way. Although the cumulative
incidence approach has enjoyed popularity in the medical treatment literature (e.g. Pepe,
1991; Gaynor et al., 1993; and Satagopan et al., 2004),
33
it has attracted surprisingly little
attention in economic applications.
6.5 Hazard function estimates
The hazard function estimates of the standard competing risks and split population spec-
iﬁcations are presented in Figure III.6 and Tables III.3 and III.4. The hazard functions
are depicted for a reference person,
34
and the estimates obtained from the split population
speciﬁcation are conditional on searching (i.e. ε = 1). The baseline parameters (λk) not
reported in the tables determine the shape of the cause-speciﬁc hazards for the treatment
group with extended UI beneﬁts in Figure III.6. The time-varying coeﬃcients (η
k
) for
individuals with the ﬁxed two-year-entitlement period measure the diﬀerence between the
hazard functions for the treatment and comparison groups, and the statistical signiﬁcance
thereof. The hazard functions for transitions to employment and ALMPs obtained from
both speciﬁcations are plotted for a reference person with extended UI beneﬁts. The
corresponding hazard functions under the ﬁxed entitlement period are roughly identical
between the speciﬁcations, and hence only the hazard function estimate from the split
population model is shown in Figure III.6. Since both speciﬁcations produce identical
estimates for the transition rate out of the labour force (see discussion in the Appendix
and parameter estimates in Tables III.3 and III.4), the two hazard functions in the last
graph are common to both models.
Under the two-year entitlement period the employment hazard exhibits considerable
negative duration dependence. By the time the unemployment period has lasted for
6 months the employment hazard is more than halved. We ﬁnd only a slight beneﬁt-
exhaustion-related upturn in the hazard for employment at 22-30 months, whereas most
of the beneﬁt-exhaustion-related exits are directed towards ALMPs. The hazard function
for transitions to ALMPs peaks considerably both at one year and, even more so, at two
years of continuous unemployment. These ﬁndings are in line with evidence from Norway
(Bratberg and Vaage, 2000; and Røed and Zhang, 2003) and Sweden (Carling et al., 1996).
The transition rate out of the labour force is fairly steady and low overall, peaking slightly
33
In clinical studies, it is common to compare nonparametric estimates of the cumulative incidence
functions. In the presence of covariates, Fine and Gray (1999) and Fine (1999) propose semiparametric
methods for directly estimating the cumulative incidence functions rather than combining estimates of the
cause-speciﬁc hazard functions.
34
The reference individual is married, lives in a region with the local unemployment rate of 20 per cent
(slightly below the sample mean), and receives UI beneﬁts equal to the mean beneﬁts for the 53-54-year-
olds (log of UI beneﬁts = 3.3162). Other dummy variables are set to zero. Under the ﬁxed entitlement
period, the UI beneﬁts of the reference individual are assumed to drop after 2 years of unemployment to
the level of basic allowance (log of UI beneﬁts = 2.6529).
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Figure III.6: Cause-speciﬁc hazard functions for a reference person under two diﬀerent UI
schemes
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around the time of beneﬁt exhaustion.
The employment hazard of the worker with extended UI beneﬁts obtained from the
standard competing risks model declines with the elapsed duration, being signiﬁcantly
lower than the hazard of the worker with the ﬁxed entitlement period (see time-varying
coeﬃcients and their standard errors in Table III.3). However, the most dramatic discrep-
ancies between the UI schemes are found for the transition rates to ALMPs. The hazard
function of the treatment group for transitions to ALMPs obtained from the standard
competing risks model lies ﬂat at a very low level. The transition rate out of the labour
force among workers with extended beneﬁts is also low and ﬂat until it peaks at the very
end of the observation period when the individuals start to exit via the unemployment
pension scheme.
Our estimates of the labour market withdrawal probability from the split population
model suggest that some half of the workers with extended UI beneﬁts are inactive, having
zero hazard rates to employment and ALMPs (see the next section). Hence, hazard esti-
mates for the treatment group obtained from the standard competing risks speciﬁcation
are subject to bias, owing to a particular type of unobserved heterogeneity problem. The
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Table III.3: Results of the standard competing risks speciﬁcation
Hazard function for transitions to
Employment ALMPs Non-particip.
Time-varying coeﬃcient for
2-year entitlement period:
Interval (0,2] months 0.634 (0.110) 1.150 (0.198) 0.491 (0.201)
Interval (2,4] months 0.580 (0.112) 1.457 (0.198) 0.691 (0.202)
Interval (4,6] months 0.361 (0.118) 1.544 (0.201) 0.481 (0.216)
Interval (6,8] months 1.258 (0.162) 1.891 (0.198) 0.347 (0.230)
Interval (8,10] months 0.946 (0.171) 1.808 (0.205) 0.495 (0.231)
Interval (10,12] months 0.889 (0.176) 2.207 (0.201) 0.639 (0.234)
Interval (12,14] months 1.235 (0.210) 3.177 (0.218) 0.730 (0.243)
Interval (14,16] months 1.569 (0.205) 3.418 (0.219) 0.849 (0.245)
Interval (16,18] months 1.609 (0.215) 3.372 (0.223) 0.663 (0.265)
Interval (18,20] months 1.508 (0.232) 3.267 (0.229) 0.916 (0.260)
Interval (20,22] months 1.372 (0.254) 3.494 (0.230) 1.270 (0.253)
Interval (22,24] months 1.610 (0.252) 3.614 (0.235) 1.305 (0.264)
Interval (24,30] months 3.120 (0.304) 5.025 (0.285) 1.847 (0.245)
Interval (30,36] months 2.231 (0.443) 5.738 (0.328) 1.442 (0.310)
Interval (36,48] months 1.387 (0.521) 4.734 (0.364) 1.300 (0.286)
Interval (48,60] months 1.387 (0.521) 4.734 (0.364) 1.300 (0.286)
Interval (60,63] months 1.387 (0.521) 4.734 (0.364) −0.623 (0.329)
Interval (63,∞] months 1.387 (0.521) 4.734 (0.364) −1.383 (0.306)
Age 50-52 0.117 (0.063) −0.233 (0.077) 0.135 (0.119)
Female −0.170 (0.071) 0.672 (0.093) −0.006 (0.102)
Married 0.363 (0.050) 0.172 (0.086) −0.109 (0.092)
Female × married −0.368 (0.081) 0.021 (0.108) 0.149 (0.122)
Dependent child 0.155 (0.045) 0.062 (0.067) −0.032 (0.091)
Swedish-speaking 0.204 (0.082) −0.049 (0.122) 0.136 (0.141)
Tenure ≥ 4 years −0.172 (0.037) −0.126 (0.049) 0.064 (0.060)
Unemployed in early 1990s 0.312 (0.042) 0.146 (0.053) 0.065 (0.067)
Past recall in early 1990s 0.709 (0.047) −0.291 (0.126) 0.089 (0.127)
Occupation: (ref. commercial)
Technical 0.302 (0.081) −0.131 (0.109) −0.179 (0.147)
Humanist 0.071 (0.140) −0.107 (0.161) −0.163 (0.217)
Health care 0.708 (0.127) −0.071 (0.200) 0.101 (0.253)
Clerical −0.050 (0.074) 0.079 (0.073) 0.059 (0.096)
Agricultural 0.685 (0.102) 0.140 (0.275) 0.162 (0.282)
Transportation 0.239 (0.086) −0.177 (0.136) 0.306 (0.130)
Industrial 0.383 (0.060) −0.204 (0.073) −0.092 (0.091)
Services −0.037 (0.084) −0.068 (0.090) 0.015 (0.114)
Not classiﬁed −0.231 (0.264) 0.332 (0.295) 0.606 (0.299)
Year 1996 x age 53-54 0.043 (0.106) −0.168 (0.199) 0.095 (0.136)
Time-varying covariates:
Ln (UI beneﬁts) −0.735 (0.064) 2.155 (0.093) 0.271 (0.125)
Ln (local unemployment rate) 0.076 (0.080) 0.205 (0.096) 0.027 (0.119)
Quarter 2 0.268 (0.047) −0.323 (0.072) 0.179 (0.091)
Quarter 3 −0.066 (0.056) −0.197 (0.072) 0.079 (0.094)
Quarter 4 −0.201 (0.058) 0.012 (0.070) 0.206 (0.094)
Year 1996 0.183 (0.067) 0.117 (0.127) −0.224 (0.132)
Year 1997 0.241 (0.070) 0.397 (0.129) −0.213 (0.143)
Year 1998 0.210 (0.069) 0.306 (0.129) −0.129 (0.141)
Year 1999 0.199 (0.087) 0.365 (0.138) 0.161 (0.158)
Year 2000 −0.235 (0.180) 0.395 (0.161) 0.667 (0.193)
Notes: Number of observations is 6,998. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates of the baseline
hazards not reported.
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Table III.4: Results of the split population speciﬁcation
Hazard function for transitions to
Employment ALMPs Non-particip.
Time-varying coeﬃcient for
2-year entitlement period:
Interval (0,2] months −0.220 (0.152) 0.174 (0.235) 0.491 (0.201)
Interval (2,4] months −0.282 (0.154) 0.480 (0.235) 0.691 (0.202)
Interval (4,6] months −0.508 (0.159) 0.565 (0.239) 0.481 (0.217)
Interval (6,8] months 0.035 (0.235) 0.910 (0.236) 0.347 (0.230)
Interval (8,10] months −0.276 (0.239) 0.824 (0.242) 0.495 (0.232)
Interval (10,12] months −0.335 (0.243) 1.221 (0.240) 0.639 (0.235)
Interval (12,14] months −0.179 (0.294) 1.839 (0.288) 0.730 (0.243)
Interval (14,16] months 0.151 (0.293) 2.078 (0.289) 0.849 (0.245)
Interval (16,18] months 0.189 (0.300) 2.031 (0.292) 0.663 (0.265)
Interval (18,20] months 0.089 (0.314) 1.926 (0.296) 0.916 (0.260)
Interval (20,22] months −0.044 (0.326) 2.151 (0.297) 1.270 (0.253)
Interval (22,24] months 0.196 (0.327) 2.273 (0.301) 1.305 (0.264)
Interval (24,30] months 1.481 (0.419) 3.440 (0.377) 1.847 (0.245)
Interval (30,36] months 0.595 (0.529) 4.039 (0.438) 1.442 (0.310)
Interval (36,48] months −0.264 (0.597) 3.036 (0.465) 1.300 (0.286)
Interval (48,60] months −0.264 (0.597) 3.036 (0.465) 1.300 (0.286)
Interval (60,63] months −0.264 (0.597) 3.036 (0.465) −0.623 (0.329)
Interval (63,∞] months −0.264 (0.597) 3.036 (0.465) −1.383 (0.306)
Age 50-52 0.124 (0.063) −0.228 (0.077) 0.135 (0.119)
Female −0.155 (0.074) 0.692 (0.095) −0.006 (0.116)
Married 0.394 (0.052) 0.196 (0.088) −0.109 (0.097)
Female × married −0.350 (0.085) 0.010 (0.112) 0.149 (0.134)
Dependent child 0.135 (0.046) 0.055 (0.067) −0.032 (0.091)
Swedish-speaking 0.198 (0.084) −0.060 (0.124) 0.136 (0.141)
Tenure ≥ 4 years −0.156 (0.039) −0.124 (0.050) 0.064 (0.060)
Unemployed in early 1990s 0.291 (0.044) 0.143 (0.054) 0.065 (0.067)
Past recall in early 1990s 0.682 (0.049) −0.312 (0.126) 0.089 (0.127)
Occupation: (ref. commercial)
Technical 0.278 (0.084) −0.140 (0.110) −0.179 (0.148)
Humanist 0.009 (0.151) −0.140 (0.163) −0.163 (0.217)
Health care 0.666 (0.131) −0.099 (0.202) 0.101 (0.253)
Clerical −0.086 (0.077) 0.053 (0.074) 0.059 (0.096)
Agricultural 0.629 (0.106) 0.134 (0.277) 0.162 (0.283)
Transportation 0.264 (0.089) −0.151 (0.137) 0.306 (0.131)
Industrial 0.381 (0.062) −0.198 (0.074) −0.092 (0.091)
Services −0.082 (0.088) −0.100 (0.091) 0.015 (0.115)
Not classiﬁed −0.284 (0.272) 0.282 (0.298) 0.606 (0.299)
Year 1996 x age 53-54 −0.255 (0.171) −0.379 (0.270) 0.095 (0.136)
Time-varying covariates:
Ln (UI beneﬁts) −0.695 (0.064) 2.096 (0.093) 0.271 (0.126)
Ln (local unemployment rate) 0.094 (0.082) 0.217 (0.097) 0.027 (0.122)
Quarter 2 0.274 (0.047) −0.321 (0.072) 0.179 (0.091)
Quarter 3 −0.038 (0.056) −0.199 (0.072) 0.079 (0.094)
Quarter 4 −0.176 (0.058) 0.018 (0.071) 0.206 (0.094)
Year 1996 0.214 (0.069) 0.145 (0.129) −0.224 (0.132)
Year 1997 0.267 (0.071) 0.430 (0.131) −0.213 (0.143)
Year 1998 0.239 (0.070) 0.333 (0.131) −0.129 (0.141)
Year 1999 0.241 (0.088) 0.395 (0.139) 0.161 (0.158)
Year 2000 −0.185 (0.181) 0.429 (0.162) 0.667 (0.193)
Notes: Number of observations is 6,998. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates of the baseline
hazards not reported.
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split population model takes this issue explicitly into account, and yields the hazard esti-
mates for a reference worker with extended beneﬁts who is still actively looking for a new
job and considers ALMPs as a possible way of escaping unemployment. Not surprisingly,
the hazard functions of the treatment group for transitions to employment and ALMPs
conditional on being active are higher compared with the estimates from the conventional
competing risks speciﬁcation. The employment hazard for the treatment group exhibits
negative duration dependence, being rather close to the estimated hazard for the com-
parison group. The diﬀerence between the employment hazard under ﬁxed and extended
entitlement is statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional risk levels only between 4-6 and
24-30 months of unemployment (see Table III.4). In other words, workers with extended
UI beneﬁts choosing to continue job search exit to employment at a similar rate as other-
wise identical workers with a ﬁxed period of UI beneﬁts. By contrast, active individuals
within the treatment group have very low transition rates to ALMPs compared with the
comparison group. As a general remark, the transition rates out of unemployment un-
der the two diﬀerent UI schemes are of a diﬀerent shape here. Restricting the eﬀects of
the length of the UI entitlement period to a proportional shift alone would, at least in
our case, be far too constraining (for such a priori restrictions see e.g. Hunt, 1995, and
Winter-Ebmer, 1998).
The coeﬃcient estimates for the background characteristics in Tables III.3 and III.4 are
in line, and hence we will only discuss the estimates of the split population speciﬁcation.
The ﬁndings are fairly conventional, indicating that women have a lower employment haz-
ard and a higher hazard rate for transitions to active labour market programmes. Married
people have higher transition rates both to employment and ALMPs. Individuals with
dependent children also have a higher employment hazard, as do people speaking Swedish
as their ﬁrst language. The coeﬃcients of occupational variables indicate diﬀerences in
the transition rate to employment across diﬀerent sectors.
There is evidence of both quarterly and yearly variation in transition rates to all end-
states. The time-dependent regional unemployment rate has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on the transition rate to ALMPs. This merely points out the strong regional aspect of
the labour market policy practised in Finland. As discussed in Lilja (1992) and Ollikainen
(2003), a higher than average proportion of individuals participating in active labour
market programmes comes from regions with a high unemployment to vacancies ratio. As
expected, the amount of unemployment beneﬁts has a negative eﬀect on the hazard rate for
transitions to employment. This is generally viewed as a result of the individual’s higher
leeway in being selective about his employment. High unemployment beneﬁts substantially
increase the transition rate to ALMPs, as well.
6.6 Likelihood of labour market withdrawal
As expected on the basis of descriptive analysis, we ﬁnd evidence of a large subgroup of
workers with extended UI beneﬁts who are no longer actively engaged in job search. Figure
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Figure III.7: Distributions of labour market withdrawal probabilities by year of entry to
unemployment (Epanechnikov kernel)
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III.7 shows the distributions of labour market withdrawal probabilities (i.e. the probability
of ε = 0) across individuals with extended beneﬁts by year of entry to unemployment. The
mean probability of being inactive in our treatment group is .54 among those becoming
unemployed in 1995 and .42 among those becoming unemployed in 1996. Thus, roughly
half of the unemployed eligible for extended UI beneﬁts are at no point interested in
ﬁnding a way out of unemployment via employment or ALMPs, but instead are just
passively waiting for retirement. The ﬁnding of such high overall withdrawal probabilities
corroborates the necessity of implementing the split population model here.
Moreover, there is a lot of variation in the withdrawal probabilities across individuals.
In addition to the evident variation within each year, there might also be some diﬀerence
in the activity levels of the groups between years. However, looking at the logit coeﬃcients
in Table III.5 we ﬁnd that, in fact, the dummy for 1996 is statistically insigniﬁcant, indi-
cating that the observed yearly diﬀerences in the withdrawal probabilities are attributed
to diﬀerences in the observed characteristics of the unemployed individuals. It appears
that personal characteristics such as gender, being married or having dependent children
do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the decision of whether or not to search. Factors related to the
individual’s employment history turn out to be much more important. In all occupations
individuals tend to be less likely discouraged than in the reference group, commercial work,
although many of these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. The inﬂection point
for the quadratic eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts is 31 euros per day. Since two-thirds of
individuals in the treatment group are receiving beneﬁts lower than this, a small increase
in UI beneﬁts would discourage most of the people from searching for a new job.
According to our previous ﬁndings, the unemployment risk of those elderly workers
who are eligible for extended UI beneﬁts is much higher than that of other older workers,
and particularly high in the case of employers with more than 50 employees. When forced
to downsize, companies tend to target their dismissals on the elderly, some of whom may
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Table III.5: Determinants of the labour market withdrawal probability in the split popu-
lation model
Logit Marginal
coeﬃcient Eﬀect
Year 1996 −0.295 (0.257) −0.058
Female 0.254 (0.360) 0.050
Married 0.447 (0.305) 0.087
Female × married 0.103 (0.388) 0.020
Dependent child −0.475 (0.265) −0.093
Swedish-speaking −0.101 (0.402) −0.020
Tenure ≥ 4 years 0.224 (0.163) 0.044
Unemployed in early 1990s −0.170 (0.188) −0.033
Past recall in early 1990s −0.796 (0.308) −0.156
Occupation: (ref. commercial)
Technical −0.848 (0.384) −0.166
Humanist −0.947 (0.733) −0.185
Health care −1.304 (0.642) −0.255
Clerical −0.680 (0.289) −0.133
Agricultural −1.955 (0.655) −0.382
Transportation −0.008 (0.414) −0.002
Industrial −0.628 (0.261) −0.123
Services −0.523 (0.413) −0.102
Not classiﬁed −1.347 (1.564) −0.263
Firm size: (ref. ≤ 50 employees)
51-500 employees 1.031 (0.236) 0.202
Over 500 employees 1.264 (0.246) 0.247
Ln (local unemployment rate) −0.042 (0.409) −0.008
(UI beneﬁts) / 10 5.064 (1.035) 0.990
(UI beneﬁts)2 / 100 −0.817 (0.175) −0.160
Constant −7.963 (1.782)
Notes: Standard errors of logit coeﬃcients are in parentheses. Marginal eﬀects are computed by taking
the average of individual-speciﬁc eﬀects.
quite willingly retire via the unemployment tunnel scheme. In a tough situation this is the
most easily approved line of action by the general public, and hence least damaging for the
ﬁrms’ reputation, as the income level for the elderly is well secured by the unemployment
tunnel scheme. Moreover, ﬁrms with more than 50 employees are liable for a fraction
of early retirement expenditures via partially experience-rated employer contributions.
The largest ﬁrms with more than 500 employees are obliged to pay a higher cost share
of disability pensions than of unemployment pensions. As a consequence, directing the
elderly employees in the UT scheme may be economically rational, especially for large
companies, as in this way they escape the potential disability pension expenditures of
these employees. Of course, the employers have an incentive to get rid of workers with the
highest risk of disability in the ﬁrst place. Such workers may also be more likely to become
passive in the case of job loss. This is consistent with our result that individuals laid oﬀ
from medium-sized or large ﬁrms are much more likely to withdraw from job search than
those laid oﬀ from small ﬁrms with no more than 50 employees. Moreover, the estimated
withdrawal probability is highest for the employees of the largest ﬁrms.
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Figure III.8: Cumulative incidence and distribution functions from standard duration
model by age and entry year of unemployment (Note: Solid lines are nonparametric esti-
mates, and the dashed ones are the ﬁtted curves from the model)
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6.7 Cumulative incidence function estimates
We found evidence of a large fraction of inactive workers within the treatment group
and notable diﬀerences in the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions between the groups. To
summarize these results, we calculate the marginal cumulative incidence and distribution
functions for diﬀerent groups deﬁned by age category and time of entry to unemployment.
In Figures III.8 and III.9 the solid lines depict the nonparametric estimates given by
the data and the dashed ones depict the estimates of our models. A comparison of the
predictions obtained from our model with the corresponding nonparametric estimates
provides a simple procedure for assessing the goodness of ﬁt. The cumulative incidence
and distribution function estimates from the standard competing risks speciﬁcation and
from the split population speciﬁcation are roughly identical in all the other groups except
for the treatment group. Even there, the ﬁt of the split population model is only marginally
better compared to the standard duration model. Hence, the contribution of our paper lies
not in claiming the split population model to be superbly better in obtaining an accurate
ﬁt in case of this particular data set, but in stating that with the split population model
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Figure III.9: Cumulative incidence and distribution functions from split population model
by age and entry year of unemployment (Note: Solid lines are nonparametric estimates,
and the dashed ones are the ﬁtted curves from the model)
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we can dig deeper into the reasons behind the phenomenon we are observing.
We ﬁnd that the treatment group, as such, is very diﬀerent from the other three groups,
with considerably lower cumulative probabilities of exiting to employment and ALMPs.
The cumulative incidence of employment by 12 months is some 45 to 50% in the control and
comparison groups, but only 25% in the treatment group. In the control groups the overall
probability of employment eventually converges up to 55% and in the comparison group to
50%, while in the treatment group this ﬁgure is less than 30%. Also, very few people in the
treatment group eventually escape unemployment through ALMPs, while the cumulative
probability of participation in such programmes in the control and comparison groups
converges even up to 35%. As discussed in Section 3.3, if the unemployed participate
in ALMPs simply in order to prolong the exhaustion of beneﬁts or to regain eligibility,
then the individuals in our treatment group have little incentive to participate, which
appears to be the case here. Overall, the percentage of the unemployed eventually leaving
unemployment in the group with extended beneﬁt duration converges to only some 50%
by duration of 60 months, after which it converges further to 75% due to retirement.
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6.8 Simulating the eﬀects of indeﬁnite UI beneﬁts
Eligibility for extended UI beneﬁts was removed from workers aged 53 and 54 in 1997.
As we have already seen, such a sharp change in the UI scheme has had a strong eﬀect
on the unemployment experiences of those who were aﬀected. In this section we address
this issue further by simulating the hypothetical eﬀects of extended UI beneﬁts on work-
ers aged 53-54 who entered unemployment in 1997 or in 1998. In other words, we ask
how this group of the unemployed would have behaved, had they been eligible for the
extended beneﬁts. We emphasize that our simulation exercise does not tell much about
the overall eﬀect of the 1997 reform, since it also had a strong impact on the inﬂow to
unemployment. In the absence of the reform there would have been more 53-54-year-old
employees becoming unemployed between 1997 and 1998. That is, our results apply only
to the group of workers who lost their jobs and became unemployed in the world where
the reform actually took place. Using the parameter estimates from the split population
model we are able to separately identify the eﬀects of extended UI beneﬁts on the partic-
ipation choice and conditional cumulative probabilities of exits to employment, ALMPs,
and non-participation.
In Figure III.10 we illustrate the results of this experiment by plotting the cumulative
distribution and incidence functions (1) for the observed data, i.e. individuals 53-54 en-
tering unemployment in 1997 or 1998,
35
(2) for the same group in the hypothetical case of
being eligible for the extended UI entitlement, but assuming that all individuals remain
active (i.e. by setting ε = 1 for all), and (3) in this same hypothetical situation, but
allowing individuals to withdraw from the labour market with the estimated probabili-
ties. These simulations were performed separately for each individual in the data, and the
averages of ﬁtted curves over all individuals are plotted in Figure III.10.
We begin with a comparison of actual outcomes and hypothetical outcomes when all
workers with extended UI beneﬁts are assumed to remain active. In the real-world data
the cumulative distribution function converges to 1, but among the active population
with extended entitlement it converges to some .8, i.e. 20% of the active unemployed are
predicted to remain unemployed secured by the extension. The probability of employment
in the actual sample with ﬁxed 2-year UI entitlement converges to 50%, but allowing for
the extended entitlement it, in fact, approaches 60% when all individuals are assumed
to remain active. This results from the drastically low transition rates to ALMPs and
non-participation among the extension-entitled population. In the real-world data exits
to ALMPs account for a notable part of all exits, as some 36% of all unemployment spells
eventually end with a transition to such programmes. Adding extended entitlement, it
would only be about 13%. The probability of exiting the labour force altogether converges
to 15% in the real data, but if we should allow for extended entitlement the incidence
of exiting would decline to 9%. Hence, among the active unemployed the entitlement
35
These are simply the nonparametric estimates.
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Figure III.10: Simulated marginal cumulative distribution and incidence functions under
diﬀerent UI schemes
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.4
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
l
p
0 12 24 36
Elapsed duration of unemployment (months)
Data
Simul ation with extended entitlement
Simul ation with the possibility of inactivity
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
i
s
t
r
ib
u
t
i
o
n
 
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
0 12 24 36
Elapsed duration of unemployment (months)
Data
Simulation with extended entitlement
Simulation with the possibility of inactivity
0
.
0
5
.
1
.
1
5
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
0 12 24 36
Elapsed duration of unemployment (months)
Data
Simulation with extended entitlem ent
Simulation with the possibility of inactivity
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
0 12 24 36
Elapsed duration of unemployment (months)
Data
Simulation with extended entitlement
Simulation with the possibility of inactivity
CDF 
Employment 
ALMP 
OUT
extension eﬀectively increases the probability of employment by 10 percentage points, but
due to the otherwise low transitions rates, the probability of remaining unemployed is also
higher for them.
If we consider the population with the extended entitlement and allow for the possibility
of inactivity, the predicted cumulative probability of exiting from any cause by the end of
the observation period is only some 60%. The probability of employment decreases by 15
percentage points compared with the real-world case with ﬁxed entitlement, converging
eventually to 35%. Allowing for the possibility of inactivity for the extension-entitled
population results in the probability of participation in ALMPs decreasing further to 7%,
while the probability of withdrawing from the labour market returns to the level of the
real-world case.
Overall, our simulation exercise illustrates that consideration of the end-state speciﬁc
hazard functions does not give a full picture of the underlying phenomena. In this par-
ticular case, the employment hazard functions reveal hardly any statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the case of the ﬁxed two-year UI entitlement and the extended entitlement
among the active population (Figure III.6). This might falsely lead us to conclude that,
after conditioning on remaining active, the extension of the entitlement period has no
105
eﬀect on the probability of exiting to employment. Looking at our simulated cumulative
incidence functions we do, however, ﬁnd that among the active extension-entitled popula-
tion the cumulative probability of employment is actually higher due to the lower hazards
for transitions to ALMPs and non-participation. This result is reversed once we allow
some of those with extended UI beneﬁts to choose inactivity. To summarize, via our sim-
ulation exercise we are able to say, that had this UI entitlement extension from two years
to indeﬁnite been applied to the same cohort becoming unemployed in 1997 or 1998, it
would have resulted in a 15% decrease in their employment probability.
7 Concluding remarks
We analysed the eﬀects of the two-year increase in the eligibility age of extended UI bene-
ﬁts on the incidence and duration of unemployment among elderly workers. We found that
disproportionate numbers of dismissals fall on the group of older workers who are eligible
for extended beneﬁts in the case of unemployment. Large employers, especially, seem to
actively exploit the unemployment tunnel scheme to get rid of their elderly employees.
This kind of a culture of early labour market withdrawal is in sharp contrast with the
original idea of the experience-rating of early retirement schemes, which was to encourage
employers to invest in working conditions and preventive measures to reduce the disabil-
ity and layoﬀ risks of their older employees. We found evidence of notable anticipation
behaviour prior to the UT reforms in 1997 and 1996. This suggests that social security
reforms should be implemented without delay after the political decisions have been made.
As a result of the 1997 reform, the layoﬀ risk of 53-54 years old employees of large ﬁrms
reduced to a level identical to that of their younger co-workers.
In the duration analysis we took advantage of the UI reform in 1997 to identify the
impact of the extended UI duration within the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework. The
possibility that some older unemployed people may be discouraged from labour market
activities was accounted for by using the competing risks speciﬁcation of the split popula-
tion duration model. We found no evidence of large increases in the employment hazard
around the time of beneﬁt exhaustion for those workers with the entitlement period of two
years. By contrast, the hazard rates for labour market programmes and non-participation
exhibit large increases as the time of beneﬁt exhaustion approaches. These ﬁndings are in
line with evidence from other Nordic countries.
Our results suggest that as many as half of the elderly unemployed entitled to extended
UI beneﬁts choose to withdraw from the labour market, remaining passive until early
retirement. The likelihood of labour market withdrawal varies with occupation, the level
of UI beneﬁts, and the size of the past employer. There are no notable discrepancies in the
employment hazards between active workers with extended UI beneﬁts and those with the
entitlement period of two years. However, active workers with extended UI beneﬁts have
much lower transition rates to labour market programmes and non-participation (prior to
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access to early retirement). As a consequence, compared with those who will lose their
beneﬁts after two years of unemployment, active workers entitled to extended UI beneﬁts
are more likely to enter employment but also more likely to still be unemployed 36 months
after entry to unemployment.
Without doubt, the combination of extended UI beneﬁts and an early retirement
scheme serves as a popular pathway to labour market withdrawal several years prior
to the normal old-age pension. The reform in 1997 reduced unemployment among the
older workers, and it may therefore be viewed as a success story. On the other hand,
the poor employment prospects of elderly workers can be attributed to the Finnish social
security system that encourages employers for age discrimination and older unemployed
to withdraw from the labour market. Therefore, a more cynical observer might see the
1997 reform as a partial correction of the self-inﬂicted catastrophe rather than a success
story. The lessons of the Finnish reform may be useful to other OECD countries with
similar schemes for the elderly which have not yet enacted all required changes of the
social security and unemployment insurance systems in order to challenge the ageing of
their societies. Our results show that early retirement via long-term unemployment can
be eﬀectively reduced by abolishing the extended unemployment beneﬁt periods of the
elderly used to bridge the time until the normal old-age pension.
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III.A Nonparametric estimators
Let t1 < t2 < · · · < tM be the observed durations of completed unemployment spells
in the data. Denote the number of individuals who exit unemployment to destination
k ∈ {e, p, o} at spell duration tj with dkj . The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor
function is
Ŝ (t) =
∏
j|tj≤t
(
1−
dj
nj
)
,
where dj = dej+dpj+doj is the total number of exits and nj is the number of individuals at
risk at spell duration tj . The estimate of the cumulative incidence function for destination
k is given by
F̂k(t) =
∏
j|tj≤t
dkj
nj
Ŝ (tj−1) ,
see for example Gaynor et al. (1993). It can be veriﬁed that F̂e(t)+F̂p(t)+F̂o(t) = 1−Ŝ(t).
III.B Survivor functions
For ease of exposition, we denote the hazard rate for destination k at spell duration t ∈
(cm−1, cm] as θk(xm) ≡ θk(t |X(t, τ)), where xm is a vector of covariate values in the mth
duration interval. The overall hazard rate is denoted with θ(xm) = θe(xm) + θp(xm) +
θo(xm).
The survivor function at spell duration t ∈ (cm−1, cm] is given by
S(t |X(t, τ)) = [1− p(z)]S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 1) + p(z)S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) ,
where
S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 1) = exp
{
−
∫
t
0
∑
k
θk(u |X(u, τ))du
}
= exp
⎧⎨
⎩−
m−1∑
j=1
∫
cj
cj−1
θ(xj)du−
∫
t
cm−1
θ(xm)du
⎫⎬
⎭
=
⎡
⎣
m−1∏
j=1
exp {−θ(xj) (cj − cj−1)}
⎤
⎦ exp {−θ(xm) (t− cm−1)} ,
and
S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) =
⎡
⎣
m−1∏
j=1
exp {−θo(xj) (cj − cj−1)}
⎤
⎦ exp {−θo(xm) (t− cm−1)} .
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III.C Cumulative incidence functions
The cumulative incidence function for destination k at spell duration t ∈ (cm−1, cm]
Fk(t |X(t, τ)) = [1− p(z)]Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 1) + p(z)Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) ,
where
Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 1) =
∫
t
0
θk(u |X(u, τ))S(u |X(u, τ), ε = 1) du
=
m−1∑
j=1
∫
cj
cj−1
θk(xj)S(u |·)du+
∫
t
cm−1
θk(xm)S(u |·)du
=
m−1∑
j=1
θk(xj)S(cj−1 |·)
∫
cj
cj−1
exp {−θ(xj) (u− cj−1)} du
+θk(xm)S(cm−1 |·)
∫
t
cm−1
exp {−θ(xm) (u− cm−1)}du
=
m−1∑
j=1
θk(xj)S(cj−1 |·)
θ(xj)
[1− exp {−θ(xj) (cj − cj−1)}]
+
θk(xm)S(cm−1 |·)
θ(xm)
[1− exp {−θ(xm) (t− cm−1)}]
=
m−1∑
j=1
θk(xj)
θ(xj)
[S(cj−1 |·)− S(cj |·)] +
θk(xm)
θ(xm)
[S(cm−1 |·)− S(t |·)] ,
with S(c0 |·) ≡ 1, and
Fk(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) = 0, k ∈ {e, p} ,
and
Fo(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) = 1− S(t |X(t, τ), ε = 0) .
III.D The log-likelihood function
For ease of exposition, the conditioning covariates, X(t, τ), are suppressed from the fol-
lowing expressions. Denote the cumulative hazard function for destination k ∈ {e, p, o} at
spell duration t ∈ (cm−1, cm] with
Λk(t) ≡ −
m−1∑
j=1
θk(xj) (cj − cj−1)− θk(xm) (t− cm−1) .
We can write
lnS(t |ε = 1) = −
∑
j
Λj(t),
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where
∑
j
denotes the sum over all the three exit destinations. For an individual in the
treatment group with p(z) > 0 we have
lnS(t) = ln
(
[1− p(z)] e
−
∑
j
Λj(t)
+ p(z)e
−Λo(t)
)
= ln
(
e
−
∑
j
Λj(t)
+ e
z
′
δ−Λo(t)
)
− ln
(
1 + e
z
′
δ
)
= ln
(
e
−Λe(t)−Λp(t)
+ e
z
′
δ
)
−Λo(t)− ln
(
1 + e
z
′
δ
)
.
By substituting these expressions into (III.4), we ﬁnd that the contribution of individ-
ual i to the log-likelihood function is
Li =
∑
j
dij ln θj(ti)− (die + dip)
[
ln
(
1 + e
z
′
i
δ
)
+
∑
j
Λj(t)
]
+(1− die − dip)
[
ln
(
e
−Λe(ti)−Λp(ti)
+ e
z
′
i
δ
)
−Λo(ti)− ln
(
1 + e
z
′
i
δ
)]
=
∑
j
dij ln θj(ti)−Λo(ti)− ln
(
1 + e
z
′
i
δ
)
− (die + dip) [Λe(ti) + Λp(ti)]
+ (1− die − dip) ln
(
e
−Λe(ti)−Λp(ti)
+ e
z
′
i
δ
)
,
if he belongs to the treatment group, and
Li =
∑
j
dij ln θj(ti)−
∑
j
Λj(t)
otherwise. These expressions can be combined:
Li =
∑
j
dij ln θj(ti)−Λo(ti)− [1− qi + qi (die + dip)] [Λe(ti) + Λp(ti)]
+qi
[
(1− die − dip) ln
(
e
−Λe(ti)−Λp(ti)
+ e
z
′
i
δ
)
− ln
(
1 + e
z
′
i
δ
)]
,
where qi = 1 if individual i belongs to the treatment group, and qi = 0 otherwise.
The structure of the log-likelihood function implies that the ML estimators of the
parameters of the non-participation hazard are statistically independent of all other pa-
rameters of the model (since the matrix of the second derivatives of the log-likelihood
function is block diagonal). As a consequence, the estimation of the conventional compet-
ing risks and split population speciﬁcations will lead to identical parameter estimates for
the hazard function for transitions out of the labour force.
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Chapter IV
Estimating Equilibrium Search
Models from Finnish Data
Empirical equilibrium search models have attracted a growing interest in recent
years. Estimation of such models has not been completely successful, however.
This has led researchers to develop more sophisticated versions of the models in
an attempt to get a better ﬁt to the data. This study investigates whether vari-
ous proposed speciﬁcations of the Burdett-Mortensen model are able to explain
the labour market histories observed in Finnish panel data. We begin with a
pure search model in which all wage dispersion results from search frictions.
Then we proceed to more complex speciﬁcations by introducing measurement
error in wages and unobserved employer heterogeneity.
1 Introduction
The focus of partial job search models is on the behaviour of workers in the labour market
where it takes time to locate alternative job opportunities. In such models the optimal
search strategy of workers is typically characterized by the reservation wage but the wage
oﬀer distribution the workers face when searching is taken as exogenously given. The
analysis of partial job search models has been the focus of much empirical work and such
models have proved to be able to explain many stylized facts of the labour market (see
Devine and Kiefer, 1991, Wolpin, 1995, and Rogerson et al., 2005, for surveys). However,
in ignoring the demand side of the story the partial job search approach rules out the
analysis of several important issues. Among the issues which cannot be analysed within the
partial framework are all those which are related to wage determination, ﬁrm behaviour,
interactions between worker and ﬁrm behaviour as well as the eﬀects of policy reforms
which aﬀect wages (Bontemps et al., 1999).
In equilibrium models of job search labour market phenomena are modelled as the
outcome of optimal choices by both sides of the labour market. When ﬁrms are assumed
to take the search behaviour of workers and wages set by other ﬁrms into account when
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setting wages, the wage oﬀer distribution emerges as a part of the equilibrium solution. The
endogeneity of the wage oﬀer distribution makes the equilibrium search approach a useful
framework for analysing diﬀerent labour market issues. In recent years the equilibrium
search models have attracted a growing interest in the theoretical and empirical literature
(see Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Van den Berg, 1999, Rogerson et al., 2005, and
Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007, for surveys). Estimation of such models in particular
has proved to be quite a tricky task.
The ﬁrst empirical application of equilibrium search theory is Eckstein and Wolpin’s
(1990) empirical analysis of the model of Albrecht and Axell (1984). In the Albrecht-Axell
model only unemployed workers are searching for jobs, and a worker who accepts a job
is expected to hold it as long as he remains in the labour market. In this setting each
wage oﬀer in the market must be equal to the reservation wage of some group of searching
workers as a higher wage for a given type of workers would not attract any more workers
from that group. When workers are homogeneous, all ﬁrms oﬀer a single wage equal to
the common reservation wage of the unemployed, and the Diamond’s (1971) paradoxical
monopsony solution emerges. Wage dispersion in the Albrecht-Axell model can arise only
in the presence of exogenous worker heterogeneity. Therefore Eckstein and Wolpin (1990)
assume that workers diﬀer from each others according to their value of non-market time.
Since the computational complexity of the equilibrium solution increases rapidly with the
number of diﬀerent types, only a small number of worker types could be considered in
practice. This results in a discrete distribution of wage oﬀers with only a few support
points and, as a consequence, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) ﬁnd a poor ﬁt to the wage data.
In the equilibrium search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) (see also Burdett,
1990, andMortensen, 1990) workers are searching both on and oﬀ the job. For workers jobs
are identical apart from the wage associated with them, so employed workers are willing to
move into higher-paying jobs whenever the opportunity arises. The fact that the current
wage serves as the reservation wage for employed workers extends the range of reservation
wages. For the wage-setting ﬁrms this means that the labour supply curve is upward-
sloping. By oﬀering a higher wage the ﬁrm makes a lower proﬁt per worker but attracts
more workers from other ﬁrms and retains them longer as high-paid workers are less likely
to receive an acceptable oﬀer elsewhere. It follows that the equilibrium distribution of
wage oﬀers is dispersed even when all workers and ﬁrms are respectively identical.
1
Thus
persistent wage diﬀerentials across identical workers can exist as an equilibrium outcome
in the labour market characterized by search frictions in the form of time it takes to ﬁnd
trading partners. This main prediction of the model is consistent with empirical evidence
on the existence of considerable wage diﬀerentials which cannot be explained by worker
and job characteristics (see e.g. Bowlus et al., 1995). Other strong predictions concerning
1
Bunzel et al. (2001) refer to the homogeneous version of the Burdett-Mortensen model as a ’pure’
equilibrium search model because no heterogeneity is needed on either side of the labour market to produce
a dispersed wage oﬀer distribution.
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the relationship between wages, job durations and ﬁrm sizes follow from this simple model
as well. Since many of these predictions are consistent with empirical observations and
since search on the job is by now regarded to be an important source of wage dispersion,
much of research eﬀort has been directed to estimating equilibrium search models that
builds on the framework of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). However, in the absence of
exogenous worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity, the equilibrium distribution of wages generated
by the Burdett-Mortensen model has an increasing density over its whole support. This
contradicts the shape of wage densities usually observed in the data. So, the simplest
version of the model is unable to explain the shape of the wage distribution.
There are many attempts to get the Burdett-Mortensen model more consistent with
the wage data. The simplest way to proceed is to introduce between-market heterogeneity
by assuming that the labour market is composed of a large number of segments which diﬀer
from each others according to observable characteristics of workers and jobs, like education,
age and industry. Assuming workers and ﬁrms to be identical within the segments one
can then apply the homogeneous model separately to each segment of the labour market
(see Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998, and Bunzel et al., 2001).
Stratifying the data in this way is, however, unlikely to be suﬃcient to obtain a good ﬁt
to the wage data. This is because the empirical wage distributions do not usually exhibit
increasing densities even within narrowly deﬁned worker categories.
An ad hoc way of accounting for the discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical
wage distributions within the segments is to assume that the wage data are subject to mea-
surement error (Christensen and Kiefer, 1994a). In this case the underlying theoretical
model remains unchanged, but the estimation procedure must deal with a more complex
measurement process. With an appropriate distribution for the measurement error, the
discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical distributions can be attributed to the
presence of measurement error in wages. On the other hand, workers and jobs are likely
to be diﬀerent within the narrowly deﬁned labour market segments as well. In this regard
a more sophisticated approach is to introduce within-market heterogeneity in terms of un-
observed diﬀerences across workers and/or ﬁrms operating in the same market. With an
exception of Bontemps et al. (1999), the empirical applications of the Burdett-Mortensen
model have focused entirely on allowing for employer heterogeneity rather than worker
heterogeneity. This is mainly due to the diﬃculties of accounting for heterogeneity simul-
taneously on both sides of the market,
2
whereas employer heterogeneity is expected to be
a more important source of wage dispersion.
A theoretical extension of the Burdett-Mortensen model which allows for a discrete
2
Bontemps et al. (1999) estimate a version of the Burdett-Mortensen model with a continuous distri-
bution for labour productivity (across ﬁrms) as well as for the value of non-market time (across workers).
However, this makes the model intractable which enforces them to restrict the arrival rate of wage oﬀers
to be the same for unemployed and employed workers. This is a problematic assumption as the empirical
evidence supports the view that unemployed workers receive wage oﬀers more frequently (see for example
our empirical results below).
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distribution of productivity across ﬁrms is outlined in Mortensen (1990) and in Burdett
and Mortensen (1998). Bowlus et al. (1995) develop an estimation method which is able
to deal with the ill-behaved likelihood function of this extension. Bontemps et al. (1999,
2000) introduce an alternative version of the Burdett-Mortensen model which allows for
a continuous productivity distribution. They also propose a structural nonparametric es-
timation procedure for the model that does not restrict the productivity distribution to
belong to any parametric family. Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages
regarding computational complexity and interpretation of the results. A discrete distrib-
ution of productivity has been adopted in the empirical studies by Bowlus et al. (1995,
2001), Bowlus (1997) and Bunzel et al. (2001), whereas Van den Berg and Van Vuuren
(2000) and Bontemps et al. (1999, 2000) have favoured the continuous speciﬁcation in
their applications.
It is worth emphasizing that the alternative ways of introducing extra wage varia-
tion into the Burdett-Mortensen model can lead to an equally good statistical ﬁt to the
data. This raises some issues regarding the empirical inference. Though the fundamen-
tal structure of the model remains unchanged, the source and interpretation of observed
wage diﬀerentials depend upon the underlying assumptions of measurement error and
productivity heterogeneity. Since the additional sources of wage variation are not directly
observable by deﬁnition, it is generally diﬃcult to distinguish between them. This suggests
that one may be able to attribute some fraction of wage dispersion arbitrarily either to
unobserved productivity or to the measurement error in the wage data. Moreover, the
estimates of the fundamental parameters, such as the layoﬀ rate and arrival rates of wage
oﬀers which are common to all extensions, are potentially sensitive with respect to the
speciﬁcation used.
We explore these issues by comparing the results obtained from the various extensions
of the Burdett-Mortensen model proposed in the literature. All variants of the model are
estimated using maximum likelihood from a sample of workers who entered unemployment
in Finland during 1992. In the analysis we distinguish between separate segments of the
labour market by stratifying the data according to education, sex and age. All structural
parameters of the model are allowed to vary freely across the diﬀerent segments. We begin
with the homogeneous version of the model which is then followed by the estimation of
speciﬁcations involving the measurement error in wages and unobserved employer het-
erogeneity within the labour market segments. The estimation results are discussed and
compared across the model speciﬁcations as well as across the worker groups. Our analysis
is closely related to the study by Bunzel et al. (2001) in which the results obtained from
diﬀerent equilibrium search models are compared. However, our set of equilibrium search
models to be compared is wider and we apply the models to the Finnish data instead of
the Danish data.
The results of the paper are useful in a variety of ways. First, a comparison of the ﬁt of
diﬀerent extensions is informative on what aspects of the theory and empirical speciﬁcation
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are likely to be important to obtain an acceptable ﬁt to the Finnish data. Second, by
investigating variation in the parameter estimates across the model speciﬁcations, we can
test how robust the estimates of the fundamental parameters are with respect to diﬀerent
ways of deviating from the homogenous version of the model. Third, our results are
informative about the relationship between unemployment durations, job durations and
wages in the Finnish labour market. This information can be used to evaluate the degree of
wage diﬀerentials attributable to diﬀerences in search behaviour and labour productivity
across the worker groups.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the concepts of
the equilibrium search theory are described. Section 3 discusses the data and provides
some summary statistics. Empirical speciﬁcations and estimation results are discussed in
Section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2 Equilibrium search theory
In this section we brieﬂy describe equilibrium search theory along the lines of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Bontemps et al. (2000). We begin with a pure search model
in which all jobs are equally productive and all workers are identical. Then we introduce
employer heterogeneity in the model but retain the assumption of homogeneity of the
worker population throughout the paper.
2.1 Equilibrium search with identical agents
Worker behaviour
The supply side of the labour market is populated by a continuum of ex ante identical
workers. Behaviour of workers is characterised with the standard job search model with
search on the job. In particular workers are assumed to be risk-neutral agents who are
maximising the expected present value of future income stream with inﬁnite horizon. Each
worker in the labour market is either employed or unemployed. Events the worker faces
in the labour market arrive with random time intervals. Each worker is facing a known
distribution of wage oﬀers F with associated jobs, from which he randomly samples wage
oﬀers both on and oﬀ the job. Wage oﬀers arrive at the Poisson rate λ0 when unemployed
and at the Poisson rate λ1 when employed. Unemployed workers search for an acceptable
job and employed workers for a better job. Jobs are destroyed at the Poisson rate δ, in
which case the worker who holds the job is laid oﬀ and becomes unemployed.
Given this framework, the present value of being unemployed, V, solves the continuous
time asset pricing equation
ρV = b+ λ0 (EF (max {W (w˜) , V })− V ) , (IV.1)
where ρ is the common discount rate, W (w) is the present value of a job paying wage
w, and b is the value of non-market time, including unemployment beneﬁts net of search
120
costs. The expectation above is taken over the support of F, and the tilde above w refers
to a random draw from F. The equation (IV.1) simply states that the opportunity cost of
unemployment, the left-hand side of (IV.1), is equal to the sum of the value of non-market
time and the expected capital gain of ﬁnding an acceptable job, the right-hand side of
(IV.1). Analogously, the present value of being employed at wage w, W (w), solves
ρW (w) = w + λ1 (EF (max {W (w˜) ,W (w)})−W (w)) + δ (V −W (w)) , (IV.2)
which consists of the current wage, the likelihood and value of receiving an alternative job
oﬀer, and the likelihood and value of becoming unemployed. Note that the utility ﬂow of
an employed worker is assumed to be equal to his current wage.
Since W (w) increases with w and V is independent of it, there exists a reservation
wage r such that W (r) = V. By virtue of (IV.1) and (IV.2), it then holds that
r = b+ (λ0 − λ1) (EF (max {W (w˜) , V })− V )
= b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫
h
r
(W (z)− V )dF (z), (IV.3)
where h is the upper bound of the support of F. To put this expression into a more
convenient form, we integrate by parts to obtain
r = b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫
h
r
[1− F(z)]dW (z)
= b+ (λ0 − λ1)
∫
h
r
1−F (z)
ρ+ δ + λ1 [1−F (z)]
dz. (IV.4)
Following Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we focus on the limiting case of zero discounting
and set ρ = 0. This allows us to rewrite (IV.4) in the simpler form:
r = b+ (κ0 − κ1)
∫
h
r
1− F(z)
1 + κ1 [1− F(z)]
dz, (IV.5)
where κ0 = λ0/δ and κ1 = λ1/δ. This equation deﬁnes the reservation wage r as a function
of the structural parameters of the model.
From (IV.5) one can see how the possibility of search on the job aﬀects the optimal
search strategy of an unemployed worker. If wage oﬀers arrive more frequently when
unemployed than when employed (λ0 > λ1) , the reservation wage r exceeds the value of
non-market time b. In that case it is more rewarding to search while unemployed and the
worker rejects wage oﬀers in the interval (b, r), even though this causes a utility loss in
the short run. When the arrival rate is independent of employment status (λ0 = λ1) , the
worker is indiﬀerent between searching while employed and while unemployed. Any job
that compensates for the foregone value of non-market time is acceptable in this case and
thus r = b. If search on the job is not possible (λ1 = 0) , the expression in (IV.5) reduces
to the standard optimization condition.
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Firm behaviour
The demand side of the labour market consists of a continuum of ex ante identical ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms are assumed to use only labour inputs in production. Each worker generates
a ﬂow of revenue p to his employer. We assume that p is independent of the size of
the workforce and refer to p as the (labour) productivity of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrm sets its
wage so as to maximise the expected steady-state proﬁt ﬂow taking the optimal search
behaviour of workers and wages set by other ﬁrms as given. To attract workers the ﬁrm
posts wage oﬀers, among which workers randomly search using a uniform sampling scheme.
Contrary to the competitive setting, the presence of search frictions in the labour market
generates dynamic monopsony power for wage-setting ﬁrms. As workers cannot ﬁnd a
higher-paying job instantaneously, ﬁrms can oﬀer wages strictly smaller than marginal
labour productivity.
The expected proﬁt ﬂow of a ﬁrm paying wage w in a steady state is given by
π(p,w) = (p−w) l(w), (IV.6)
where l(w) is the expected size of the workforce (associated with a given F ). The ﬁrm
would employ as many workers as possible to maximise its proﬁt ﬂow as long as p > w.
Since the current wage serves as the reservation wage for employed workers, the number of
workers available to the ﬁrm in equilibrium increases with the wage oﬀered, i.e. the labour
supply curve the ﬁrm is facing with is upward-sloping. The ﬁrm takes the function l as
given and oﬀers a wage that maximises its expected steady-state proﬁt ﬂow. Obviously, a
ﬁrm never oﬀers a wage above p as the proﬁts would be negative, nor it oﬀers a wage less
than r as such a wage would not attract any workers. The optimal wage oﬀer of a ﬁrm
with productivity p is a point in a setKp of wages that maximise the expected steady-state
proﬁts,
Kp = argmax
w
{π(p,w) |r ≤ w ≤ p} . (IV.7)
When Kp is not a singleton the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between alternative wage strategies.
Equally productive ﬁrms must receive the same expected proﬁt ﬂow in equilibrium.
This does not mean that wage oﬀers need to be equal, however. A ﬁrm paying a higher
wage makes a lower proﬁt per worker but makes it up in volume as the higher wage attracts
more workers from other ﬁrms and enables the ﬁrm to retain them for a longer time. It
follows that some ﬁrms choose to oﬀer low wages with a cost of high labour turnover,
while others pay higher wages and experience lower labour turnover. Due to this trade-
oﬀ between the wage oﬀered and labour turnover, the same expected proﬁt level can be
attained by paying diﬀerent wages.
Steady-state outcomes
Denote the ﬁxed size of the labour force withm and the steady-state number of unemployed
workers with u. In a short time interval dt a fraction δdt of employed workers, m− u, lose
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their jobs and become unemployed, so the ﬂow from employment into unemployment is
δ (m− u)dt. The corresponding ﬂow out of unemployment into employment is given by
λ0udt.
3
In a steady state the ﬂows into and out of unemployment are equal which implies
that the steady-state unemployment rate is
u
m
=
δ
δ + λ0
=
1
1 + κ0
. (IV.8)
Using an analogous argument we can derive the steady-state earnings distribution G,
the cross-section wage distribution of currently employed workers, associated with a given
wage oﬀer distribution F. Given the initial allocation of workers to ﬁrms, the number of
workers employed at a wage no greater thanw is given by G(w)(m−u). The ﬂow out of jobs
paying w or less in a short time interval dt is δG(w)(m−u)dt+λ1 [1−F (w)]G(w)(m−u)dt,
while the ﬂow into such jobs is λ0F(w)udt. The outﬂow is equal to the number of workers
who lose their jobs due to a demand shock plus the number of those who receive an oﬀer
greater than w. The inﬂow consists of those unemployed who receive an oﬀer no greater
than w. By equating these ﬂows, we ﬁnd the following steady-state relationship between
the wage oﬀer and earnings distribution:
G(w) =
F(w)
δ + λ1 [1− F(w)]
·
λ0u
m− u
=
F (w)
1 + κ1 [1−F (w)]
(IV.9)
for all w on the common support of F and G. Since workers tend to move up the wage
range over time, the earnings distribution lies to the right of the wage oﬀer distribution,
or more formally, G ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F as F (w)−G(w) ≥ 0 for all w
and κ1 ≥ 0. The discrepancy between the earnings and wage oﬀer distributions depends
on κ1 which is equal to the expected number of wage oﬀers during a spell of employment
(which may consist of several consecutive job spells) and can be thought of as a relative
measure of competition among ﬁrms for workers.
Let us consider next the labour turnover of a ﬁrm which oﬀers wage w in the sup-
port of F. In a short time interval dt a fraction δdt of ﬁrm’s employees are laid oﬀ
and a fraction λ1 [1−F (w)]dt quits for a higher-paying job, so the outﬂow of employ-
ees is (δ + λ1 [1− F(w)]) l(w)dt. Provided that the size of the ﬁrm population is nor-
malized to one and contacts are made randomly, the inﬂow of workers to the ﬁrm is
[λ0u+ λ1G(w) (m− u)]dt, the number of hires from unemployment plus the number of
hires from lower-paying ﬁrms. In a steady state the inﬂow and outﬂow are expected to
be equal which implies that the expected size of the workforce of the ﬁrm oﬀering wage w
can be expressed as
l(w) =
λ0u+ λ1G(w) (m− u)
δ + λ1 [1− F(w)]
=
κ0 (1 + κ1)m
(1 + κ0) (1 + κ1 [1−F (w)])
2
. (IV.10)
Obviously l is increasing in w and continuous where F is continuous. Note that no as-
sumptions on the shape of F have been made so far. Since workers quit and are hired
3
More generally, the ﬂow out of unemployment is λ0 [1− F (r)]udt but we know that in equilibrium
F (r) = 0 because ﬁrms oﬀering a wage below r do not attract any workers and cannot therefore survive.
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and laid oﬀ at random intervals, the workforce of the ﬁrm is a random variable, varying
around its expected value l over time. As a consequence, also the proﬁt ﬂow is a random
variable.
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) prove that there exists a unique non-cooperative equi-
librium which consists of a triple (r,F, π), such that (i) r satisﬁes (IV.5) given F and (ii)
each w on the support of F maximises π(p,w), yielding the expected steady-state proﬁt
ﬂow equal to π.
4
Furthermore, they show that the equilibrium solutions for F and G are
absolutely continuous with the common support [r, h] .
5
Since the expected proﬁt ﬂow is π across all ﬁrms in equilibrium, it holds in particular
that π(r) = π = π(w) for all w on the support of F. Taking this together with (IV.10)
gives the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution
6
F (w) =
1 + κ1
κ1
(
1−
√
p− w
p− r
)
, w ∈ [r, h] , (IV.11)
with the associated density
f(w) =
1 + κ1
2κ1
√
(p− r) (p−w)
, w ∈ [r, h] . (IV.12)
Moreover, by substituting (IV.11) into (IV.5) and recognising that F (h) = 1, we can write
the bounds of support of F as
r = αb+ (1− α) p, (IV.13)
h = βb+ (1− β) p, (IV.14)
where the weights are given by
α =
(1+ κ1)
2
(1 + κ1)
2
+ (κ0 − κ1)κ1
, (IV.15)
β =
1
(1 + κ1)
2
+ (κ0 − κ1)κ1
. (IV.16)
In other words, both the support and functional form of the wage oﬀer distribution depends
only on the structural parameters of the model.
7
The fact that h is a weighed average of
4
Trivial solutions are ruled out by making the natural assumptions that ∞ > p > b and ∞ > κi > 0
for i = 0,1.
5
To see that there cannot be mass points in the equilibrium wage distributions, suppose that there is
a mass point at w
∗
∈ [r, h] . This induces the ﬁrm oﬀering w
∗
to increase its oﬀer slightly to increase its
steady-state workforce substantially at the cost of only a second-order decrease in the proﬁt per worker.
It follows that a wage oﬀer equal to a mass point cannot be proﬁt-maximising for any ﬁrm. Secondly, to
illustrate that there cannot be gaps in the support [r, h] , let us suppose that no ﬁrm oﬀers a wage on the
interval (w,w) ⊂ [r, h] . This cannot be the case in equilibrium as the ﬁrm oﬀering wage w could increase
its proﬁts by reducing its wage oﬀer to w. The same argument implies that the ﬁrms oﬀering the lowest
wage in the market must oﬀer a wage equal to r.
6
The associated equilibrium solutions for the earnings distribution follows directly from the steady-state
relationship outlined in (IV.9).
7
Obviously, β = α/ (1 + κ1)
2
which implies that 0 < β < α < 1 for κ1 > 0, so h > r provided that
p > b.
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b and p further implies that the highest wage oﬀered in the market is strictly smaller than
p.
The main outcome of equilibrium search theory with on-the-job search is that wages
are dispersed in equilibrium even when all workers and ﬁrms are respectively identical.
When the arrival rates of job oﬀers, λ0 and λ1, tend to inﬁnity, the equilibrium earnings
distribution G converges to a mass point at p, and both the steady-state unemployment
rate and the equilibrium proﬁt rate tends to zero. Thus the competitive solution emerges
as a limiting case when search frictions disappear. As a second extreme, if only unemployed
workers receive oﬀers (0 < λ0 <∞ and λ1 = 0), the ﬁrms cannot increase their workforce
by oﬀering higher wages. Thus all ﬁrms oﬀer the same wage equal to r which in turn
converges to b. In this case the equilibrium earnings distribution G limits to a mass point
at b, and the Diamond’s (1971) paradoxical monopsony solution emerges. Moreover, all
employment would be uniformly distributed across the ﬁrms as l(w) =m− u by virtue of
(IV.10) and (IV.8).
Other strong predictions follow from the simple model outlined above. Firstly, workers
with longer employment history are predicted to be more likely to be located at the upper
end of the wage distribution. This is because wage growth in the model results from job-
to-job transitions. Secondly, the model implies a positive relationship between the size of
workforce and the wage paid by the ﬁrm. Firms oﬀering higher wages grow at a larger
size because a higher wage attracts more workers to a ﬁrm from other ﬁrms and reduces
the quit rate, λ1 [1− F(w)]. These results are driven by on-the-job search.
An interesting prediction of the model is that a change in the unemployment beneﬁt
b does not aﬀect equilibrium unemployment as long as b < p. For example, an increase
in b increases the reservation wage r by virtue of (IV.5). However, to retain a positive
workforce, ﬁrms oﬀering wages below the new value of r must react by increasing their
wage oﬀers which in turn aﬀects the wage oﬀers of other ﬁrms. The net result is that
the exit rate out of unemployment and thus the unemployment level remain unchanged.
Using a similar reasoning one can see that a decrease in b does not aﬀect unemployment
either.
2.2 Employer heterogeneity
The model of the previous section makes several predictions which can be expected to be
consistent with empirical data. However, a closer look at (IV.12) reveals that the density
of the wage oﬀer distribution (and, consequently, that of the earnings distribution) is
strictly increasing and convex on its whole support. This contradicts with the shape of
wage distributions usually observed in the data as empirical wage densities are typically
unimodal and skewed with a long right tail. This calls to doubt whether the simple
equilibrium search model with identical agents can provide an acceptable ﬁt to the wage
data. To make the model more realistic, we extend the basic model by allowing for
employer heterogeneity. In the ﬁrst case we introduce heterogeneity assuming a discrete
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distribution for productivity across ﬁrms along the lines of Mortensen (1990) and Burdett
and Mortensen (1998). This is followed by an extension of Bontemps et al. (2000) which
allows for continuous productivity dispersion.
A ﬁnite number of ﬁrm types
Assume that there are q types of ﬁrms which diﬀer in their labour productivity such that
p1 < p2 < ... < pq. Let γi be the fraction of ﬁrms with productivity pi or less. Keeping
all other aspects of the model unchanged, Mortensen (1990) and Burdett and Mortensen
(1998) show that the equilibrium solution in this case results in a complete segmentation
of the wage oﬀer range among ﬁrm types. Optimal wage setting implies that the wage
oﬀered increases with productivity and that all ﬁrms of type i oﬀer wages on the interval
[w
i
, wi) , where the bounds of intervals are such that wi = wi+1 for i = 1, 2, ..., q − 1. In
addition, the lowest wage oﬀered is equal to the reservation wage, so that w
1
= r. We also
deﬁne that wq = h in order to be consistent with our previous notation.
In equilibrium all ﬁrms of given type must have the same expected proﬁt ﬂow, so that
(pi −w) l(w) = (pi − wi) l(wi), where l (w) is as deﬁned in (IV.10), holds for all ﬁrms
with productivity pi oﬀering a wage on the interval [wi
, wi) . This implies the following
equilibrium distribution of wage oﬀers:
F (w) =
1 + κ1
κ1
(
1−
1 + κ1
(
1− γ
i−1
)
1 + κ1
√
pi − w
pi − wi
)
, w ∈ [w
i
, wi) , (IV.17)
with the associated density
f(w) =
1 + κ1
(
1− γ
i−1
)
2κ1
√
(pi −w) (pi − wi)
, w ∈ [w
i
, wi) , (IV.18)
where γ
i
= F(wi), with the convention that γ0 = 0. As shown in Mortensen (1990) and in
Burdett and Mortensen (1998), an equilibrium is characterized by (r,F, π1, ..., πq) , where
(i) r is the common reservation wage satisfying (IV.5), (ii) F is the wage oﬀer distribution
given in (IV.17) and (iii) πi = (pi − w) l(w) is the expected steady-state proﬁt ﬂow of
ﬁrms with productivity pi oﬀering wages on the interval [wi, wi) , i = 1, 2, ..., q. In general,
when there are q types of ﬁrms, the resulting distribution of wage oﬀers F is absolutely
continuous with the support [r, h] and has q − 1 "kinks" corresponding to the wage cuts
(w1, w2, ...,wq−1) .
8
Recall from the previous section that the equilibrium wage distributions have increasing
densities over their whole support when all jobs are equally productive. This property is
at odds with the long ﬂat right tail commonly observed in the wage data. In contrast, the
model of this section with productivity heterogeneity implies that the wage density f is
8
Van den Berg (2003) points out that there may exist other equilibria characterized by a diﬀerent
reservation wage and a diﬀerent number of active ﬁrm types. This possibility arises from the two-way
relationship between the reservation wage of the unemployed and minimum productivity level in use. In
other words, the reservation wage aﬀects the minimum level of proﬁtable productivity and vice versa.
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discontinuous at the wage cuts, between which it exhibits locally increasing patterns. This
theoretical distribution can take the functional form able to mimic the shape observed in
the data. Moreover, since more productive ﬁrms oﬀer higher wages, they attract more
workers, face lower quit rates and, consequently, are larger on average. High productivity
ﬁrms make also more proﬁt on average in equilibrium than less productive ﬁrms.
A continuum of ﬁrm types
Bontemps et al. (2000) (see also Bontemps et al., 1999, and Burdett and Mortensen,
1998) propose an alternative extension of the Burdett-Mortensen model which allows for
continuous productivity dispersion. For this speciﬁcation we suppose that productivity p is
continuously distributed across active ﬁrms according to the distribution function Γ, with
support
[
p, p
]
, where p ≥ r.9 Bontemps et al. (2000) show that only one wage oﬀer can be
proﬁt-maximizing for each ﬁrm (that is, the set Kp of proﬁt-maximizing wages for a ﬁrm
with productivity p is a singleton) and the optimal wage oﬀer increases with productivity.
It follows that there exists a direct map between the productivity distribution Γ and wage
oﬀer distribution F :
F (K(p)) = Γ(p), (IV.19)
where K(p) denotes the wage oﬀered by ﬁrms with productivity p and K is an increasing
and continuous function. Stated diﬀerently, the fraction of oﬀers no higher than K(p)
equals the fraction of ﬁrms with productivity p or less.
Given that K is strictly increasing in p, ﬁrms with the lowest productivity p must oﬀer
a wage equal to the reservation wage r and the highest wage in the market is oﬀered by
ﬁrms with the highest productivity p. Since the wage oﬀer is unique for any p in the interior
of Γ, the optimal wage oﬀer w = K(p) solves the ﬁrst-order condition ∂π (p,w) /∂w = 0,
where the expected proﬁt function is π(p,w) = (p−w) l (w) and l (w) is as deﬁned in
(IV.10). For given F and p this condition writes as
2κ1f(w) (p−w)− (1 + κ1 [1−F (w)]) = 0, (IV.20)
and the associated second-order condition can be expressed as
f
′
(w) (1 + κ1 [1− F(w)])− κ1f(w)
2
< 0, (IV.21)
9
The number of active ﬁrms in the market can be viewed to be endogenous in this setting. To see
this, suppose that there are N0 ﬁrms willing to participate in the market, across which productivity is
distributed according to the distribution function Γ0, with the lower and upper bound of support p
0
and
p respectively. However, only ﬁrms making a non-negative proﬁt are active and hence participating in the
market. The distribution of productivity across these ﬁrms is obviously Γ(p) = Γ0 (p |p ≥ r ) , where the
threshold value for participation is the reservation wage r. Stated diﬀerently, only those ﬁrms which are
able to pay at least r can participate in the market. If the reservation wage is high enough to drop some
ﬁrms out of the market (i.e. when r > p
0
), the measure of active ﬁrms in the market is N0 [1− Γ0(r)] (this
ﬁgure is normalized to one in the text to be consistent with our previous analysis). See Bontemps et al.
(2000) for further discussion.
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provided that w = K(p) ≥ r. The ﬁrst-order condition (IV.20) gives an implicit function
of the wage oﬀer of a ﬁrm with productivity p given κ1 and the distribution of wages
oﬀered by other ﬁrms.
From (IV.19) it follows that γ(p) = f(K(p))K
′
(p), where γ denotes the productivity
density associated with Γ. Using this we can rewrite (IV.20) as
K
′
(p) =
2κ1γ(p)
1 + κ1 [1− Γ(p)]
(p−K(p)) . (IV.22)
This diﬀerential equation with the boundary condition K(p) = r imply the following
optimal wage policy:
K(p) = p− (1 + κ1 [1− Γ(p)])
2
∫
p
r
dz
(1 + κ1 [1− Γ(z)])
2
. (IV.23)
By substituting r from (IV.5) into (IV.23), we can express K(p) in terms of the structural
parameters (b, λ0, λ1, δ, p,Γ) .
Given Γ an equilibrium is characterized by (r, F) , where (i) the common reservation
wage r satisﬁes (IV.5) and (ii) the wage oﬀer distribution the workers face while searching
F is given by (IV.19) and (IV.23).
10
As before the equilibrium distribution of wage oﬀers
F is absolutely continuous over its support [r, h] . Neither K nor F has a closed-form
expression in general. Despite this the model outlined above makes some strong restrictions
on the shape of the wage distributions, excluding certain shapes for F and G. Bontemps
et al. (2000) show that the set of wage oﬀer distributions that can be generated by the
model is characterized by the following conditions:
11
(i) the upper bound of support of F
is ﬁnite (i.e. h <∞), (ii) the density f has a high peak at the lowest wage if and only if the
lowest wage equals the lower bound of the support of the productivity distribution (i.e. if
r = p), and (iii) for given κ1, f(w) (1 + κ1 [1− F(w)]) decreases over the whole support of
F (that is, the second-order condition (IV.21) holds).
12
These conditions impose testable
restrictions which can be used as a speciﬁcation test in the empirical analysis of the model.
In ruling out wage distributions with unbounded support the ﬁrst condition implies
that ﬁrms with high productivity may have very high monopsony power and, consequently,
receive very high proﬁts.
13
The second condition reﬂects the fact that if the reservation
wage is high enough it destroys monopsony power of ﬁrms located at the lower end of the
productivity distribution. Since the wage oﬀers of these ﬁrms must lie in a narrow interval
10
To be speciﬁc, there can be a single equilibrium, multiple equilibria or equilibrium may not exist at
all, depending on the values of structural parameters of the model. Bontemps et al. (2000) point out that
it is in general hard to diﬀerentiate between alternative cases. In the text we arbitrarily assume that the
unique equilibrium exists.
11
Bontemps et al. (2000) derive the corresponding conditions for the earnings distribution G as well.
Since F and G are directly related through (IV.9), as imposed by the equilibrium ﬂow conditions, we focus
here on the conditions for F only.
12
Note that f(w) (1+ κ1 [1− F (w)]) is constant for the homogeneous version of the Burdett-Mortensen
model.
13
The expected steady-state proﬁt ﬂow is convex in productivity, suggesting a high degree of monopsony
power for high-productivity ﬁrms.
128
between the reservation wage and their productivity, there is a congestion at the lowest
wages, resulting in a peak. In contrast, when the lower bound of productivity support
exceeds the reservation wage notably, low-productivity ﬁrms can also choose their wages
from a wide range. In such a case a wage oﬀer equal to a mass point cannot be proﬁt-
maximizing for any ﬁrm. The third condition imposes the restriction how steeply f can
increase for given κ1. Where the density f is decreasing the condition is obviously met
regardless of the value of κ1. For large κ1 the condition allows f to increase quite steeply,
but for small κ1 the condition is violated even if f increases only slightly.
When productivity is dispersed across ﬁrms, the shape of F obviously depends on the
shape of Γ. However, whereas κ1 > 0 is necessary and suﬃcient for wage dispersion, it
should be noted that productivity dispersion is neither necessary nor suﬃcient for wage
dispersion. In the presence of productivity diﬀerentials the degree of wage dispersion may
be decomposed into two parts: one which is due to search frictions analogously to the
homogeneous case and another which results from variation in productivity across ﬁrms.
In particular it can be shown that the equilibrium of the homogeneous version of the
Burdett-Mortensen models emerges as a limiting case when the degree of productivity
dispersion goes to zero (see Bontemps et al., 2000, for details).
3 Data
Christensen and Kiefer (1997) discuss data requirements for identiﬁcation of the structural
parameters of the Burdett-Mortensen model. They show that the model can be estimated
from data on individual labour market histories where at least some of the workers are
observed with both unemployment duration and job duration with the associated wage.
Empirical analysis of this study is based on a sample of individuals drawn from the worker
data of the Integrated Panel of Finnish Companies and Workers (the IP data).
14
Un-
derlying source of information on workers in the IP data is the Employment Statistics
(ES) database of Statistics Finland. The ES database is a longitudinal database which
combines information from over 20 administrative registers. Since 1987 the ES database
has been updated regularly, and it covers eﬀectively all people with a permanent residence
in Finland.
Each individual in the ES database who holds a job at the last week of the year
is associated to his or her employer with a company and establishment identiﬁer. The
worker panel of the IP data covers all people from the ES database with an identiﬁer of
the private-sector employer at least in one of the years between 1988 and 1996. As a result,
the underlying worker panel covers practically all persons who have been employed in the
private sector during the period 1988-1996 (at least at the end of one year). The total
number of persons in the IP data is slightly below two million. For these people a set of
14
A detailed description of the IP data is given in Korkeamäki and Kyyrä (2000). More recently, the
Finnish Longitudinal Employer-Employee data (FLEED) have replaced the IP data.
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variables, collected by combining the annual records of the ES database, is available over
the period 1988-1996.
In this paper we focus on a certain subsample of the worker panel of the IP data. As a
ﬁrst step we select all individuals between the ages of 16 and 65 who entered unemployment
during 1992. In choosing a sample of unemployed workers we follow the practice of Bowlus
et al. (2001) and Bunzel et al. (2001).
15
We exclude workers who have been self-employed
as well as those have been employed by the public sector or non-proﬁt organization during
the period 1990-1996. These groups are excluded as the underlying model does not describe
their labour market experiences.
For all individuals selected in the sample, we record the duration of the unemployment
spell (d) and information on whether unemployment ended because of ﬁnding a job (cd = 0)
or for some other reason (cd = 1).
16
Unemployment spells not followed by a job are treated
as right-censored in the empirical analysis. This may occur due to a drop out of the labour
force, participation in the active labour market programme or the spell continuing beyond
the observation period. It should be stressed that we treat unemployment spells ended
in a job placement programme as right-censored as well. Thus we make a diﬀerence
between ﬁnding a job from the open labour market and becoming employed by labour
administrative measures.
For those workers who found a job, we further record the accepted wage (w) and
the duration of the subsequent job spell (j) along with the reason for termination. The
wage rate is computed using information on annual earnings and the days worked. A job
spell may end in a layoﬀ (a = 0, cj = 0), a quit (a = 1, cj = 0) or be right-censored
(cj = 1). Job spells followed by unemployment are classiﬁed to be ended in a layoﬀ,
whereas job spells consecutively followed by another job spell with a new employer are
interpreted to be ended in a quit for a better job. We identify changes in employer by
comparing establishment identiﬁers attached to workers on the basis of the employer. Job
spells terminated due to a drop out of the labour force and those continuing beyond the
observation period are treated as right-censored. All durations are measured in months,
and wages are converted into monthly rates to match the duration measures.
Recall that our theoretical model is concerned with the population of homogeneous
workers. While all workers are diﬀerent in practice, we cannot allow the parameters to
be diﬀerent for each individual as the model will be of no use at all in such a case.
Instead we assume that the labour market consists of a large number of segments, each
15
A few points concerning the sampling scheme should be stressed. First, the sample drawn from
the inﬂow of unemployment is not a representative sample of the labour force but workers with poor
employment prospects are likely to be over represented. But as we wish explain diﬀerences in post-
unemployment wages a ﬂow sample is a natural choice and, under the assumptions of the theory, it does
not make any diﬀerence whether we use a stock or ﬂow sample. Second, the sampled workers are followed
from 1992 to 1996, which is the period following a deep recession and is, consequently, characterised by a
record high unemployment level (see discussion in the text). However, this sub-period exhibits the most
stable labour market conditions in the period 1988-1996 potentially available for the analysis.
16
If the worker has several unemployment spells started in 1992, we choose the ﬁrst one.
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of which forms a single market of its own. These segments are assumed to diﬀer from
each others according to observed characteristics of workers. To deal with this kind of
heterogeneity, the model can be applied separately to each group of workers, allowing for
all parameters to vary freely across the groups. This approach corresponds to controlling
observed heterogeneity with a complete set of discrete regressors (Christensen and Kiefer,
1994a). To pursue this approach, we stratify the data by education, sex and age. We
categorize education as follows: lower vocational education or less (11 years or less), upper
vocational education (12-13 years), lower university (a Bachelor degree or the lowest level
of university education, 13-15 years), and upper university (a Master degree or higher,
16 years or more). The age groups considered are: 16-21 years, 22-30 years, 31-50 years,
and 51-65 years. As only few workers with lower or upper university education are aged
below 22 or above 50, we combine the two lowest age groups as well as the two highest
age groups for these education groups.
As some of the estimation procedures used are sensitive to outliers in the wage data,
some concern needs to be taken with our wage measures. Since the monthly wages are
computed from annual earnings without information on hours worked, the wage data can
be expected to contain some measurement error. To deal with outliers in the wage data,
we ﬁrst require that all wages must be at least 80% of the lowest salary grade of the central
government, after which we trim the lowest and highest 3% of wage observations in each
subgroup.
Table IV.1 gives some descriptive statistics for the worker groups to be analysed. The
number of observations in the underlying group (N) is given in the ﬁrst column of the table.
Since the computational burden of the estimation method for the model with a discrete
distribution of productivity increases rapidly with the sample size and the number of ﬁrm
types, the maximum size of the estimation sample is restricted to 3,000 observations.
Thus, where N exceeds 3,000 we have drawn a random subsample of 3,000 workers from
the underlying group (after trimming the wage data). All sample statistics in the table
are computed from this subsample, describing the sample to be used in the estimations.
It is worth emphasizing that the period under investigation is exceptional one. An
overheating period of the Finnish economy in the last years of the 1980s was followed by a
deep recession in the early 1990s. The annual change in the GDP was negative during the
period 1991-1993, and in the worst year, 1991, the GDP decreased by over 7%. According
to the Labour Force Survey, the unemployment rate rose from 3.2% in 1990 to over 16% in
1993, remaining at the level beyond 14.5% until 1996. Thus, labour market experiences of
the sampled workers thus took place in a period of record high and stable unemployment.
We should keep this in mind when interpreting the results.
From the ﬁrst column of the table it appears that the size of the underlying worker
group is much lower for highly educated groups. This does not reﬂect only the education
structure of the labour force but also a lower incidence of unemployment among more
educated workers. The fact that the period under investigation is characterized by high
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Table IV.1: Summary statistics
N w w
min
wmax d cd j cj a
Lower vocational and less
Men, 16-21 17,051 7,819 4,625 16,713 7.56 .78 12.54 .32 .20
Men, 22-30 40,145 9,526 4,845 23,464 10.49 .58 12.28 .20 .22
Men, 31-50 73,142 10,483 5,067 26,669 11.58 .57 12.52 .22 .20
Men, 51-65 20,129 10,320 4,940 27,002 16.43 .73 9.94 .20 .19
Women, 16-21 7,604 7,071 4,546 18,325 7.07 .80 12.24 .33 .17
Women, 22-30 13,721 7,638 4,607 18,858 10.06 .71 14.63 .31 .22
Women, 31-50 31,212 7,932 4,685 18,172 11.94 .66 16.71 .29 .14
Women, 51-65 13,724 7,871 4,647 17,741 19.17 .79 13.95 .22 .10
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 9,544 7,843 4,659 15,324 5.83 .78 11.91 .41 .27
Men, 22-30 11,233 9,298 4,834 22,003 8.81 .57 14.92 .28 .27
Men, 31-50 8,993 11,742 5,278 28,770 11.22 .60 17.82 .31 .22
Men, 51-65 1,811 13,645 5,724 27,963 18.08 .79 14.02 .30 .12
Women, 16-21 6,769 6,919 4,535 14,799 5.41 .73 11.45 .37 .25
Women, 22-30 11,002 7,734 4,680 16,232 7.51 .60 15.72 .31 .26
Women, 31-50 6,273 9,298 4,837 22,809 10.35 .65 17.60 .32 .23
Women, 51-65 695 10,284 5,028 23,591 18.98 .82 13.98 .26 .07
Lower university
Men, 16-30 5,042 10,531 5,185 23,859 7.36 .59 17.77 .35 .28
Men, 31-65 4,495 13,755 5,338 37,047 9.28 .54 18.88 .34 .24
Women, 16-30 1,831 8,541 4,725 16,842 6.55 .56 17.31 .36 .32
Women, 31-65 1,512 11,241 4,938 28,597 10.83 .61 17.97 .36 .25
Upper university
Men, 16-30 502 12,883 5,636 27,255 7.21 .47 20.87 .35 .55
Men, 31-65 1,321 17,874 5,667 53,488 12.12 .56 22.18 .38 .32
Women, 16-30 526 11,756 5,683 34,397 6.33 .51 18.09 .40 .38
Women, 31-65 543 12,887 4,831 34,092 10.32 .59 16.64 .34 .32
Notes: N is the number of observations in the underlying population from which the estimation sample was drawn.
w is the average accepted wage (FIM) in the estimation sample. wmin and wmax are the minimum and maximum
of observed wages (FIM) in the estimation sample respectively. d and j are the average durations of unemployment
and job spells respectively. cd is the share of censored unemployment spells, and cj is the share of censored job
spells in the estimation sample. a is the share of uncensored job spells ending in a quit for a better job.
unemployment levels is reﬂected to the ﬁgures in the table. Unemployment durations are
relatively long with a high rate of censoring, and most of subsequent job spells ended in a
layoﬀ.
Unemployment duration increases with age and is exceptionally high among low ed-
ucated workers aged over 50. There are no clear diﬀerences in the average duration of
unemployment by sex. The rate of censoring in the unemployment data is found to be
very high. It is also worth emphasizing that the average duration of censored spells is
over two times higher than that of uncensored spells (not shown in the table). This is be-
cause long-duration spells of unemployment are often terminated by labour administrative
measures. This explains partly the higher censoring rates for the groups with the longest
unemployment durations. Young job seekers are often regarded as a special target group
of the labour administrative measures, resulting in a relatively high censoring rate for
workers aged under 22. There are no large diﬀerences in job duration across age groups.
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Highly educated workers experience slightly longer job spells and are more likely to quit
for a better job. Compared to unemployment spells, job spells are longer on average and
the rate of censoring in the job duration data is much lower.
Wages increase with age at least up until the interval 31-50 years of age. There are
no clear wage diﬀerentials between workers at the two lowest levels of education, whereas
higher education yields slightly higher return. Despite the trimming procedure there
are still wage observations which are relatively low compared to minimum requirements,
reﬂecting some measurement problems in the wage data. Empirical wage densities for
each worker group are shown in Figures IV.1 to IV.3 in the Appendix, where the thick
solid lines represent the kernel density estimates obtained using Gaussian kernels with the
bandwidth chosen by a rule of thumb. Other lines depict the predicted densities obtained
from the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the equilibrium search model and they will be discussed
later on. The empirical wage densities are generally unimodal and skewed with a long right
tail.
4 Empirical application
We have derived the explicit solutions for the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution with and
without employer heterogeneity. From the assumptions underlying the theoretical model
it is straightforward to derive distributions for unemployment and job durations as well.
Knowledge about these distributions allows us to write down the likelihood functions for
various speciﬁcations of the model. In the next section we derive the general form of the
likelihood function without specifying the functional form for the wage oﬀer distribution.
In the subsequent sections we will then discuss the estimation of various speciﬁcations of
the model and report the results.
4.1 The log-likelihood function
The structural parameters of interest to be estimated are (λ0, λ1, δ, r) with a scalar p for
the homogeneous model, the set (p1, p2, ..., pq) of productivity terms for the model with a
discrete distribution of productivity, and Γ for the model with a continuous distribution
of productivity. With these parameter estimates in hand, we can obtain an estimate for b
using (IV.5).
17
Since our data were drawn from the inﬂow of unemployment, we observe a
spell of unemployment along with the post-unemployment destination for each individual
in the data. For those whose unemployment ended in a new job we further observe the
wage rate accepted as well as the duration of the subsequent job along with the reason for
termination. Since we do not have complete information on all observations, the possibility
of censored observations on unemployment and job durations is explicitly accounted for
using censoring indicators cd and cj .
17
It can be argued that b is the ’deep’ structural parameter of the model rather than r, which follows
implicitly from the optimal search strategy of unemployed workers. However, this distinction does not
make any diﬀerence in practice due to the one-to-one relationship between b and r outlined in (IV.5).
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The likelihood contribution from an individual who is unemployed for d periods, accepts
then a job with an associated wage w, keeps that jobs for j periods until he gets laid oﬀ
(a = 0) or ﬁnds another job (a = 1) has a general form
 = ϕ (d) [f(w)φ (j, a |w )]
1−cd
, (IV.24)
where ϕ is the density function of unemployment duration, f is the density of the wage
oﬀer distribution and φ is the density function of job duration and destination conditional
on the accepted wage w. The censoring indicator for unemployment duration cd takes
a value of zero if the unemployment spell is followed by a new job, and a value of one
otherwise.
Since job oﬀers arrive at the Poisson rate λ0 and all oﬀers are acceptable to the unem-
ployed in equilibrium, unemployment duration d is exponentially distributed with intensity
parameter λ0, so
ϕ (d) = λ
1−cd
0
e
−λ0d
. (IV.25)
As workers search randomly among employers using a uniform sampling scheme, the wage
oﬀers are random draws from the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution F. To derive the
conditional distribution of job duration j and destination a, we can use the standard
competing risks framework for exponential duration models. Recall that layoﬀs occur at
the Poisson rate δ and alternative oﬀers arrive at the Poisson rate λ1. Since only wage
oﬀers exceeding the current wage will be accepted, the actual quit rate is λ1 (1− F(w)) , the
probability of receiving an oﬀer times the probability that the received oﬀer is acceptable
given the current wage w. Conditional on the current wage w, the job duration j has an
exponential distribution with intensity parameter δ + λ1 (1−F (w)) . Exit from this job
into unemployment occurs with probability δ/ [δ + λ1 (1−F (w))] and exit into a higher-
paying job with probability λ1 (1−F (w)) / [δ + λ1 (1−F (w))]. Putting these together
yields
φ (j, a |w ) = [(1− a)δ + aλ1 (1−F (w))]
1−cj
e
−(δ+λ1 [1−F (w)])j
. (IV.26)
Substituting (IV.25) and (IV.26) into (IV.24) and taking logarithm gives the individual
contribution to the log-likelihood function
log  = (1− cd) (1− cj) ln [(1− a)δ + aλ1 (1−F (w))]− λ0d
+(1− cj) (lnλ0 + ln f(w)− (δ + λ1 [1−F (w)]) j) . (IV.27)
Estimations of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the Burdett-Mortensen model will all be based on
(IV.27), the only diﬀerence between the speciﬁcations being the functional form assumed
for F and f .
18
Recall that the shape of the equilibrium wage oﬀer distribution generally
18
Christensen and Kiefer (1997) show that identiﬁcation of all structural parameters of the model does
not necessarily require information on whether the job spell ends in a quit or layoﬀ, i.e. observations on
a are not crucial for identiﬁcation. The separate identiﬁcation of λ1 and δ even without knowledge of a
follows from the fact that the conditional job hazard decreases with w. A higher wage does not aﬀect the
layoﬀ rate but implies a lower quit rate and the extent of this eﬀect depends on λ1.
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does not depend on λ0. This observation taken together with (IV.27) suggests that λ0
is identiﬁed from the unemployment duration data only. It follows that the estimator of
λ0 is stochastically independent of all other parameters of the model, being robust with
respect to diﬀerent model speciﬁcations.
4.2 Identical workers and ﬁrms
We begin our empirical analysis with the simplest speciﬁcation of the model with homo-
geneous workers and ﬁrms. Equilibrium solutions for F and f are given by (IV.11) and
(IV.12) respectively. Substituting these expressions into (IV.27) and summing over the
observations gives the log-likelihood function in terms of (λ0, λ1, δ, p, r) . The properties
of the maximum likelihood estimators are not standard in this case, however. This is due
to the dependence of the support of F on the unknown parameters of the model. Kiefer
and Neumann (1993) show that one can simplify the estimation problem considerably by
reparametrizing the model from (λ0, λ1, δ, p, r) to (λ0, λ1, δ, h, r) and using order statistics
to estimate the bounds of the support of F . To pursue this route, we solve the system
(IV.13) and (IV.14) for p and b to obtain
p =
β
β − α
r +
α
α− β
h, (IV.28)
b =
β − 1
β − α
r +
α− 1
α− β
h, (IV.29)
where α and β are given by (IV.15) and (IV.16) respectively. Using (IV.28) to substitute
p out of the expressions for F and f, we can rewrite the log-likelihood function in terms
of (λ0, λ1, δ, r, h) .
Following Kiefer and Neumann (1993), we estimate r and h using the sample minimum
and maximum respectively. In the second step the frictional parameters are estimated by
maximizing the likelihood function with respect to (λ0, λ1, δ) conditional on the estimates
of (r, h) . Due to the properties of order statistics, the estimates of (r, h) are superconsis-
tent, converging to their true values at a rate faster than
√
n, where n is the sample size.
This suggests that ignoring variation in the estimates of (r, h) does not aﬀect asymptotic
inference about (λ0, λ1, δ), and therefore we can treat (r, h) as ﬁxed in the maximum like-
lihood estimation of the frictional parameters, even though they are not exogenous (see
Christensen and Kiefer, 1994b). Given the consistent estimates of (λ0, λ1, δ, r, h) , we can
estimate p and b using (IV.28) and (IV.29) and compute their standard errors using the
delta method (see Bunzel et al., 2001, for details).
Order statistics estimates of (r, h) for each group can be found from Table IV.1, where
they correspond to the minimum and maximum accepted wage (i.e. r̂ = wmin and ĥ =
wmax). Estimates of other parameters of the model are presented in Table IV.2. It is found
that λ0 is uniformly higher than λ1, suggesting that wage oﬀers arrive more frequently
when unemployed than when employed. This corresponds to the case where the reservation
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Table IV.2: Estimation results with identical agents
λ0 λ1 δ p b
Lower vocational and less
Men, 16-21 .0285 (.0011) .0099 (.0011) .0470 (.0024) 42,697 (3,271) 2,461 (229)
Men, 22-30 .0399 (.0011) .0130 (.0009) .0547 (.0018) 58,533 (2,844) 754 (279)
Men, 31-50 .0375 (.0010) .0117 (.0008) .0531 (.0018) 70,946 (3,629) 332 (312)
Men, 51-65 .0166 (.0006) .0138 (.0013) .0701 (.0029) 78,136 (5,373) 4,532 (205)
Women, 16-21 .0282 (.0012) .0070 (.0009) .0486 (.0025) 62,871 (6,164) 1,753 (257)
Women, 22-30 .0292 (.0010) .0082 (.0007) .0401 (.0017) 50,235 (3,240) 1,228 (264)
Women, 31-50 .0286 (.0009) .0051 (.0005) .0384 (.0015) 65,841 (5,314) 811 (238)
Women, 51-65 .0109 (.0004) .0054 (.0008) .0519 (.0024) 78,050 (9,152) 3,988 (114)
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 .0385 (.0015) .0128 (.0013) .0405 (.0022) 29,884 (1,751) 1,740 (298)
Men, 22-30 .0494 (.0014) .0118 (.0008) .0390 (.0014) 46,673 (1,950) —2,358 (416)
Men, 31-50 .0353 (.0010) .0080 (.0006) .0327 (.0012) 71,490 (3,825) —3,464 (535)
Men, 51-65 .0116 (.0006) .0071 (.0013) .0454 (.0029) 94,126 (13,130) 4,687 (342)
Women, 16-21 .0505 (.0018) .0113 (.0010) .0458 (.0022) 33,238 (1,982) 635 (291)
Women, 22-30 .0534 (.0015) .0106 (.0007) .0357 (.0013) 33,173 (1,426) —1,366 (346)
Women, 31-50 .0335 (.0010) .0079 (.0006) .0324 (.0013) 55,604 (3,089) —1,489 (419)
Women, 51-65 .0095 (.0009) .0035 (.0014) .0506 (.0055) 152,083 (55,257) 3,970 (337)
Lower university
Men, 16-30 .0562 (.0016) .0096 (.0007) .0296 (.0011) 48,443 (2,054) —7,453 (697)
Men, 31-65 .0495 (.0013) .0075 (.0005) .0292 (.0010) 91,523 (4,474) —14,893 (1,031)
Women, 16-30 .0675 (.0025) .0119 (.0010) .0284 (.0014) 28,814 (1,272) —5,081 (705)
Women, 31-65 .0357 (.0015) .0080 (.0009) .0293 (.0017) 66,729 (4,988) —4,881 (895)
Upper university
Men, 16-30 .0735 (.0047) .0180 (.0020) .0184 (.0018) 34,727 (1,350) —16,266 (2,945)
Men, 31-65 .0363 (.0016) .0078 (.0008) .0218 (.0013) 110,639 (7,135) —20,876 (2,368)
Women, 16-30 .0770 (.0050) .0102 (.0015) .0249 (.0023) 63,666 (5,355) —26,298 (3,901)
Women, 31-65 .0395 (.0027) .0123 (.0019) .0310 (.0029) 64,873 (6,069) —5,850 (1,781)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
wage r exceeds the value of non-market time b. Moreover, as δ is uniformly higher than
λ1, jobs are more likely to end in a layoﬀ than in a quit for a better job.
Ignoring workers aged below 22, λ0 decreases with age, being exceptionally low for
less educated workers aged over 50. Moreover, λ0 increases with education, though not
uniformly. In contrast, λ1 does not exhibit any clear patterns with respect to education
nor with respect to age. Less educated women aged over 50 have the lowest chances of
ﬁnding a job when unemployed, but women with university education tend to receive
more oﬀers than their male counterparts when unemployed. Layoﬀ rate δ decreases with
education but there is little diﬀerence by sex. Workers aged below 22 and those aged over
50 are more likely to be laid oﬀ than other workers.
Productivity p increases with age and is often higher for men than women with some
exceptions. Young workers with upper vocational education are found to be less productive
than their less educated counterparts. Otherwise productivity diﬀerentials across educa-
tion groups do not exhibit very clear insight. The value of non-market time b appears to
be positive among workers with the lowest level of education. For more educated groups
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b is typically negative, being more negative for higher education levels. Negativity of b
reﬂects the need to interpret this parameter not only a function of unemployment beneﬁts
but also of search costs and perhaps even of the disutility of unemployment (Bunzel et al.,
2001). There is also a tendency for b to be lower for women than men among less educated
workers aged below 22 and over 50, while the reverse is true among workers between 22
and 50.
Overall all structural parameters of the model are estimated accurately and their es-
timates allow for a meaningful economic interpretation. The ﬁt to the wage data is less
satisfactory, however. This is illustrated in Figures IV.1 to IV.3 in the Appendix where
empirical wage distributions and predicted wage oﬀer distributions obtained from the dif-
ferent speciﬁcations of the model are shown. The predicted theoretical density for the
pure homogeneity model is computed by inserting the parameter estimates into (IV.12).
While the empirical (kernel) densities are unimodal and skewed with a long right tail,
the equilibrium search model with identical agents restricts the predicted densities to be
increasing and convex over the whole support. Such a shape is obviously not supported
by the data. The predicted densities are ﬂat over their whole support, leading to a poor
ﬁt to the wage data in all worker groups.
Recall that our data do not contain information on working time. This with some
inaccuracies in the available wage data suggests that our wage variables are subjected to
measurement error. The existence of measurement error in wages may partly explain the
clear discrepancy between the empirical and theoretical wage distributions. The estimates
of the structural parameters of the model can be expected to be aﬀected by measurement
errors as well. Note that the order statistics estimators of (r, h) are clearly sensitive to
measurement error. Moreover, the dependence of (r, h) on other parameters of the model
implies that the maximum likelihood estimates of frictional parameters (λ1, δ) are also
aﬀected by measurement error in wage data (Van den Berg and Ridder, 1993). Taking the
possibility of measurement error in wages explicitly into account may hence improve the
performance of maximum likelihood estimation.
To deal with measurement errors, we assume that the wage observation in the data,
say x, is the product of the true unobserved wage w and an error term ε, so that x = w ·ε.
The multiplicative measurement error is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed across individuals and to be independent of all other variables in the model.
Following Christensen and Kiefer (1994a) and Bunzel et al. (2001), we assume that ε has
a Pearson Type V distribution with unit mean, variance σ
2
and density
gε(ε) =
(
1 + σ
−2
)
2+σ
−2
Γ˜ (2 + σ
−2
) · ε3+σ
−2
exp
(
−
1 + σ
−2
ε
)
, (IV.30)
where Γ˜ denotes the gamma function. A consequence of allowing for the measurement error
is that we need to add an integral for each wage observation in the individual likelihood
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Table IV.3: Estimation results with identical agents and measurement error in wages
λ0 λ1 δ p b σ
Low voc. & less
Men, 16-21 .0285 (.0011) .0236 (.0027) .0437 (.0023) 9,278 (920) 7,052 (454) .3012 (.0114)
Men, 22-30 .0399 (.0011) .0317 (.0024) .0508 (.0018) 11,915 (848) 8,121 (475) .3417 (.0108)
Men, 31-50 .0375 (.0010) .0291 (.0022) .0495 (.0017) 11,329 (996) 9,995 (545) .3739 (.0100)
Men, 51-65 .0166 (.0006) .0339 (.0033) .0658 (.0028) 14,336 (1,499) 8,855 (517) .3743 (.0173)
Women, 16-21 — — — — — —
Women, 22-30 — — — — — —
Women, 31-50 .0286 (.0009) .0122 (.0013) .0366 (.0015) 8,013 (1,022) 7,849 (420) .2700 (.0069)
Women, 51-65 .0109 (.0004) .0124 (.0018) .0502 (.0024) 11,457 (1,793) 7,026 (391) .2883 (.0123)
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 .0385 (.0015) .0300 (.0031) .0363 (.0021) 10,900 (660) 5,611 (409) .2294 (.0183)
Men, 22-30 .0494 (.0014) .0286 (.0020) .0353 (.0013) 10,682 (635) 8,056 (540) .3320 (.0091)
Men, 31-50 .0353 (.0010) .0189 (.0015) .0301 (.0012) 16,688 (1,268) 8,244 (889) .3549 (.0170)
Men, 51-65 .0116 (.0006) .0133 (.0025) .0439 (.0029) 34,816 (4,476) 8,013 (652) .2657 (.0327)
Women, 16-21 .0505 (.0018) .0301 (.0029) .0412 (.0021) 7,436 (479) 6,464 (364) .2594 (.0076)
Women, 22-30 — — — — — —
Women, 31-50 — — — — — —
Women, 51-65 .0095 (.0009) .0075 (.0031) .0496 (.0054) 40,043 (13,510) 5,802 (674) .2217 (.0516)
Lower university
Men, 16-30 .0562 (.0016) .0228 (.0016) .0264 (.0011) 15,660 (612) 4,556 (607) .2506 (.0151)
Men, 31-65 .0495 (.0013) .0183 (.0013) .0265 (.0010) 22,672 (1,127) 4,951 (1,007) .3550 (.0201)
Women, 16-30 .0675 (.0025) .0267 (.0024) .0251 (.0014) 9,190 (570) 7,545 (827) .3018 (.0103)
Women, 31-65 .0357 (.0015) .0195 (.0022) .0265 (.0016) 13,554 (1,640) 9,305 (1,332) .3832 (.0188)
Upper university
Men, 16-30 .0735 (.0047) .0431 (.0047) .0140 (.0016) 17,131 (528) 2,864 (1,355) .2071 (.0210)
Men, 31-65 .0363 (.0016) .0197 (.0020) .0189 (.0012) 27,896 (1,760) 6,656 (1,901) .4462 (.0388)
Women, 16-30 .0770 (.0050) .0294 (.0044) .0205 (.0022) 12,490 (1,350) 9,911 (2,646) .3409 (.0206)
Women, 31-65 .0395 (.0027) .0305 (.0050) .0271 (.0028) 19,978 (1,861) 6,219 (1,642) .4045 (.0604)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses
contribution. Formally, we replace (IV.24) by
 = ϕ (d)
(∫
x/r
x/h
φ
(
j, a
∣∣∣x
ε
)
f
(
x
ε
)
1
ε
gε(ε)dε
)
1−cd
, (IV.31)
where ϕ, φ and f are as given in the previous section, and 1/ε is the Jacobian of the
transformation between the true and observed wages given the error term. In this case we
do not use order statistics for (r, h) but estimate them simultaneously with (λ0, λ1, δ, σ)
by maximizing the likelihood function based on (IV.31), in which the integral must be
evaluated numerically in each iteration.
19
With the estimates of (λ0, λ1, δ, r, h) in hand,
the estimates of (p, b) can be computed using (IV.28) and (IV.29) as before.
Estimation results for the homogeneous model with measurement error in wages are
reported in Table IV.3. The results are missing for four groups of low-educated women
as the estimates of r and h converged to the same value in their cases. Compared to the
previous results, λ1 is now uniformly much higher and δ uniformly slightly lower, while λ0
19
Note that the presence of measurement errors makes the support of the distribution of observed wages
independent of the unknown parameters, so the maximum likelihood estimation is standard in this case.
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is of course not aﬀect by the introduction of measurement errors. Among workers with an
upper university degree λ1 now exceeds δ, while the reverse still holds for other groups.
Moreover p is uniformly lower and b uniformly higher than previously. The presence of
measurement errors in the wage data suggests that a range of wage oﬀers is narrower
than previously, so less variation in p and b is required to explain the observations in the
data. The estimates of r and h are generally very close to each other, resulting in a small
diﬀerence between p and b. As another implication, dispersion in the sequence of wages
that the worker can earn over time is predicted to be quite narrow.
From Figures IV.1 to IV.3 in the Appendix we see that the measurement error speci-
ﬁcation results in a good ﬁt to the wage data.
20
Both tails are captured quite nicely and
the mode point is very close. Because allowing for the measurement error in the wages
improves the model’s ﬁt to the wage data crucially, one can expect that the estimates of
frictional parameters are more appropriate as well. On the other hand, the fact that mea-
surement errors account for such a large part of the observed wage variation can be viewed
as a failure of the model as it implies that the theory is unable to explain wage dispersion
within the labour market segments. Provided the clear contrast between the theoretical
and empirical wage distributions, it is obvious that a large degree of measurement error is
required to ’explain’ the divergent shapes of the distributions.
4.3 Discrete productivity dispersion
Next we consider the extended model with a discrete distribution of productivity. Here
we do not allow for measurement error in wages, so comparisons with the homogeneous
version of the model can be done in a straightforward manner. The individual contribution
to the likelihood function is still given by (IV.27), the only diﬀerence compared to the
homogeneous case without measurement errors being that F and f are now given by
(IV.17) and (IV.18) respectively. In addition to the previous problem that the bounds of
the support of F depend on unknown parameters, estimation is further complicated by the
fact that the likelihood function is not diﬀerentiable at the wage cut points (w1, ..., wq−1).
An estimation method which can deal with these complications has been developed by
Bowlus et al. (1995).
Once again it is convenient to reparametrize the model in a similar fashion as was
done in the homogeneous case. Evaluating (IV.17) at w = wi and solving for pi gives the
following relationship between the productivity terms, wage cuts and the fractions of ﬁrm
types:
pi =
1
1− μ2
i
wi −
μ
2
i
1− μ2
i
w
i
, i = 1, 2, ..., q, (IV.32)
20
The predicted densities for observed wages in the ﬁgures are obtained by inserting the parameter
estimates into ∫
x/r
x/h
f
(
x
ε
)
1
ε
gε(ε)dε.
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where
μ
i
=
1 + κ1 (1− γi)
1 + κ1
(
1− γ
i−1
) ∈ (0, 1) , i = 1, 2, ..., q. (IV.33)
Substituting pi’s out of (IV.17) and (IV.18) using (IV.32) allows us to write the likelihood
function in terms of
(
λ0, λ1, δ, r, h,w1, ..., wq−1, γ1, ..., γq−1
)
. Since there are kinks at the
wage cuts in F, the density f and hence the likelihood function is discontinuous at these
points.
Bowlus et al. (1995) show that the maximum likelihood estimates of wage cuts
(w1, ...,wq−1) come from the set of observed wages. As in the homogenous case, we use or-
der statistics to estimate (r, h). Conditional on these estimates, the likelihood function can
be maximized using an iterative procedure with two steps in each iteration. In the ﬁrst step
the likelihood function is maximized with respect to (w1, ...,wq−1) holding (r, h, λ0, λ1, δ)
ﬁxed, using simulated annealing which randomly searches over the possible wage cut com-
binations according an optimal stopping rule.
21
Given the estimates of (w1, ...,wq−1), the
corresponding discontinuity points in the wage oﬀer distribution
(
γ
1
, ..., γ
q−1
)
are esti-
mated by observed frequencies in the wage data. In the second step the likelihood func-
tion is maximized with respect to (λ0, λ1, δ) conditional on
(
r, h,w1, ...,wq−1, γ1, ..., γq−1
)
.
Since this part of the maximization problem is smooth, standard maximum likelihood
algorithms can be applied. These two steps are then iterated until convergence occurs.
In addition to the order statistics estimators for (r, h), the maximum likelihood esti-
mators of the wage cuts in the wage oﬀer distribution (w1, ...,wq−1) also converge to their
true value at a rate faster than
√
n. It follows that they are asymptotically independent of
the maximum likelihood estimator of (λ0, λ1, δ) and the theory of local cuts by Christensen
and Kiefer (1994b) justiﬁes conditioning on them in the second step of the procedure. The
iterative separate maximization can be shown to lead to a joint maximum of the likelihood
function on convergence.
There is no formal test for choosing a value of q, the number of ﬁrm types. However,
the authors of this estimation technique argue that the likelihood ratio test of one value of
q against another based on the standard χ
2
-criterion can be expected to work reasonably
well in practice. This is so even though the exact distribution of the test statistics is
not known due to non-regular estimation procedure. Thus, we choose the number of ﬁrm
types by comparing two times the improvement in the log-likelihood function with each
additional ﬁrm type to the χ
2
.05
critical value.
22
Once the other parameters of the model
are estimated, unobserved heterogeneity terms (p1, ..., pq) can be estimated using (IV.32)
21
For simulated annealing, see for example Goﬀe et al. (1994) and Bowlus et al. (1995).
22
A Monte Carlo evidence of Bowlus et al. (2001) indicates a tendency towards overﬁtting the number
of heterogeneity types using this criterion. However, they further ﬁnd that choosing a value of q greater
than the true value has only a minor eﬀect on the estimates of (λ1, δ) , while the order statistics estimators
of (r, h) and the ML estimator of λ0 are obviously unaﬀected by the value of q chosen.
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Table IV.4: Estimation results with discrete productivity dispersion
λ0 λ1 δ q p b
Lower vocational and less
Men, 16-21 .0285 (.0011) .0219 (.0023) .0444 (.0023) 5 21,539 4,266
Men, 22-30 .0399 (.0011) .0288 (.0019) .0507 (.0018) 6 28,438 4,049
Men, 31-50 .0375 (.0010) .0234 (.0016) .0499 (.0017) 5 36,920 3,761
Men, 51-65 .0166 (.0006) .0298 (.0026) .0662 (.0028) 6 37,507 5,793
Women, 16-21 .0282 (.0012) .0166 (.0020) .0464 (.0025) 4 27,227 4,069
Women, 22-30 .0292 (.0010) .0193 (.0017) .0370 (.0017) 6 22,808 3,971
Women, 31-50 .0286 (.0009) .0123 (.0012) .0365 (.0015) 6 29,556 3,465
Women, 51-65 .0109 (.0004) .0122 (.0017) .0503 (.0024) 4 36,217 4,715
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 .0358 (.0015) .0254 (.0024) .0373 (.0021) 4 17,497 3,827
Men, 22-30 .0494 (.0014) .0254 (.0016) .0353 (.0013) 4 23,945 2,491
Men, 31-50 .0353 (.0010) .0181 (.0013) .0301 (.0012) 5 35,160 2,320
Men, 51-65 .0116 (.0006) .0133 (.0023) .0439 (.0029) 3 53,937 5,972
Women, 16-21 .0505 (.0018) .0276 (.0024) .0420 (.0021) 5 15,697 3,636
Women, 22-30 .0534 (.0015) .0230 (.0015) .0323 (.0013) 6 17,499 2,547
Women, 31-50 .0335 (.0010) .0174 (.0013) .0298 (.0013) 4 27,277 2,913
Women, 51-65 .0095 (.0009) .0072 (.0029) .0498 (.0054) 2 77,089 4,798
Lower university
Men, 16-30 .0562 (.0016) .0213 (.0014) .0267 (.0011) 5 25,167 275
Men, 31-65 .0495 (.0013) .0180 (.0012) .0266 (.0010) 6 41,202 —1,758
Women, 16-30 .0675 (.0025) .0245 (.0019) .0250 (.0014) 6 16,807 373
Women, 31-65 .0357 (.0015) .0205 (.0021) .0263 (.0016) 6 29,217 2,460
Upper university
Men, 16-30 .0735 (.0047) .0410 (.0043) .0138 (.0016) 5 19,919 —863
Men, 31-65 .0363 (.0015) .0208 (.0020) .0188 (.0012) 6 45,053 —584
Women, 16-30 .0770 (.0050) .0257 (.0033) .0206 (.0022) 5 26,853 —3,965
Women, 31-65 .0395 (.0027) .0265 (.0039) .0275 (.0028) 5 33,265 2,109
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. q is the number of ﬁrm types and p =
∑
q
i=1
(
γ
i
− γ
i−1
)
pi is the
average productivity across ﬁrms.
and (IV.33),
23
and an estimate of b can be obtained using
b = r−
λ0 − λ1
λ1
q∑
i=1
(pi − wi)
(
1− μ2
i
−
2δ (1− μ
i
)
δ + λ1
(
1− γ
i−1
)
)
, (IV.34)
which follows from the substitution of (IV.17) into (IV.5).
Order statistics estimates for (r, h) ≡ (w
1
, wq) can be found from Table IV.1 as pre-
viously. Other parameter estimates are shown in Tables IV.4 to IV.6. Estimates of the
frictional parameters (λ1, δ) are generally very close to the estimates obtained from the
homogeneous model with measurement error in wages. Compared to the corresponding es-
timates from the measurement error speciﬁcation, there is a tendency for λ1 to be slightly
smaller while δ does not exhibit any systematic diﬀerences. Overall the diﬀerences in
these estimates are so moderate that one can draw basically the same conclusions con-
23
It is worth noting that in this model all wage diﬀerentials that cannot be explained by diﬀerences in
the frictional parameters are attributed to productivity diﬀerences. Thus the productivity parameters may
capture also other sources of wage dispersion than pure productivity diﬀerences (Bowlus, 1997).
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Table IV.5: Estimation results with discrete productivity dispersion, continued
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5 p6
Lower vocational and less
Men, 16-21 13,643 30,392 40,487 44,072 108,892
Men, 22-30 17,295 17,190 19,007 24,177 41,443 136,864
Men, 31-50 22,671 37,564 47,012 56,809 148,293
Men, 51-65 20,879 26,750 35,892 40,360 62,652 211,517
Women, 16-21 11,969 33,784 114,231 679,097
Women, 22-30 12,354 17,426 25,163 42,016 47,827 125,113
Women, 31-50 16,398 17,708 24,134 28,632 45,129 162,682
Women, 51-65 19,360 43,418 123,891 540,357
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 13,375 19,258 26,360 62,415
Men, 22-30 15,146 21,668 27,620 75,768
Men, 31-50 22,338 27,545 30,704 41,592 100,363
Men, 51-65 38,261 72,673 141,549
Women, 16-21 9,757 15,158 29,653 39,350 87,954
Women, 22-30 11,946 13,236 16,207 26,410 56,156 56,535
Women, 31-50 16,759 26,769 48,668 195,431
Women, 51-65 49,328 152,647 721,354
Lower university
Men, 16-30 18,213 20,020 24,891 35,263 113,867
Men, 31-65 25,616 45,985 48,888 83,992 156,640 446,879
Women, 16-30 12,812 13,507 14,208 17,024 22,032 41,729
Women, 31-65 17,605 25,184 30,545 44,957 59,843 127,858
Upper university
Men, 16-30 16,589 16,960 19,525 21,083 40,111
Men, 31-65 26,719 28,891 31,640 44,102 58,421 168,181
Women, 16-30 17,355 18,697 25,678 50,459 151,310
Women, 31-65 22,495 26,773 34,878 40,743 95,614
Notes: All pi ’s are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5 per cent level.
cerning the frictional parameters from this model and from the homogeneous model with
the measurement error.
To get an idea of productivity diﬀerences, the average productivity across the ﬁrms
is computed and shown in Table IV.4. Conditional on the education level, the average
productivity p tends to increase with age. Except for workers aged over 50, there is a
tendency for p to be lower for workers with upper vocational education than for those
with lower vocational education. Overall these diﬀerences across the worker groups are in
line with the ﬁndings from the homogeneous model, even though the absolute values of
productivity estimates are quite diﬀerent. Namely, the average productivity estimates p
are approximately only half of the corresponding productivity estimates obtained from the
homogeneity model without measurement error but are clearly higher than the estimates
from the measurement error speciﬁcation. Furthermore, it turns out that the value of
non-market time b is typically positive, though there are few groups for which b takes a
negative value. Diﬀerences in b with respect to education and age are similar to those
observed in the case of the homogeneous model.
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Table IV.6: Estimation results with discrete productivity dispersion, continued
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5
Lower voc. & less
Men, 16-21 8,700 10,704 11,755 12,511 .7857 .8917 .9297 .9543
Men, 22-30 9,768 10,008 10,273 11,889 15,874 .6143 .6493 .6807 .8053 .9420
Men, 31-50 12,458 14,803 15,684 16,329 .7477 .8620 .8933 .9110
Men, 51-65 11,330 11,478 12,988 13,132 18,042 .7283 .7403 .8183 .8247 .9467
Women, 16-21 7,352 9,303 14,857 .8027 .9153 .9927
Women, 22-30 7,913 8,150 10,445 11,352 12,211 .7080 .7357 .8880 .9173 .9410
Women, 31-50 8,270 8,647 9,378 9,629 12,102 .6623 .7290 .8063 .8270 .9383
Women, 51-65 8,849 11,177 13,265 .7947 .9433 .9823
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 9,379 10,197 11,728 .7967 .8673 .9450
Men, 22-30 9,563 10,242 14,532 .6310 .6810 .9067
Men, 31-50 12,429 13,539 14,280 17,680 .6340 .7100 .7527 .8757
Men, 51-65 16,607 19,303 .7914 .8767
Women, 16-21 7,118 8,296 10,438 10,646 .7297 .8663 .9517 .9573
Women, 22-30 8,074 8,349 9,603 11,238 11,580 .6483 .6957 .8377 .9157 .9213
Women, 31-50 10,213 11,963 18,128 .7013 .8103 .9770
Women, 51-65 13,736 17,585 .8653 .9686
Lower university
Men, 16-30 12,405 12,811 13,030 17,481 .7490 .7897 .8030 .9563
Men, 31-65 15,407 21,470 21,528 25,153 31,672 .7200 .9040 .9057 .9520 .9903
Women, 16-30 8,763 8,951 9,742 10,257 12,828 .5913 .6199 .7297 .7763 .9206
Women, 31-65 10,846 13,638 14,769 15,852 21,243 .6153 .7864 .8373 .8635 .9533
Upper university
Men, 16-30 12,846 14,301 16,066 17,204 .5553 .7085 .8255 .8872
Men, 31-65 16,284 17,287 19,185 23,020 29,622 .5637 .6181 .7062 .8022 .9103
Women, 16-30 13,065 13,086 16,651 22,223 .7102 .7122 .8796 .9592
Women, 31-65 13,888 15,327 17,958 21,768 .6160 .6979 .7914 .9006
Estimates of productivity parameters, wage cuts and their weights are shown in Tables
IV.5 and IV.6. Individual productivity values and wage cuts, say pi and wi, exhibit
increasing patterns with respect to age among groups with university education while the
picture is less clear for less educated workers. Of course, these kinds of comparisons are
complicated by the fact that the number of ﬁrm types q varies across the groups. Given
the shape of the empirical wage distribution, it is not very surprising that the bulk of
ﬁrms is found to be low productivity ones. Firms with the lowest level of productivity
represent over half of all ﬁrms in each submarket as γ
1
> .5 holds for all worker groups.
Some productivity terms take very high values in some groups of workers, though their
relative weights are very low (see the associated γ
i
’s).
In Figures IV.1 to IV.3 in the Appendix the estimated density functions of the model
with discrete productivity dispersion are characterized by discontinuous jumps at the
estimated wage cuts (w1, ...,wq−1) , between which the densities exhibit locally increasing
patterns. It turns out that the model with discrete productivity dispersion is able to
capture the shape of the wage distribution quite well but has some diﬃculties with the
both tails of the distribution. In particular the estimated density has generally the left
tail which is too fat compared to the observed wage distribution. As a result, the model
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has problems also to match the mode point accurately. These failures are not unique to
the Finnish data but appear in the previous empirical applications of the same model as
well (see Bowlus et al., 1995, Bowlus, 1997, Bunzel et al., 2001, and Bowlus et al., 2001).
Additionally, there are diﬃculties in explaining wage observations at the upper end of the
distribution which is often thin, covering wide ranges. Adding more ﬁrm types serves as a
way of obtaining a more accurate ﬁt to the right tail of the distribution. The estimation
procedure aims to attach diﬀerent ﬁrm types to each of these observations, leading to
implausibly high productivity values sometimes. However, these high productivity values
have only a minor overall eﬀect as their weights are very low (in terms of the associated
values of γ
i
’s).
It should be stressed that the trimming procedure applied to the wage data is related
to the number of heterogeneity terms needed to match the right hand tail of the wage
distribution. Indeed by trimming a higher fraction of wage values from the upper end of
the distribution leads to a smaller choice of q, with the highest productivity parameters
pi being in a more reasonable range and the associated values of γi being well below one.
Changing the upper value of trimming has of course a direct eﬀect on the estimate of h.
A brief sensitivity analysis done with the diﬀerent trimming thresholds suggests that the
parameters and conclusions of interest are reasonably robust, however.
4.4 Continuous productivity dispersion
Next we turn our attention to the version of the model with a continuous productivity
distribution. The individual likelihood contribution has the same general form as previ-
ously deﬁned in (IV.27) but the equilibrium distribution of wage oﬀers is now given by
F (w) = Γ
(
K
−1
(p)
)
. This is a highly nonlinear function of unknown parameters and does
not have a closed-form expression in general, suggesting that the standard maximum like-
lihood estimation could be very cumbersome. The ﬁrst point to note is that the integrals
within the expressions for F and f must be evaluated numerically in each iteration. An
additional diﬃculty follows from the fact that the productivity distribution Γ is not gen-
erated by the model but it must be taken as exogenously given. This is not a problem as
such but, as argued by Bontemps et al. (2000), the most well-known parametric speciﬁca-
tions for Γ are unlikely to generate the wage oﬀer distribution consistent with the shape
usually observed in the wage data.
For these diﬃculties Bontemps et al. (2000) propose a ﬂexible estimation procedure
which does not restrict Γ to belong in any parametric family. This estimation method
consists of three steps. The ﬁrst step of the procedure is to estimate F and f from the
wage data using some nonparametric procedure. In the second step the likelihood function
is maximized with respect to (λ0, λ1, δ) conditional on the nonparametric estimates of F
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and f. As the ﬁnal step p = K
−1
(w) and γ(p) are estimated using
24
K
−1
(w) = w +
1 + κ1 [1− F(w)]
2κ1f(w)
, (IV.35)
γ(p) =
2κ1f(w)
3
κ1f(w)
2 − f ′(w) (1 + κ1 [1−F (w)])
, (IV.36)
where F, f and f
′
are replaced by their nonparametric estimates from the ﬁrst step and
κ1 = λ1/δ by its maximum likelihood estimate from the second step.
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To estimate
the wage oﬀer density f, we apply the standard Gaussian kernel density estimator and
choose the bandwidth by a rule of thumb that minimizes the mean integrated square error.
Corresponding estimates of F and f
′
are then obtained by integration and diﬀerentiation
of the kernel density estimate. Standard errors are ﬁnally obtained by bootstrapping the
whole estimation procedure outlined above.
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It is worth emphasizing that the application of the kernel density techniques to the
wage data does not impose any restrictions on the shape of equilibrium wage distributions.
Conditional on the nonparametric estimates of F and f, the likelihood function estimated
in the second step relies only on assumptions about the behaviour of individual workers
who are taking the wage oﬀer distribution as given. In other words, the assumptions
about the wage-setting strategies of ﬁrms do not aﬀect the estimation of frictional para-
meters (λ0, λ1, δ) . Only the third step of the estimation procedure exploits the part of the
model which describes ﬁrm behaviour (that is, the ﬁrst-order condition of ﬁrm’s problem).
Bontemps et al. (2000) emphasize that the estimates of the frictional parameters can be
expected to be consistent under a wide range of assumptions on the demand side of the
story. This class of models includes, among others, the speciﬁcations of equilibrium search
models outlined and estimated in the previous sections. Finally, it should be stressed that
the estimation method of Bontemps et al. (2000) is very simple in computational respect.
Substitution of the kernel estimates in the likelihood function circumvents the need for
numerical integrations, while the third step does not require even iterations. This a clear
advantage compared to the estimation procedure of Bowlus et al. (1995) for the case of
discrete productivity dispersion.
24
The ﬁrst equation is simply the ﬁrst-order condition (IV.20) solved for p = K
−1
(w). The second
equation can be found by diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst equation with respect to w and noting that
(
K
−1
)
′
(w) =
f(w)/γ(p) by virtue of the relationship F (w) = Γ
(
K
−1
(w)
)
.
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Obviously, the ﬁnal step requires the denominator of (IV.36) to be positive. Note that this condition
is equivalent to the second-order condition of the ﬁrm’s problem outlined in (IV.21) or, in other words,
that f(w) (1+ κ1 [1− F (w)]) decreases over the support of F.
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Our estimation procedure diﬀers slightly from that used by Bontemps, et al. (2000) because of the
diﬀerent sampling scheme. Contrary to the inﬂow sample of unemployment, Bontemps, et al. (2000)
use a sample from the French Labour Force Survey drawn from the stock of employed and unemployed
workers. Consequently, wage observations in their data come from G, not from F as in our data. As such
they estimate G (instead of F ) using a nonparametric procedure and then recover the associated F using
the equilibrium ﬂow relationship. They also replace (IV.35) and (IV.36) by the corresponding equations
expressing p and γ as functions of G, g, g
′
and κ1, where g is the density of the earnings distribution and
g
′
its derivative.
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Table IV.7: Estimation results with continuous productivity dispersion
λ0 λ1 δ p
Lower vocational and less
Men, 16-21 .0285 (.0009) .0234 (.0029) .0437 (.0034) 20,921
Men, 22-30 .0399 (.0014) .0291 (.0021) .0508 (.0026) 28,443
Men, 31-50 .0375 (.0016) .0254 (.0022) .0495 (.0025) 34,973
Men, 51-65 .0166 (.0007) .0298 (.0030) .0658 (.0040) 36,894
Women, 16-21 .0282 (.0010) .0179 (.0025) .0454 (.0032) 25,973
Women, 22-30 .0292 (.0010) .0194 (.0019) .0368 (.0022) 22,520
Women, 31-50 .0286 (.0011) .0118 (.0011) .0366 (.0019) 30,019
Women, 51-65 .0109 (.0006) .0117 (.0016) .0502 (.0034) 38,504
Upper vocational
Men, 16-21 .0385 (.0014) .0293 (.0026) .0362 (.0029) 16,134
Men, 22-30 .0494 (.0017) .0262 (.0020) .0352 (.0019) 23,465
Men, 31-50 .0353 (.0012) .0183 (.0014) .0301 (.0018) 33,879
Men, 51-65 .0116 (.0006) .0129 (.0026) .0440 (.0043) 56,461
Women, 16-21 .0505 (.0023) .0280 (.0026) .0412 (.0029) 15,990
Women, 22-30 .0534 (.0019) .0232 (.0017) .0322 (.0017) 17,573
Women, 31-50 .0335 (.0013) .0184 (.0015) .0296 (.0016) 26,052
Women, 51-65 .0095 (.0012) .0077 (.0034) .0495 (.0075) 71,444
Lower university
Men, 16-30 .0562 (.0018) .0224 (.0014) .0264 (.0014) 24,535
Men, 31-65 .0495 (.0018) .0174 (.0011) .0266 (.0013) 42,881
Women, 16-30 .0675 (.0026) .0245 (.0025) .0251 (.0018) 16,971
Women, 31-65 .0357 (.0015) .0185 (.0020) .0265 (.0020) 31,605
Upper university
Men, 16-30 .0735 (.0067) .0384 (.0054) .0139 (.0021) 20,448
Men, 31-65 .0363 (.0018) .0189 (.0018) .0190 (.0016) 48,668
Women, 16-30 .0770 (.0051) .0271 (.0042) .0204 (.0026) 24,157
Women, 31-65 .0395 (.0031) .0294 (.0051) .0272 (.0035) 30,916
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. p is the average productivity over workers who found a job.
The estimates of the frictional parameters are given in Table IV.7, whereas the kernel
estimates of f are shown in Figures IV.1 to IV.3 in the Appendix. It appears that λ1
is generally very close to the estimates obtained from the homogeneous model with mea-
surement error and from the model with discrete productivity dispersion while δ is almost
identical. Since the estimates of (λ0, λ1, δ) in this setting can be expected to be robust
with respect to diﬀerent mechanisms determining the wage distributions, we can conclude
that all speciﬁcations of the Burdett-Mortensen model generating an acceptable ﬁt to the
wage data produce appropriate estimates for the frictional parameters. This suggests that
to the extent we are concerned with the estimation of frictional parameters it is not so
important whether the deviations from the theoretical distribution predicted by the homo-
geneous model are explained by measurement error or by employer heterogeneity as long
as the shape of the wage distribution is captured by the speciﬁcation. This is essentially
the same result as found by Bunzel et al. (2001) with the Danish data.
The average productivity values in the last column are computed by taking the average
over workers entering employment based on (IV.35). However, the estimated relationship
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between the wage oﬀer and productivity is not consistent with the theory. The condition
that f(w) (1 + κ1 [1−F(w)]) decreases everywhere is violated for small wages in all worker
groups. In other words, the model fails to capture a steeply increasing wage density
observed at the lower end of the wage distribution. Recall that the model with a discrete
distribution of productivity also fails to explain the shape of the left tail of the wage
distribution.
The increasing pattern of f(w) (1 + κ1 [1− F(w)]) on small wages implies that the
relationship K(p) is downward-sloping for small values of p. This suggests the wages
oﬀered by some less productive ﬁrms are not optimal as they could increase their proﬁts
by reducing their wages. A binding minimum wage is an obvious candidate to explain this
failure of the model, as it may prevent low paying ﬁrms from lowering their wages further.
As pointed out by Van den Berg and Van Vuuren (2000), omitted worker heterogeneity
may also provide an explanation. To see this, suppose that workers within a given labour
market segment are heterogeneous with respect to their value of non-market time (this
heterogeneity may result, for example, from diﬀerences in unemployment beneﬁts or in the
value of leisure). In this case workers will apply diﬀerent reservation wages when searching
from unemployment. Thus a ﬁrm which lowers its wage oﬀer may become unattractive
for some groups of workers. The ﬁrms should take this eﬀect into account when setting
wages which may explain the failure of the theoretical model at the lower end of the wage
distribution.
5 Conclusion
This paper has provided quite an extensive structural empirical analysis of various speci-
ﬁcations of the Burdett-Mortensen model. We found that, in the absence of measurement
error in wages, the equilibrium search model with identical agents does not ﬁt to the wage
data. This failure is due to the prediction of the theory that the equilibrium wage oﬀer
distribution has an increasing density everywhere which is at odds with the wage data.
Introduction of the measurement error in wages or employer heterogeneity in terms of
labour productivity across ﬁrms provides a way of making the model more ﬂexible. These
extended versions of the basic model proved to give a much better ﬁt to the wage data.
The frictional parameters of the model, i.e. the layoﬀ rate and arrival rates of job oﬀers,
were found to be fairly robust across the model speciﬁcations which ﬁt to the wage data.
Stated diﬀerently, it does not make much diﬀerence for the estimates of the frictional pa-
rameters whether the wage distribution is matched by allowing for the measurement error
in wages or unobserved productivity diﬀerences. However, the estimates of the other pa-
rameters — the value of non-market time and productivity terms — vary across the diﬀerent
speciﬁcations to a large extent.
In the case of the homogeneous model with the measurement error in wages almost all
wage dispersion was attributed to the measurement error. This indicates that the model
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without (unobserved) worker or employer heterogeneity cannot explain the observed wage
variation. Although the equilibrium models with employer heterogeneity match the overall
shape of the wage distributions relatively well, they do have problems in explaining the
shape of the left tail of the wage distribution, and in particular the testable theoretical con-
ditions implied by the model with continuous productivity dispersion were rejected in the
empirical analysis. Of course, one can expect that incorporating employer heterogeneity
and measurement error into the same model provides a way of capturing the shape of the
lower end of the wage distribution as well. On the other hand, unobserved heterogeneity
and measurement errors allowed for in a suﬃciently ﬂexible form can be used to ’explain’
any discrepancy between the theory and data.
One may call into question whether introducing more unobservables in the empirical
analysis of equilibrium search models stands for any progress. As long as the shape of
empirical wage distributions has to be captured mainly by unobservables, we cannot be
very satisﬁed with our empirical applications. Since the equilibrium search theory is a story
about joint behaviour of workers and ﬁrms, it may be hard to make signiﬁcant progress in
the empirical analysis of such models without data on both sides of the market. Indeed,
the increasing availability of matched worker-ﬁrm data provides a natural way to proceed.
With such data one may, for example, estimate the distribution of labour productivity
from ﬁrm records rather than infer it indirectly from the wage distribution. In general, the
matched worker-ﬁrm data contain more information for estimation and testing of existing
models as well as make the estimation of more general models feasible (see Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2002, and Christensen et al., 2005) .
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Figure IV.1: Wage oﬀer densities for workers with lower vocational education or less
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Figure IV.2: Wage oﬀer densities for workers with upper vocational education
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Figure IV.3: Wage oﬀer densities for workers with university education
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Chapter V
Marginal Eﬀects for Competing
Risks Models with Piecewise
Constant Hazards
In the competing risks context the eﬀect of a covariate on the hazard function
for a particular cause may be very diﬀerent from its eﬀect on the likelihood
of exiting from that cause. The latter probability is a function of all cause-
speciﬁc hazards, and thereby potentially aﬀected by indirect eﬀects via hazards
for competing causes. We consider the eﬀects of covariates on the cumulative
probability of exiting from a particular cause. These "marginal eﬀects" are
decomposed into direct eﬀects via the hazard of interest and indirect eﬀects via
the hazards for competing causes. For the piecewise constant hazard speciﬁca-
tion we derive simple closed-form expressions for the marginal eﬀects that can
be easily computed from the standard hazard functions estimates. We argue
that the marginal eﬀects provide a useful and coherent way of summarizing the
results of competing risks analysis. This point is illustrated with an empirical
application of unemployment duration data.
1 Introduction
Competing risks arise in the analysis of duration data on individuals subject to leave
the initial state from one of several competing causes. For example, a person may leave
unemployment by taking a job, by withdrawing from the labour force, or by participating
in a labour market programme. The conventional approach involves the speciﬁcation and
estimation of hazard functions for exits from competing causes. The cause-speciﬁc hazard
function can be used to examine the eﬀects of covariates on the instantaneous exit rate
from a particular cause conditional on not having exited from any cause previously. It
does not, however, provide direct information about the cumulative or overall probability
of exit due to a particular cause since these are functions of all cause-speciﬁc hazards. In
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general, the eﬀect of a covariate on the hazard function for a particular cause can be very
diﬀerent from its eﬀect on the likelihood of exiting from that cause by a given time (Gray,
1988). This latter probability, described by the cumulative incidence function, is often of
primary interest.
For example, the goal of policy-makers may be to induce the unemployed to ﬁnd an
acceptable job within a reasonable amount of time, while transitions out of the labour
force and into labour market programmes are viewed as less desired outcomes. The eﬀects
of policy variables, such as beneﬁt levels or the maximum length of entitlement periods,
on the hazard rate to employment may be less interesting from a policy perspective than
their eﬀects on the likelihood of leaving unemployment for employment by a given time.
The employment eﬀect of a policy change that aﬀects the employment hazard may be
reinforced or attenuated by changes in hazard rates out of the labour force and to labour
market programmes. As a consequence, a policy change with a strong eﬀect on the em-
ployment hazard may have a negligible or even inverse eﬀect on the probability that the
unemployment spell will end with employment. Alternatively, a policy change with no
eﬀect on the employment hazard may still have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the likelihood of
exiting to employment due to indirect eﬀects via the competing hazards. If one focuses
on estimating the reform eﬀects only on the employment hazard, the overall employment
eﬀect of the reform is not identiﬁed. An appropriate way of evaluating employment eﬀects
in the presence of competing risks calls for a simultaneous account of all cause-speciﬁc
hazards.
An alternative approach is to directly compare the cumulative probabilities of em-
ployment between diﬀerent groups. Estimation of the cumulative incidence functions has
a long tradition in the statistical analysis of medical trials (see for example Pepe, 1991,
Gaynor et al., 1993, or Satagopan et al., 2004). This literature has, however, relied heav-
ily on nonparametric estimators, which may be less useful in economic applications where
randomized experiments are rare and hence the need to account for heterogeneity is more
important. Recently, some semiparametric methods for estimating the eﬀects of covari-
ates on the cumulative incidence function have been developed (see Fine, 1999, and Fine
and Gray, 1999). However, the eﬀect of a covariate on the cumulative incidence function
does not generally identify the eﬀects on the underlying cause-speciﬁc hazards. This may
limit the usefulness of these methods in economic applications where the hazard function
speciﬁcation is often dictated by some theoretical model (Van den Berg, 2001). Therefore,
in economic applications where the cumulative cause-speciﬁc exit probabilities are of in-
terest, it may be advisable to obtain estimates of the cumulative incidence functions and
covariate eﬀects on these by combining the estimates of cause-speciﬁc hazard functions
from the ﬁrst step. This approach is taken in this study. It preserves a direct link to
the hazard function speciﬁcation which has been the focal point of econometric duration
analysis but facilitates the interpretation of covariates eﬀects.
To be more speciﬁc, we consider the eﬀects of covariates on the cumulative probability
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of exiting from a particular cause by a given time. These "marginal eﬀects" provide us
with a complementary way of summarizing the results of cause-speciﬁc hazard estimates.
This is analogous to the common practice of reporting marginal eﬀects in the context of
qualitative response models, such as multinominal logit and ordered probit models. Just
as in the context of qualitative response models, the marginal eﬀects in the competing
risks model provide a clear probabilistic interpretation for covariate eﬀects and eliminate
much of the risk of confusion about the interpretation of the results.
In general, the cumulative incidence function and marginal eﬀects are not available in
closed form. We consider a class of semiparametric competing risks models with piecewise
constant hazard functions. For this class there exist simple analytical expressions for the
cumulative incidence functions and marginal eﬀects, which can be easily computed using
the standard hazard estimates. We decompose the marginal eﬀects into direct eﬀects via
the hazard of interest and indirect eﬀects via the hazards for competing causes. To what
extent the eﬀect of a covariate on the cumulative incidence function stems from a change
in a particular hazard function may be of particular interest. For example, in assessing
the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the likelihood of ﬁnding a job, the indirect eﬀect
via the hazard rate into labour market programmes may be particularly interesting from a
policy perspective, as the eligibility rules for such programmes are under the direct control
of the employment authorities.
In the next section we discuss the marginal eﬀects in the competing risks context
with an emphasis on a special case of the piecewise constant hazard speciﬁcation. This is
followed by an empirical illustration in Section 3. We estimate a competing risks model
of unemployment duration with distinct hazards for exits to employment, labour market
programmes, and out of the labour force using a sample of unemployed workers drawn
from Finnish register data. We ﬁnd clear diﬀerences, both in quantitative and qualitative
terms, between the eﬀects of covariates on cause-speciﬁc hazards and their eﬀects on the
associated cumulative incidence functions. In addition, by examining the distributions
of marginal eﬀects across individuals, we illustrate how marginal eﬀects may work in the
opposite directions for diﬀerent subgroups. Some extensions of the modelling approach
are discussed in Section 4. This is followed by concluding remarks about the usability of
marginal eﬀects as a way of summarizing the results of competing risks analysis.
2 Econometric methods
2.1 Basic concepts
Let T be the (continuous) time until exit out of the initial state from one of K possible
causes. The hazard function for cause k at time t, conditional on a vector of covariates x,
is deﬁned as
θk(t |x) = lim
dt→0
Pr(t ≤ T < t+ dt,K = k |T ≥ t,X = x)
dt
. (V.1)
157
The survivor function is
S(t |x) ≡ Pr(T > t |X = x) = exp
{
−
∑K
k=1
Λk(t |x)
}
, (V.2)
where Λk(t |x) ≡
∫
t
0
θk(u |x)du denotes the integrated hazard for cause k. The likelihood of
exiting from cause k during a short interval [t, t+ dt) is θk(t |x)S(t |x) dt. In other words,
one must not have exited from any cause by time t, the probability of which is S(t |x) ,
to subsequently exit from cause k during [t, t+ dt), the probability of which is θk(t |x)dt.
The likelihood of exiting due to cause k by time t is
Fk(t |x) ≡ Pr(T ≤ t,K = k |X = x) =
∫
t
0
θk(u |x)S(u |x)du, (V.3)
(see e.g. Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 2002, p. 252). The likelihood of ever exiting from
cause k emerges as a limiting case: Pr(K = k |X = x) = limt→∞ Fk(t |x) .
1
We refer to
Fk(t |x) as the cumulative incidence function but it is also known as the cause-speciﬁc
failure probability and sub-distribution function.
Obviously, Fk(t |x) depends on all hazard rates via S(u |x) . The marginal eﬀect of a
continuous covariate, say xi, on Fk(t |x) can be decomposed as
∂Fk(t |x)
∂xi
=
∂
2
Fk(t |x)
∂θk∂xi
+
∑
j =k
∂
2
Fk(t |x)
∂θj∂xi
, (V.4)
where
∂
2
Fk(t |x)
∂θk∂xi
=
∫
t
0
(
∂θk(u |x)
∂xi
− θk(u |x)
∂Λk(u |x)
∂xi
)
S(u |x) du (V.5)
denotes the direct eﬀect via the hazard function for cause k and
∂
2
Fk(t |x)
∂θj∂xi
= −
∫
t
0
θk(u |x)S(u |x)
∂Λj(u |x)
∂xi
du (V.6)
denotes the indirect eﬀect via the hazard for cause j = k.
The formulas above apply to continuous covariates but may be used as approximations
for dummy variables as well. Alternatively, one can compute the marginal eﬀect for a
dummy variable, xi, as Fk(t |x
∗
i
, xi = 1)− Fk(t |x
∗
i
, xi = 0) , where x
∗
i
denotes a vector of
all other covariates.
2
The direct eﬀect via the hazard of cause k can obtained by computing
this diﬀerence but restricting the eﬀect of xi to zero in hazards for causes j = k when
computing Fk(t |x
∗
i
, xi = 1) . The indirect eﬀects can be obtained in a similar fashion. In
this case the sum of direct and indirect eﬀects does not generally equal the overall marginal
eﬀect. However, the diﬀerence is found to be reasonably small at least in our empirical
application.
If a covariate has a positive eﬀect on θk(t
′ |x) for all t′ ≤ t, its direct eﬀect on Fk(t |x) is
positive. The indirect eﬀect via the hazard for cause j = k evaluated at time t is positive
1
One can easily verify that
∑
K
k=1
Fk(t |x) = 1− S(t |x) and
∑
K
k=1
Pr(K = k |X = x) = 1.
2
If xi is a discrete variable with several categories that is measured in deviation from some proper
reference value (e.g. sample mean), the same formula applies directly.
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(negative) if the covariate has a negative (positive) eﬀect on θj(t
′ |x) for all t′ ≤ t. With
θk(t
′ |x) held constant for all t′ ≤ t, the negative eﬀect on the hazard for cause j = k
increases the likelihood of surviving up to t
′ ≤ t, and hence the individual is more likely
to be at risk of exiting from cause k at each t
′ ≤ t. In sum, the marginal eﬀect of xi
on Fk(t |x) is positive if the covariate increases θk(t |x) and decreases or has no eﬀect on
θj(t |x) for all j = k up to time t. When the direct eﬀect and some of the indirect eﬀects
work in opposite directions, i.e. when the covariate aﬀects the cause-speciﬁc hazards in
the same direction, the marginal eﬀect is generally ambiguous, depending on the shapes
of the hazard functions, the relative magnitude of the covariate eﬀects, and the values of
the conditioning covariates.
Only in some special cases can we deduce the sign of a covariate eﬀect on the cu-
mulative incidence function directly from the hazard parameters. Consider the following
proportional risks model:
θk(t |x) = λ (t) e
γ
k
+x
′
β
k , k = 1, 2, ...,K,
in which the covariates have proportional eﬀects on the baseline hazard λ (t) and the cause-
speciﬁc hazards are proportional to each other over time (and for uniqueness let γ
1
= 0).
3
Denote Λ(t) ≡
∫
t
0
λ (u) du. From (V.3) we ﬁnd that Fk(t |x) = Πk(x) [1− S(t |x)] , where
S(t |x) = exp
{
−Λ(t)
∑K
j=1
e
γ
j
+x
′
β
j
}
is the survivor function and
Πk(x) =
e
γ
k
+x
′
β
k
∑
K
j=1
e
γ
j
+x
′
β
j
denotes the likelihood that the exit will eventually be from cause k, which is of the familiar
multinominal logit form. Let β
ki
be the coeﬃcient of xi in the hazard for cause k. If
β
ki
> β
ji
≥ 0 for all j = k, both Πk(x) and 1 − S(t |x) increase with xi, and thereby xi
has a positive eﬀect on Fk(t |x) for any choice of x and λ.
4
The eﬀect of xi on the overall
probability of exit due to cause k, Πk(x), is positive if βki > βji for all j = k. These results
and the particularly simple form of Fk(t |x) follow from the proportional risks assumption,
which is rather restrictive. In particular, the restriction that the cause-speciﬁc hazards
are proportional over time implies that K and T are statistically independent.
When the baseline hazards are not proportional over time, it is diﬃcult to draw any
insight about the eﬀect of the covariate i on Fk(t |x) from the hazard coeﬃcients except
in the trivial case where β
ki
has the opposite sign compared with β
ji
for all j = k. Then
the only way to proceed is to compute the marginal eﬀect of interest explicitly. This may
be computationally demanding, however, since the cumulative incidence function and the
marginal eﬀects may not have closed-form expressions. This problem arises, for example,
3
See Gaynor et al. (1993) for the discussion of a similar example.
4
One can easily verify that ∂Πk(x)/∂xi = Πk(x)
∑
j =k
(
β
ki
− β
ji
)
Πj(x) and ∂ [1− S(t |x)]/∂xi =
S(t |x)Λ(t)
∑
j
β
ji
e
γ
j
+x
′
β
j .
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in the context of the simple parametric speciﬁcations of the Weibull and Log-Logistic
hazards. Thomas (1996), for example, simulates the marginal eﬀects for a competing risks
Weibull model by evaluating the probability of exiting due to a given cause at various
values of covariates using numerical methods to compute the integral in (V.3).
5
It should be stressed that a good ﬁt of Fk(t |x) from the hazard estimates requires that
all cause-speciﬁc hazards are appropriately speciﬁed. This suggests that the proportional
risks model, even in the absence of parametric restrictions on the shape of the common
baseline hazard, and fully parametric hazard speciﬁcations are likely to be too restric-
tive for most applications. The piecewise constant hazard speciﬁcation provides a more
attractive alternative, at least for two reasons. First, without parametric restrictions on
the shape of the hazard functions, it is very ﬂexible, which is crucial for obtaining an
accurate ﬁt of the cumulative incidence function. Second, besides being very ﬂexible, the
speciﬁcation results in simple closed-form solutions for the cumulative incidence function
and marginal eﬀects.
2.2 Piecewise constant hazard speciﬁcation
Suppose the time axis is divided into M intervals (cm−1, cm], m = 1, 2, ...,M, with c0 ≡ 0
and cM ≡ ∞. The hazard function for exit from cause k at time t ∈ (cm−1, cm] is
parametrized as
θk(t |x) ≡ θ
m
k
(x) = e
α
h
k
+x
′
β
k , (V.7)
where e
α
h
k equals the cause-speciﬁc hazard in interval m for a reference individual with
x = 0 (i.e. baseline hazard). The hazard functions are constant within each interval
but can vary across intervals. Any duration dependence can be approximated arbitrarily
closely by increasing the number of time intervals. The integrated hazard for cause k at
time t ∈ (cm−1, cm] is given by
Λk(t |x) =
m−1∑
h=1
∫
ch
ch−1
θ
h
k
(x)du+
∫
t
cm−1
θ
m
k
(x)du
=
m−1∑
h=1
e
α
h
k
+x
′
β
k∆ch + e
α
m
k
+x
′
β
k (t− cm−1) , (V.8)
where ∆ch ≡ ch − ch−1.
We can express the cumulative probability of exiting from cause k by time t ∈ (cm−1, cm]
5
Andrews et al. (2002) summarize their results from a competing risks proportional hazard model in
terms of the eﬀects of covariates on the probability of exit due to cause k conditional on exiting at time
t. This conditional exit probability equals the ratio of hazard k to the overall hazard at time t. They
justify their approach by pointing out that these eﬀects are computationally much easier to obtain than
covariates eﬀects on the likelihood of eventually exiting from cause k. This is true, but the approaches are
quite diﬀerent. If the latter eﬀects are of interest, computing only the former eﬀects does not help.
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as
Fk(t |x) =
m−1∑
h=1
∫
ch
ch−1
θ
h
k
(x)S(u |x) du+
∫
t
cm−1
θ
m
k
(x)S(u |x) du
=
m−1∑
h=1
Pk(∆ch |x) +Pk(t− cm−1 |x) , (V.9)
where
Pk(∆ch |x) ≡ π
h
k
(x) [S(ch−1 |x)− S(ch |x)]
denotes the probability of exiting during interval h from cause k, which equals the prod-
uct of the overall probability of exiting during interval h, S(ch−1 |x) − S(ch |x) , and the
probability that the exit is from cause k conditional on exiting,
π
h
k
(x) ≡
θ
h
k
(x)∑
K
j=1
θ
h
j
(x)
.
Thus Fk(t |x) can be computed as the sum of the survivor functions weighted by the ratio
of interval-speciﬁc hazards.
The marginal eﬀect of a continuous variable, xi, at time t ∈ (cm−1, cm] is computed as
∂Fk(t |x)
∂xi
=
m−1∑
h=1
∂Pk(∆ch |x)
∂xi
+
∂Pk(t− cm−1 |x)
∂xi
, (V.10)
where
∂Pk(∆ch |x)
∂xi
= π
h
k
(x) [S(ch−1 |x)− S(ch |x)]
∑
j =k
π
h
j
(x)
(
β
ki
− β
ji
)
(V.11)
+π
h
k
(x)
∑
j
[S(ch |x) Λj(ch |x)− S(ch−1 |x)Λj(ch−1 |x)]βji,
which equals the sum of the direct eﬀect via hazard k
∂
2
Pk(∆ch |x)
∂θk∂xi
= π
h
k
(x)
[
1− πh
k
(x)
]
[S(ch−1 |x)− S(ch |x)]βki
+π
h
k
(x) [S(ch |x)Λk(ch |x)− S(ch−1 |x)Λk(ch−1 |x)] βki,
and the indirect eﬀects via hazards j = k
∂
2
Pk(∆ch |x)
∂θj∂xi
= −πh
k
(x)π
h
j
(x) [S(ch−1 |x)− S(ch |x)] βji
+π
h
k
(x) [S(ch |x)Λj(ch |x)− S(ch−1 |x) Λj(ch−1 |x)]βji.
Since the right-hand side of (V.11) does not include anything more than the sums and
products of survivor functions, hazard functions, and coeﬃcients, the marginal eﬀects of
continuous covariates can be easily computed from the standard hazard function estimates.
The marginal eﬀects for discrete covariates are even simpler to obtain. We just take the
diﬀerence in Fk(t |x) evaluated at two diﬀerent values of the covariate of interest, holding
all other covariates constant. The direct and indirect eﬀects via a particular hazard can
be obtained by allowing the covariate of interest to change only in that hazard.
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2.3 Estimation and statistical inference
The maximum likelihood estimation of unknown hazard function parameters is straight-
forward. Consider an individual l with characteristics xl who left the initial state at time
tl ∈ (cm−1, cm] . Let dkl = 1 if the exit was due to cause k, and dkl = 0 otherwise. If the
spell is censored,
∑
K
k=1
dkl = 0. The contribution of this observation to the log-likelihood
function is given by
Ll =
K∑
k=1
dkl ln θk(tl |xl) + lnS(tl |xl)
=
K∑
k=1
(
dkl
(
α
m
k
+ x
′
l
β
k
)
−
m−1∑
h=1
e
α
h
k
+x
′
l
β
k∆ch − e
α
m
k
+x
′
l
β
k (tl − cm−1)
)
. (V.12)
The log-likelihood function of the model is maximized with respect to φ = (φ
1
,φ
2
, ...,φ
K
),
where φ
k
= (α
1
k
, α
2
k
, ...., α
M
k
,β
k
). Since ∂
2Ll/∂φj∂φ
′
k
= 0 for all j = k, the ML estimators
of φ
j
and φ
k
are statistically independent for all j = k, a common property of independent
risks duration models. The asymptotic distribution of the ML estimator φ̂ is N(φ,Σ),
where Σ is the block-diagonal matrix of the covariance matrixes of φ
j
, j = 1, 2, ..., K.
Given the properties of the ML estimator φ̂, we can derive asymptotic distributions
for the estimators of the cumulative incidence functions and marginal eﬀects using the
delta method. The asymptotic distribution of F̂k(t |x) is given by
√
n
[
F̂k(t |x)− Fk(t |x)
]
as
→ N
⎛
⎝0,
K∑
j=1
(
∂Fk(t |x)
∂φ
′
j
)
Σj
(
∂Fk(t |x)
∂φ
j
)⎞
⎠ , (V.13)
where n is the sample size and Σj is the covariance matrix of φj . Let δ̂k(t |x) be the
vector of estimators for the marginal eﬀects of both continuous and discrete covariates
with respect to Fk(t |x). Its asymptotic distribution is given by
√
n
[
δ̂k(t |x)− δk(t |x)
]
as
→ N
⎛
⎝0,
K∑
j=1
(
∂δk(t |x)
∂φ
′
j
)
Σj
(
∂δk(t |x)
∂φ
j
)⎞
⎠ . (V.14)
The additive structures of the variance in (V.13) and the covariance matrix in (V.14)
result from the block-diagonality of Σ.
To summarize, we ﬁrst obtain the ML estimate of φ by maximising the log-likelihood
function based on (V.12). In the second stage we compute the estimates of cumulative
incidence functions and marginal eﬀects at φ̂. The standard errors and conﬁdence intervals
of these two-step estimators are obtained from (V.13) and (V.14) by replacing Σj ’s with
their ML estimates and evaluating the derivatives of Fk(t |x) and δk(t |x) numerically at
φ̂.
6
In the empirical application we report δk(t |x) at the sample mean of x. We also
examine the distribution of marginal eﬀects over observations. To assess the ﬁt of the
model, one may contrast the nonparametric estimate of Fk(t) with the model’s estimate
of the marginal cumulative incidence function, n
−1
∑
n
l=1
F̂k(t |xl).
6
One can derive the analytical expression for ∂δk(t |x)/∂φj but it is rather messy.
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3 Empirical application
3.1 Data
Our data come from the records of the Employment Statistics database of Statistics Fin-
land. This database merges information from over 20 administrative registers for all people
with permanent residence in Finland. Along with standard socio-demographic background
variables, the database includes detailed information on annual income (from the tax au-
thorities), job spells (from the pension institutes), unemployment spells and participation
in labour market programmes (from the employment oﬃces). Our sample includes workers
aged 25 to 50 who lost their private-sector job and entered unemployment in 1998, having
been employed for the past year. Workers who have been working and contributing insur-
ance payments to an unemployment fund for at least 10 months during the two years prior
to unemployment are eligible for earnings-related UI beneﬁts, which can be collected for
the maximum duration of two years. We focus on this group by excluding workers whose
unemployment beneﬁts do not exceed 14 euros per day, which equals the maximum level
of the basic allowance. In addition, observations with the replacement rate above one or
unemployment beneﬁts exceeding 100 euros per day are excluded, due to likely errors in
income variables.
For each worker we observe the length of the unemployment spell in days, exit desti-
nation, and a number of background variables. An unemployment spell may end owing
to one of three causes: a person returns to work, enters a labour market programme (relief
work or training course), or withdraws from the labour force. Those whose exit desti-
nation is not known are assumed to be withdrawn from the labour force, which is likely
the case, as activities outside the labour force are not well documented in the data. All
unemployment spells that continued beyond the end of 2000 are recorded as censored.
Table V.1 reports the sample means of the explanatory variables used in the analysis.
The sample deviations are given in parentheses for non-dummy variables. Some 40% of
individuals are female and roughly half are married. The average age is slightly below
38. Commercial, clerical, and industrial work are the most typical occupations among
the unemployed. Over 70% of individuals were unemployed previously in the 1990s. This
high fraction is explained by the fact that the early 1990s was a time of record high
unemployment in Finland. The mean replacement rate, the ratio of UI beneﬁts to earnings
in 1997, is 0.49, which seems rather meaningful, as the gross replacement rate for a worker
with median earnings is 0.55 (Koskela and Uusitalo, 2006). In the empirical analysis the
continuous and discrete covariates are measured in deviation from the sample mean.
We divide the time axis, i.e. the duration of unemployment, into intervals of one to two
months on the basis of observations available for estimation. The frequency of observed
exits from diﬀerent causes over time is shown in Table V.2. It appears that 61% of the
unemployment spells eventually ended in employment, 27% in labour market programmes,
and 11% in withdrawal from the labour force. Less than 2% of the unemployment spells
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Table V.1: Deﬁnition of variables and sample statistics
Mean
(Std.dev.) Description
Married 0.4781 1 if married, 0 otherwise
Female 0.4185 1 if female, 0 otherwise
Dependent child 0.4353 1 if there is a child under age 17
in the family, 0 otherwise
Swedish 0.0316 1 if person speaks Swedish as
native language, 0 otherwise
Past unemployment 0.7273 1 if person experienced unemployment
in the early 1990s, 0 otherwise
Past recall 0.1904 1 if person experienced a temporary layoﬀ
in the early 1990s, 0 otherwise
Tenure 2.6270 Tenure with the last employer in years
(2.4466)
Age 37.6472 Age in years
(7.3811)
Occupation: Occupation reported to employment authorities
Commercial work 0.1191
Technical 0.0640
Sociological work 0.0323 Teacher, lawyer, humanist
Health care 0.0389
Clerical work 0.1230
Agricultural work 0.0230 Forest work, farming, ﬁshing
Transportation 0.0604
Industrial work 0.4215
Service work 0.1050
Not classiﬁed 0.0128
Wealth 5886 Taxable wealth in 1997, in euros
(16157)
Capital Income 279 Capital income in 1997, in euros
(2554)
Debt 10243 Debts in 1997, in euros
(15206)
Replacement rate 0.4887 UI beneﬁts / Earnings in 1997
(0.1421)
were still in progress at the end of 2000 and hence treated as censored.
3.2 Results
Cause-speciﬁc hazards, evaluated at the sample mean of the covariates, are shown in Fig-
ure V.1. Over the ﬁrst months of unemployment the employment hazard is very high but
decreases steeply and crosses the hazard for labour market programmes at 12 months,
remaining approximately constant thereafter. The hazard rate for labour market pro-
grammes increases slowly over the ﬁrst 12 months and exhibits level shifts at around one
and two years of unemployment. After 18 months of unemployment, a transition to a
labour market programme is the most likely way of escaping unemployment. Transitions
out of the labour force seem to be relatively rare. The hazard rate for labour market with-
drawal starts at a very low level but increases somewhat as unemployment is prolonged. A
number of studies have found that the hazard rates out of unemployment increase just prior
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Table V.2: Exits to diﬀerent states and risk set by duration interval
Exits to
Labour Outside
Time market labour Risk
Interval Work progr. force set
(0,1] 1721 329 189 13501
(1,2] 1613 401 122 11262
(2,3] 1063 269 112 9126
(3,4] 824 286 101 7682
(4,5] 563 221 71 6471
(5,6] 469 176 90 5616
(6,7] 326 184 92 4881
(7,8] 260 164 68 4279
(8,9] 212 121 52 3787
(9,10] 166 121 50 3402
(10,11] 140 124 61 3065
(11,12] 120 114 42 2740
(12,14] 177 299 72 2464
(14,16] 112 187 73 1916
(16,18] 126 142 59 1544
(18,20] 86 131 52 1217
(20,22] 69 80 38 948
(22,24] 54 89 39 761
(24,26] 39 71 35 577
(26,28] 23 45 27 386
(28,30] 16 24 10 248
(30,∞) 13 24 14 158
Sum 8192 3602 1469
(%) (60.7) (26.7) (10.9)
Notes: Risk set is the number of spells in progress at the beginning of the time interval.
to the exhaustion of UI beneﬁts. We ﬁnd no evidence of spikes in the employment hazard
and only a moderate level shift in the hazard for labour market programmes around two
years of unemployment when UI beneﬁts lapse. Although someone might have expected
a larger increase in the employment hazard close to beneﬁt exhaustion, these ﬁndings are
consistent with previous evidence for the Nordic countries, where active labour market
policy has an important role by international standards (e.g. Carling et al., 1996, and
Koskela and Uusitalo, 2006)
Figure V.2 depicts the marginal distribution function and marginal cumulative inci-
dence functions for each cause of exit. These curves were computed by averaging the
estimates of individual level curves. If the corresponding non-parametric estimates are
added to the same graph, they will be basically identical to the marginal curves obtained
from our model, implying a good ﬁt of the model. The cumulative incidence function
for employment increases steeply over the ﬁrst 12 months of unemployment, remaining
almost unchanged for the rest of the period. The likelihood of escaping unemployment
eventually to employment is close to 60%. The cumulative incidence of participating in
labour market programmes and that of withdrawing from the labour force increase more
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Figure V.1: Cause-speciﬁc hazards evaluated at the sample mean of covariates
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smoothly over a longer period. The unemployed are estimated to leave unemployment via
labour market programmes with a probability of 25%t on average, while the likelihood of
labour force withdrawal is some 10%.
The estimated hazard coeﬃcients for covariates are given in Table V.3. Table V.4
reports the marginal eﬀects at the sample mean of covariates, decomposed into direct and
indirect eﬀects, on the overall probability of exiting from a given cause. Evolution of the
overall marginal eﬀects over the observation period is shown in Figures V.3, V.4, and V.5
in the Appendix. We do not report the marginal eﬀects for the occupational dummies
in order to reduce the reported numbers. The marginal eﬀects of continuous variables
(wealth, capital income, debt, and the replacement rate) are based on derivatives and
those of discrete variables were obtained by taking the diﬀerences. Age, tenure, and the
continuous variables are measured in deviation from their sample mean. As a result, the
marginal eﬀects of age and tenure correspond to one year’s increase from their mean values.
For discrete covariates we also report the sum of partial eﬀects in the last column, since
the partial eﬀects do not total the overall eﬀect in their case. Since these sums are very
close to the overall marginal eﬀects in each case, decomposing the overall marginal eﬀects
of discrete covariates into the partial marginal eﬀects seems reasonable as well.
A comparison of Table V.3 and Panel A of Table V.4 suggests that the eﬀects of
covariates on the employment hazard are very similar to their overall marginal eﬀects on
the overall incidence of employment. Covariates with statistically signiﬁcant hazard eﬀects
are associated with the signiﬁcant eﬀects of the same sign on the overall probability of
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Figure V.2: Marginal cumulative incidence functions
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employment. The only exception is the amount of debt, which increases the employment
hazard signiﬁcantly but has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the overall incidence of employment.
This can be understood by noting that the debts also increase the hazard for labour
market programmes. The relative importance of this indirect eﬀect increases over time
as a transition to employment becomes less likely compared with a transition to a labour
market programme (see Figure V.1). As a result, the eﬀect of debts increases the likelihood
of ﬁnding a job within two years of unemployment but loses its signiﬁcancy since then (see
Figure V.3).
From Table V.3 we observe that the hazard rate to employment is 20% lower for
women than men (because e
−0.2195 ≈ 0.80). But this observation does not tell us how
much less likely women’s unemployment spells will end with employment. To answer
this question we must take into account women’s higher hazard rates for labour market
programmes and out of the labour force. We see from Table V.4 that the likelihood of
leaving unemployment via employment is 10.1 percentage points lower for women. This
gender gap would shrink to 6.7 percentage points in the absence of sex diﬀerences in the
hazards for labour market programmes and labour market withdrawal. Turning to the
incentive issues, it is interesting to note that the eﬀects of the replacement rate on the
hazards for employment and labour market programmes are of the same magnitude but in
opposite directions. The former eﬀect contributes more to the likelihood of exiting from
various causes, as the employment hazard is higher for most of the time and especially in
the early phases of unemployment. A ten percentage points increase in the replacement
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Table V.3: Coeﬃcients of covariates for cause-speciﬁc hazard functions
Labour market Outside labour
Employment programmes force
Married 0.1830 (0.0253)
∗∗∗
−0.0235 (0.0371) 0.0292 (0.0584)
Female −0.2195 (0.0280)
∗∗∗
0.1627 (0.0397)
∗∗∗
0.2986 (0.0620)
∗∗∗
Dependent child 0.1512 (0.0247)
∗∗∗
0.0923 (0.0366)
∗∗
−0.2459 (0.0593)
∗∗∗
Swedish 0.0451 (0.0646) 0.1266 (0.0933) 0.1608 (0.1420)
Past unemployment 0.3195 (0.0297)
∗∗∗
0.0427 (0.0388) −0.0830 (0.0607)
Past recall 0.5199 (0.0276)
∗∗∗
−0.2600 (0.0607)
∗∗∗
−0.0655 (0.0910)
Tenure −0.0321 (0.0050)
∗∗∗
0.0011 (0.0071) −0.0307 (0.0113)
∗∗∗
Age −0.0146 (0.0017)
∗∗∗
−0.0082 (0.0026)
∗∗∗
−0.0242 (0.0040)
∗∗∗
Occupation:
Technical 0.1698 (0.0572)
∗∗∗
0.2390 (0.0794)
∗∗∗
−0.0307 (0.1454)
Sociological work 0.3074 (0.0727)
∗∗∗
0.0081 (0.1033) 0.4425 (0.1426)
∗∗∗
Health care 0.3581 (0.0688)
∗∗∗
0.0493 (0.0901) 0.2916 (0.1404)
∗∗
Clerical work 0.0175 (0.0514) 0.1911 (0.0569)
∗∗∗
0.1326 (0.0982)
Agricultural work 0.6916 (0.0748)
∗∗∗
−0.2328 (0.1588) 0.3214 (0.2064)
Transportation 0.2328 (0.0581)
∗∗∗
−0.1915 (0.0880)
∗∗
0.1782 (0.1300)
Industrial work 0.3617 (0.0414)
∗∗∗
−0.1635 (0.0534)
∗∗∗
−0.0139 (0.0885)
Service work 0.2273 (0.0510)
∗∗∗
−0.1644 (0.0642)
∗∗
0.2780 (0.0980)
∗∗∗
Not classiﬁed −0.3619 (0.1295)
∗∗∗
−0.3143 (0.1405)
∗∗
0.5233 (0.1665)
∗∗∗
ln Wealth 0.0194 (0.0028)
∗∗∗
0.0127 (0.0043)
∗∗∗
0.0018 (0.0070)
ln Capital income 0.0011 (0.0053) 0.0102 (0.0080) 0.0315 (0.0123)
∗∗
ln Debt 0.0101 (0.0027)
∗∗∗
0.0137 (0.0040)
∗∗∗
−0.0008 (0.0063)
Replacement rate −1.8561 (0.0930)
∗∗∗
1.8543 (0.1290)
∗∗∗
0.1609 (0.2141)
Notes: The number of observations is 13,501. The mean log-likelihood is —3.54322. The reference
occupation is commercial work. Age, tenure, and income variables are measured in deviation from their
sample mean. The standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10,
5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
rate would lead to a decline of 7.9 percentage points in the employment probability, of
which 5.7 percentage points is attributable to the decrease in the employment hazard.
In terms of the sign or statistical signiﬁcance there are no notable diﬀerences between
the eﬀects of covariates on the employment hazard and their marginal eﬀects on the
cumulative likelihood of employment. In other words, the indirect eﬀects via the hazards
for labour market programmes and labour market withdrawal play a relatively small role.
This is what one should expect, as the employment hazard is quantitatively the most
important one and some 60% of individuals eventually escape from unemployment to
employment. By the same way of reasoning, we should expect the indirect eﬀects via
competing hazards to account for a larger part of the overall marginal eﬀects on the
incidence functions for the two other exit causes.
Being married or having experienced a spell of unemployment in the past have no
signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hazard rate for labour market programmes in Table V.3. However,
these covariates signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of exiting via labour market programmes
(see the overall marginal eﬀects in Panel B of Table V.4). In both cases the signiﬁcant
overall marginal eﬀect stems from a strong indirect eﬀect via the employment hazard.
The opposite pattern is found for the dummy of a dependent child. Having a child under
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Table V.4: Marginal eﬀects for the overall probability of exiting from a given cause
Partial eﬀect via hazard Overall Sum of
function for marginal partial
Empl. LMP Out eﬀect Std. Err. eﬀects
Panel A: Likelihood of ﬁnding a job
Married 0.0562 0.0028 −0.0014 0.0574 (0.0093)
∗∗∗
0.0575
Female −0.0673 −0.0193 −0.0154 −0.1011 (0.0102)
∗∗∗
−0.1020
Dependent child 0.0464 −0.0105 0.0123 0.0475 (0.0091)
∗∗∗
0.0482
Swedish 0.0138 −0.0150 −0.0084 −0.0089 (0.0237) −0.0096
Past unemployment 0.0989 −0.0048 0.0042 0.0982 (0.0107)
∗∗∗
0.0983
Past recall 0.1526 0.0293 0.0031 0.1816 (0.0103)
∗∗∗
0.1849
Tenure −0.0099 −0.0001 0.0015 −0.0085 (0.0018)
∗∗∗
−0.0085
Age −0.0045 0.0010 0.0012 −0.0024 (0.0006)
∗∗∗
−0.0024
ln Wealth 0.0060 −0.0015 −0.0001 0.0044 (0.0011)
∗∗∗
ln Capital income 0.0003 −0.0012 −0.0015 −0.0024 (0.0020)
ln Debt 0.0031 −0.0016 0.0000 0.0016 (0.0010)
Replacement rate −0.5706 −0.2150 −0.0079 −0.7935 (0.0340)
∗∗∗
Panel B: Likelihood of entering labour market programmes
Married −0.0397 −0.0039 −0.0014 −0.0444 (0.0084)
∗∗∗
−0.0451
Female 0.0479 0.0252 −0.0113 0.0603 (0.0093)
∗∗∗
0.0619
Dependent child −0.0311 0.0153 0.0114 −0.0076 (0.0083) −0.0044
Swedish −0.0097 0.0207 −0.0072 0.0037 (0.0215) 0.0038
Past unemployment −0.0674 0.0075 0.0048 −0.0577 (0.0097)
∗∗∗
−0.0551
Past recall −0.1085 −0.0428 0.0032 −0.1388 (0.0092)
∗∗∗
−0.1481
Tenure 0.0069 0.0002 0.0013 0.0085 (0.0017)
∗∗∗
0.0084
Age 0.0032 −0.0013 0.0010 0.0029 (0.0006)
∗∗∗
0.0029
ln Wealth −0.0042 0.0020 −0.0001 −0.0022 (0.0010)
∗∗
ln Capital income −0.0002 0.0016 −0.0014 0.0000 (0.0018)
ln Debt −0.0022 0.0022 0.0000 0.0001 (0.0009)
Replacement rate 0.4004 0.2984 −0.0069 0.6920 (0.0302)
∗∗∗
Panel C: Likelihood of labour market withdrawal
Married −0.0164 0.0012 0.0028 −0.0130 (0.0061)
∗∗
−0.0124
Female 0.0194 −0.0059 0.0266 0.0408 (0.0068)
∗∗∗
0.0401
Dependent child −0.0153 −0.0048 −0.0237 −0.0399 (0.0059)
∗∗∗
−0.0438
Swedish −0.0041 −0.0057 0.0156 0.0051 (0.0155) 0.0058
Past unemployment −0.0315 −0.0027 −0.0091 −0.0405 (0.0073)
∗∗∗
−0.0432
Past recall −0.0440 0.0135 −0.0063 −0.0428 (0.0070)
∗∗∗
−0.0368
Tenure 0.0030 0.0000 −0.0028 0.0000 (0.0012) 0.0001
Age 0.0013 0.0004 −0.0022 −0.0005 (0.0004) −0.0005
ln Wealth −0.0018 −0.0006 0.0002 −0.0022 (0.0007)
∗∗∗
ln Capital income −0.0001 −0.0005 0.0029 0.0023 (0.0013)
∗
ln Debt −0.0009 −0.0006 −0.0001 −0.0016 (0.0007)
∗∗
Replacement rate 0.1701 −0.0834 0.0148 0.1016 (0.0221)
∗∗∗
Notes: The marginal eﬀects are evaluated at the sample mean of covariates, and computed using partial
derivatives for continuous variables and using diﬀerences for discrete variables. *, **, and *** denote
statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. The last column shows the sum of
partial eﬀects for discrete variables. The marginal eﬀects for the occupational dummies are not reported.
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age 17 in the family increases the hazard for labour market programmes signiﬁcantly but
does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of leaving unemployment via such programmes.
In two cases the indirect eﬀects are strong enough to turn the overall marginal eﬀect in
the opposite direction from that of the direct eﬀect. One year’s increase in age increases
the hazard for labour market programmes but decreases the likelihood that the worker
will eventually escape from unemployment via such a programme. Although both eﬀects
are quantitatively very small, they are statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional risk
level. Also, the amount of taxable wealth has opposite eﬀects on the hazard and incidence
functions for labour market programmes.
From Panel C of Table V.4 we see that amounts of taxable wealth and debts, having
experienced unemployment or a recall in the past, being married, and the replacement
rate all signiﬁcantly aﬀect the likelihood of labour market withdrawal, but none of these
variables have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hazard rate out of the labour force.
By contrast, age and capital income have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the hazard rate
out of the labour force, while their overall eﬀects on the likelihood of leaving the labour
force do not diﬀer from zero at the 5% risk level.
Since the spell of unemployment must eventually end in one way or another, the sum
of the marginal eﬀects on the likelihood of exiting from diﬀerent causes must equal zero
in Table V.4. For example, a ten percentage increase in the replacement rate is predicted
to raise the ﬂow to labour market programmes by 6.9 percentage points and the ﬂow out
of the labour force by one percentage point. These increases occur at the expense of a
decline of 7.9 percentage points in the ﬂow out of unemployment to employment. When
we look at changes in the cumulative incidence functions by the end of some limited time
period, say by one year, the sum of the marginal eﬀects need not be zero, as the expected
duration of the spell can change as well.
The size of the marginal eﬀect of a covariate depends on the values of all covariates,
and hence the marginal eﬀects vary across individuals in the sample. This is illustrated in
Table V.5, where the distributions of marginal eﬀects on the overall likelihood of exiting
from competing causes are shown. Marginal eﬀects on the overall incidence of employment
in Panel A exhibit a considerable amount of variation across individuals but always have
the same sign for all individuals. This is not the case for marginal eﬀects on the overall
probabilities of entering labour market programmes and labour market withdrawal. Panels
B and C show that for many covariates the sign of the marginal eﬀect diﬀers between
diﬀerent individuals. For example, an increase in the replacement rate is predicted to
encourage some individuals to stay in the labour market but will induce some others to
withdraw from the labour force.
Obviously it is possible that the marginal eﬀect of a covariate does not diﬀer signiﬁ-
cantly from zero when evaluated at the sample mean of covariates but takes large positive
and/or negative values when evaluated at some other values of covariates. Therefore a
policy variable of interest may have no eﬀect on average but still have a strong eﬀect within
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Table V.5: Distributions of marginal eﬀects for the overall probability of exiting from a
given cause
Min P5 Q1 Median Q3 P95 Max Mean
Panel A: Likelihood of ﬁnding a job
Married 0.0071 0.0249 0.0450 0.0533 0.0569 0.0586 0.0600 0.0491
Female −0.1088 −0.1033 −0.1004 −0.0961 −0.0842 −0.0535 −0.0188 −0.0896
Dependent child 0.0080 0.0212 0.0365 0.0429 0.0470 0.0524 0.0648 0.0407
Swedish −0.0133 −0.0101 −0.0089 −0.0082 −0.0073 −0.0053 −0.0027 −0.0080
Past unemployment 0.0145 0.0492 0.0799 0.0916 0.0968 0.0999 0.1059 0.0855
Past recall 0.0362 0.0960 0.1447 0.1740 0.1880 0.1940 0.1983 0.1625
Tenure −0.0094 −0.0089 −0.0084 −0.0078 −0.0066 −0.0035 −0.0006 −0.0072
Age −0.0028 −0.0025 −0.0023 −0.0021 −0.0018 −0.0008 0.0000 −0.0020
ln Wealth 0.0004 0.0018 0.0034 0.0040 0.0043 0.0046 0.0052 0.0037
ln Capital income −0.0037 −0.0028 −0.0024 −0.0022 −0.0019 −0.0012 −0.0005 −0.0021
ln Debt 0.0001 0.0006 0.0011 0.0014 0.0016 0.0018 0.0024 0.0013
Replacement rate −0.8624 −0.8184 −0.7848 −0.7347 −0.6247 −0.3452 −0.0970 −0.6795
Panel B: Likelihood of entering labour market programmes
Married −0.0549 −0.0499 −0.0454 −0.0410 −0.0336 −0.0176 −0.0040 −0.0384
Female −0.0035 0.0282 0.0450 0.0536 0.0606 0.0691 0.0796 0.0519
Dependent child −0.0181 −0.0129 −0.0097 −0.0059 0.0023 0.0162 0.0542 −0.0028
Swedish −0.0042 0.0007 0.0024 0.0032 0.0039 0.0049 0.0075 0.0031
Past unemployment −0.0773 −0.0658 −0.0571 −0.0502 −0.0416 −0.0260 −0.0059 −0.0487
Past recall −0.1840 −0.1662 −0.1495 −0.1309 −0.1045 −0.0662 −0.0209 −0.1251
Tenure 0.0006 0.0031 0.0065 0.0083 0.0092 0.0096 0.0099 0.0076
Age 0.0002 0.0009 0.0021 0.0029 0.0033 0.0035 0.0037 0.0026
ln Wealth −0.0031 −0.0026 −0.0021 −0.0018 −0.0014 −0.0007 0.0010 −0.0017
ln Capital income −0.0035 −0.0014 −0.0005 0.0000 0.0003 0.0005 0.0008 −0.0002
ln Debt −0.0004 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0001 0.0005 0.0011 0.0025 0.0002
Replacement rate 0.0594 0.2645 0.5298 0.6627 0.7256 0.7784 0.8484 0.6087
Panel C: Likelihood of labour market withdrawal
Married −0.0308 −0.0184 −0.0138 −0.0106 −0.0076 −0.0035 0.0034 −0.0107
Female 0.0083 0.0203 0.0297 0.0374 0.0450 0.0565 0.0835 0.0377
Dependent child −0.0833 −0.0587 −0.0476 −0.0384 −0.0286 −0.0148 −0.0060 −0.0379
Swedish 0.0013 0.0026 0.0039 0.0049 0.0059 0.0077 0.0112 0.0050
Past unemployment −0.0814 −0.0555 −0.0441 −0.0367 −0.0290 −0.0190 −0.0068 −0.0368
Past recall −0.1011 −0.0611 −0.0458 −0.0370 −0.0277 −0.0166 0.0093 −0.0374
Tenure −0.0050 −0.0022 −0.0009 0.0000 0.0004 0.0008 0.0019 −0.0003
Age −0.0027 −0.0015 −0.0009 −0.0005 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0000 −0.0006
ln Wealth −0.0045 −0.0031 −0.0025 −0.0020 −0.0015 −0.0008 −0.0002 −0.0020
ln Capital income 0.0003 0.0009 0.0016 0.0023 0.0029 0.0036 0.0050 0.0023
ln Debt −0.0036 −0.0025 −0.0020 −0.0016 −0.0011 −0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0015
Replacement rate −0.2217 −0.0602 0.0358 0.0803 0.1162 0.1658 0.3021 0.0708
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some subgroup. In the treatment analysis it may be of considerable interest to examine
the variation in the treatment eﬀect on the likelihood of exiting from a given cause across
individuals and to detect subgroups who respond in diﬀerent ways.
The last column of Table V.5 reports the sample means of marginal eﬀects over indi-
viduals. Compared with the overall marginal eﬀects in Table V.4, these are qualitatively
equivalent and quantitatively rather similar. However, there are such diﬀerences that we
cannot argue that it would not matter at all whether the marginal eﬀects were computed
at the sample mean of covariates or as the sample mean of individual-speciﬁc marginal
eﬀects.
4 Some extensions
We have considered the marginal eﬀects associated with the proportional eﬀects of time-
invariant covariates on the cause-speciﬁc hazard functions in the absence of unmeasured
heterogeneity. Computation of marginal eﬀects can be modiﬁed in a straightforward way
for the piecewise constant hazard models with time-varying covariates, a more general
form of covariate eﬀects, and unobserved heterogeneity.
4.1 Time-varying covariates
In the presence of exogenous time-varying covariates (Lancaster, 1990, p. 28), we can
deﬁne hazard functions and various exit probabilities conditional on the time path of
covariates from the beginning of the spell to the current point of time. If the time-varying
covariates are constant within the duration intervals but vary across the intervals, only
minor notational changes to the previous analysis are required. Let xm be the vector
of covariate values for interval m (which may also include the past values of covariates).
We replace x with xm in the hazard function speciﬁcation (V.7). As a consequence, the
integrated hazard, survivor, and cumulative incidence functions at time t ∈ (cm−1, cm]
will depend on x1,x2, ...,xm. Given these changes, the cumulative incidence functions
and marginal eﬀects can be computed as before from (V.9), (V.10), and (V.11). The
cumulative incidence function now gives the probability of exiting from a particular cause
by a given time conditional on the time path of covariates up to that point. The marginal
eﬀect of a time-varying continuous covariate describes a change in this probability resulting
from a marginal change in the time path of the covariate. For a discrete covariate one
may compute the diﬀerence in the cumulative incidence functions associated with two
alternative time paths of the covariate, holding other covariates ﬁxed at some prespeciﬁed
values.
4.2 Time-varying coeﬃcients
The assumption that all covariates have proportional eﬀects on the underlying cause-
speciﬁc hazards is rather restrictive. This can be relaxed by introducing time-varying
172
coeﬃcients. Denote the vector of coeﬃcients for hazard k in interval m with β
m
k
, where
some of the coeﬃcients may vary across intervals. In this case β
m
k
replaces β
k
in the hazard
speciﬁcation (V.7), so that the integrated hazard, survivor, and cumulative incidence
functions at time t ∈ (cm−1, cm] will be functions of β
1
k
,β
2
k
, ...,β
m
k
, k = 1, 2, ...., K. After
these modiﬁcations, the cumulative incidence function can be computed as before from
(V.9). The marginal eﬀect of a continuous covariate i with a time-varying coeﬃcient is
obtained by substituting
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,
into (V.10). The marginal eﬀects of discrete covariates with time-varying coeﬃcients are
obtained by computing the diﬀerence in the cumulative incidence functions.
4.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Not all relevant covariates may be observed in the available data. A common approach to
deal with this issue is to introduce multiplicative individual-speciﬁc random eﬀects into the
hazard functions. Assume that the eﬀect of all unmeasured factors on the hazard for cause
k is captured by a scalar variable εk, which is unobserved, time-invariant, and independent
of x. The hazard function for exit from cause k at time t ∈ (cm−1, cm] conditional on x
and ε = (ε1, ε2, ..., εK) is
θk(t |x,ε) = εk
(
e
α
h
k
+x
′
β
k
)
= e
α
h
k
+˜x
′
˜
β
k .
where x˜ ≡ (1,x) and β˜
k
≡ (ln εk,βk) . With this reparametrization, it is easy to see that
Fk(t |x, ε) has an expression similar to Fk(t |x) in the absence of unobserved heterogene-
ity. In a special case of a discrete distribution for ε we can further integrate ε out as
Fk(t |x) =
∑
q
Pr (ε = ε
q
)Fk(t |x,ε
q
) , where the sum is over all possible realizations of
ε, resulting in a closed-form expression for Fk(t |x) and, hence, for marginal eﬀects. It
is worth emphasising that incorporating unobserved heterogeneity in this way leads to a
very general model. First, as the number of points of support increases, the discrete dis-
tribution can approximate any distribution of ε, even if the true underlying distribution
were continuous (Van den Berg, 2001). Second, the unobserved heterogeneity terms εk
can be correlated across k.
Thus one can compute the marginal eﬀects in a rather straightforward manner for
dependent competing risks models with unobserved heterogeneity of the unknown form.
Although the marginal eﬀects would be readily available in the second step, the identiﬁ-
cation and estimation of such a general model is another issue (see Heckman and Honoré,
1989, and Abbring and Van den Berg, 2003, for the identiﬁability of dependent risks mod-
els). The parameters of the heterogeneity distribution — the number of points of support,
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their location, and associated probabilities — must be estimated along with other parame-
ters. This can be a diﬃcult task even if we assume independence between the unobserved
heterogeneity components across the cause-speciﬁc hazards (see e.g. Baker and Melino,
2000). Usually either the hazard function or the heterogeneity distribution is character-
ized by a parametric form to minimize numerical diﬃculties (e.g. Heckman and Singer,
1984, Meyer, 1990, and Han and Hausman, 1990). Under the piecewise constant hazard
speciﬁcation with the discrete distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, this may imply
that only a few steps in the baseline hazards could be allowed for in empirical analysis.
5 Conclusions
This paper has aimed to highlight the potential beneﬁts of marginal eﬀects as a way of
summarizing the results of competing risks analysis. The marginal eﬀects, the eﬀects
of covariates on the cumulative incidence function, are directly interpretable in terms of
probabilities that are likely to be of interest in many applications. We derived analytical
solutions for the marginal eﬀects in the context of the piecewise constant hazard model.
In the empirical application the marginal eﬀects were contrasted with the standard hazard
function estimates obtained from the competing risks model of unemployment duration.
This exercise illustrated some issues that require attention when the researcher is interested
in the likelihood of exiting from a particular cause.
First, our ﬁndings conﬁrm the old claim that the eﬀect of the covariate on the hazard
function for a particular cause can diﬀer substantially from its eﬀect on the corresponding
cumulative incidence function. These two eﬀects were found to work in opposite directions
in many cases. Such a diﬀerence is driven by the indirect eﬀects via the competing hazards.
One can expect a potentially more important role for the indirect eﬀects in cases where
the level of the hazard function for the cause of primary interest is relatively low compared
with the competing hazards. Therefore, when exits due to the cause of primary interest are
relatively rare, one should pay particular attention to indirect eﬀects via the competing
hazards. Testing the eﬀect of a covariate on the cause-speciﬁc hazard and testing its
eﬀect on the likelihood of exiting from that cause are, of course, two diﬀerent issues. If
the latter eﬀect is of interest, one should not focus on the cause-speciﬁc hazard function
only but look at the marginal eﬀects on the cumulative incidence function as well. The
relative importance of partial eﬀects via diﬀerent hazards can be seen by decomposing the
marginal eﬀect into direct and indirect eﬀects.
Second, a considerable amount of variation existed in marginal eﬀects across individ-
uals and, in many cases, the marginal eﬀects worked in opposite directions for diﬀerent
subgroups. This degree of heterogeneity took place under the standard proportional haz-
ard speciﬁcation, where all covariates were assumed to have homogeneous proportional
eﬀects on the underlying cause-speciﬁc hazards. By exploring the distribution of marginal
eﬀects one can study heterogeneity in responses across individuals. This may be of con-
174
siderable interest in the evaluation of treatment eﬀects on the likelihood of exiting via a
particular route in the presence of competing risks.
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Figure V.3: Marginal eﬀects with 95% conﬁdence bands for the cumulative incidence
function for employment
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Figure V.4: Marginal eﬀects with 95% conﬁdence bands for the cumulative incidence
function for labour market programmes
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Figure V.5: Marginal eﬀects with 95% conﬁdence bands for the cumulative incidence
function for labour market withdrawal
-.030
-.027
-.024
-.021
-.018
-.015
-.012
-.009
-.006
-.003
.000
.003
.006
.009
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Married
Elapsed duration in months
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
.024
.028
.032
.036
.040
.044
.048
.052
.056
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Female
Elapsed duration in months
-.055
-.051
-.047
-.043
-.039
-.035
-.031
-.027
-.023
-.019
-.015
-.011
-.007
-.003
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Dependent child
Elapsed duration in months
-.024
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
.004
.008
.012
.016
.020
.024
.028
.032
.036
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Swedish speaking
Elapsed duration in months
-.052
-.048
-.044
-.040
-.036
-.032
-.028
-.024
-.020
-.016
-.012
-.008
-.004
.000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Past unemployment
Elapsed duration in months
-.060
-.050
-.040
-.030
-.020
-.010
.000
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Past recall
Elapsed duration in months
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Tenure
Elapsed duration in months
-.002
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Age
Elapsed duration in months
-.004
-.003
-.002
-.001
.000
.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
ln Wealth
Elapsed duration in months
-.001
.000
.001
.002
.003
.004
.005
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
ln Capital income
Elapsed duration in months
-.003
-.002
-.001
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
ln Debt
Elapsed duration in months
-.010
.000
.010
.020
.030
.040
.050
.060
.070
.080
.090
.100
.110
.120
.130
.140
.150
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34
Replacement rate
Elapsed duration in months
180
VATT-TUTKIMUKSIA -SARJASSA ILMESTYNEITÄ 
PUBLISHED VATT RESEARCH REPORTS
95. Junka Teuvo: Maailman kilpailukykyisin maa? Tuottavuus ja investoinnit Suomessa 
1975-2000. Helsinki 2003. 
96. Cogan Josehp – McDevitt James: Science, Technology and Innovation Policies in 
Selected small European Countries. Helsinki 2003. 
97. Perrels Adriaan – Kemppi Heikki: Liberalised Electricity Markets – Strengths and 
Weaknesses in Finland and Nordpool. Helsinki 2003. 
98. Sarvimäki Matti: Euroopan Unionin itälaajentuminen ja maahanmuutto Suomeen. 
Helsinki 2003. 
99. Räty Tarmo – Luoma Kalevi – Mäkinen Erkki – Vaarama Marja: The Factors 
Affecting the Use of Elderly Care and the Need for Resources by 2030 in Finland. 
Helsinki 2003. 
100. van Beers Cees: The Role of Foreign Direct Investments on Small Countries’ 
Competitive and Technological Position. Helsinki 2003. 
101. Kangasharju Aki: Maksaako asumistuen saaja muita korkeampaa vuokraa? Helsinki 
2003.
102. Honkatukia Juha – Forsström Juha – Tamminen Eero: Energiaverotuksen asema EU:n 
laajuisen päästökaupan yhteydessä. Loppuraportti. Helsinki 2003. 
103. Simai Mihály (ed.): Practical Guide for Active National Policy Makers – what 
Science and Technology Policy Can and Cannot Do? Helsinki 2003. 
104. Luoma Arto – Luoto Jani – Siivonen Erkki: Growth, Institutions and Productivity: An 
empirical analysis using the Bayesian approach. Helsinki 2003. 
105. Montén Seppo – Tuomala Juha: Muuttoliike, työssäkäynti ja työvoimavarat 
Uudellamaalla. Helsinki 2003. 
106. Venetoklis Takis: An Evaluation of Wage Subsidy Programs to SMEs Utilising 
Propensity Score Matching. Helsinki 2004. 
107. Räisänen Heikki: Työvoiman hankinta julkisessa työnvälityksessä. Helsinki 2004. 
108. Romppanen Antti: Vakaus- ja kasvusopimuksen ensimmäiset vuodet. Helsinki 2004. 
109. Vaittinen Risto: Trade Policies and Integration – Evaluations with CGE Models. 
Helsinki 2004. 
110. Hjerppe Reino – Kiander Jaakko (eds.): Technology Policy and Knowledge-Based 
Growth in small Countries. Helsinki 2004. 
111. Sinko Pekka: Essays on Labour Taxation and Unemployment Insurance. Helsinki 
2004.
112. Kiander Jaakko – Martikainen Minna – Voipio Iikko: Yrittäjyyden tila 2002-2004. 
Helsinki 2004. 
113. Kilponen Juha – Santavirta Torsten: Competition and Innovation – Microeconomic 
Evidence Using Finnish Data. Helsinki 2004. 
114. Kiander Jaakko – Venetoklis Takis: Spending Preferences of Public Sector Officials. 
Survey Evidence from the Finnish Central Government. Helsinki 2004. 
115. Hämäläinen Kari – Ollikainen Virve: Differential Effects of Active Labour Market 
Programmes in the Early Stages of Young People’s Unemployment. Helsinki 2004. 
116. Räisänen Heikki: Recent Labour Market Developments in Europe. Helsinki 2005. 
117. Ropponen Olli: Kokonaiskulutuksen kehitys Suomessa talouden ulkopuolisten 
tekijöiden suhteen vuosina 1985–2001. Helsinki 2005. 
118. Räty Tarmo – Luoma Kalevi – Aaltonen Juho – Järviö Maija-Liisa: Productivity and 
Its Drivers in Finnish Primary Care 1988–2003. Helsinki 2005. 
119. Kangasharju Aki – Aaltonen Juho: Kunnallisen päivähoidon yksikkökustannukset: 
Miksi kunnat ovat niin erilaisia? Helsinki 2006. 
120. Perrels Adriaan – Ahlqvist Kirsti – Heiskanen Eva – Lahti Pekka: Kestävän 
kulutuksen mahdollisuudet ekotehokkaassa elinympäristössä. Helsinki 2006. 
121. Berghäll Elina – Junka Teuvo – Kiander Jaakko: T&K, tuottavuus ja taloudellinen 
kasvu. Helsinki 2006. 
122. Rauhanen Timo – Peltoniemi Ari: Elintarvikkeiden ja ruokapalveluiden 
arvonlisäverotus EU:ssa ja Suomessa. Helsinki 2006. 
123. Kiander Jaakko – Martikainen Minna – Pihkala Timo – Voipio Iikko: Yritysten 
toimintaympäristö: Kyselytutkimuksen tuloksia vuosilta 2002–2005. Helsinki 2006. 
124. Räty Tarmo – Kivistö Jussi: Mitattavissa oleva tuottavuus Suomen yliopistoissa. 
Helsinki 2006. 
125. Teppala Tiina: Kulutusverotus teoriasta käytäntöön – Vaikuttaako arvonlisäverotus 
kuluttajahintoihin? Helsinki 2006. 
126. Ulvinen Hanna: Suomen elintarvike- ja ruokapalvelualan rakenne, kilpailullisuus ja 
taloudellinen suorituskyky. Helsinki 2006. 
127. Aaltonen Juho – Kirjavainen Tanja – Moisio Antti: Efficiency and Productivity in 
Finnish Comprehensive Schooling 1998–2004. Helsinki 2006. 
128. Mattila-Wiro Päivi: Changes in the Distribution of Economic Wellbeing in Finland. 
Helsinki 2006. 
129. Kiander Jaakko: Julkisen talouden liikkumavara vuoteen 2030 mennessä. Helsinki 
2007.
130. Lintunen Jussi: Tuloerojen ja taloudellisen eriarvoisuuden mittaamisesta: Sovellus 
Suomen kulutustutkimuksilla. Helsinki 2007. 
131. Kirjavainen Tanja: Nuorten lukiokoulutuksen tehokkuus 2000–2004. Helsinki 2007. 
132. Ollikainen Virve: Ammatillisen peruskoulutuksen kustannustehokkuus 2001–2003. 
Helsinki 2007. 
